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Our recent experiences with federal agenciesand their
ham-handed approach causes me serious concern
about taking action that increases their authority in
local matters. The possibility of greater federal
involvement in state or local management or interference with economic development is unacceptable.
Frankly, the unilateral actions of federal agencies
without consultation with state or local government
impedes rather than facilitatesprogress and I have
had enough. Members of Congress agree that their
good intentions to protect the environment become an
open door for agencies to run amuck.'

The long-held notion that the federal government is not in
the business of attempting to influence the outcome of state,
local, and private land use decisions is no longer even remotely
tenable.2 To be sure, local zoning practices continue to dictate
1. Letter from Ann Richards, Governor, State of Texas, to John Hall,
Chairman, Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission 1 (July 25, 1994)
(on file with author) (advising Chairman Hall that his agency should not support
efforts to designate Barton Creek, located in Austin, Texas, a protected watershed
under the Clean Water Act).
2. In 1988 I claimed that "the local grip on land planning has remained
tight" and "[tihe federal role.., has been largely passive." J.B. Ruhl, Interstate
Pollution Control and Resource Development Planning: Outmoded Approaches or
Outmoded Politics?,28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 293,309 (1988). Another commentator
posited in 1991 that "[tihe federal government, for the most part, has been
reluctant to intrude on state and local land use decisionmaking [sic] authority."
Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection of Biological
Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 289 (1991). Times change. In fairness to myself
and others (there are more than two of us) who have uttered similar words,
however, it is true that the federal government has not flirted with involving itself
directly in local land use decision-making since the failed efforts to do so of the
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the basic color of land use controls in most areas of the nation,
but increasingly it is an amorphous body of federal regulation

that decides the shades. Chief among these federal themes of
land use control is the unwieldy concept of 'biodiversity
With its cousin the "ecosystem approach,"
conservation."

biodiversity conservation has exploded into the vast network of
federal environmental

regulation in ways which, though

trumpeted as primarily national in dimension, in practice have
had profound effects at the state, local, and private land use
levels. Although the term biodiversity was barely in use in
scientific or legal literature prior to 1990-practically all of the
governmental documents, policy analyses, scientific papers, and
legal commentaries cited in this article with respect to biodiversity conservation were written after 1990-today it is a
watchword in many corners of federal environmental policy.

Perhaps because of its Big Bang emergence, however, the
development of federal biodiversity conservation policy has been
disorganized, heavy handed, and offensive to state, local, and
private autonomy.3 A completely different approach is needed
if the federal government expects to be influential in shaping
this nation's response to one of its most critical long term
environmental issues. This article suggests such an approach.

early 1970s. For a review of those initiatives, see EVA H. HANKS ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 643-57 (1974).
3. Professor Dan Tarlock's thorough exploration of the role of local
governments in biodiversity conservation provides a level of analysis which is
complementary to the federal policy focus of this article. A. Dan Tarlock, Local
Government Protection of Biodiversity: What Is Its Niche?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 555
(1993). Professor Tarlock's analysis, however, rests largely on the premises that
"[b]iodiversity protection.., is becoming more decentralized and site-specific," id.
at 557, and that "federal and state land use managers are extremely deferential
to local concerns." Id. at 557 n.10. If only that were so! Rather, although
Professor Tarlock anticipated that "[1local government biodiversity programs are
in danger of being squeezed out through state and federal preemption," id. at 603,
he underestimated, as I and no doubt many others did, how quickly and decisively
that pernicious effect would come about. In the short time since his article was
published, events have overtaken his premises. It is no longer true that "[flederal
law is not organized around the construct of biodiversity protection because the
idea is so new." Id. at 569. The idea caught on too fast! The thesis of this article
is not only that federal biodiversity conservation policy has now become an
organizing principle of federal policy, but that it embarked on exactly the wrong
direction in terms of its relation to local concerns. A complete about-face is
needed, and needed fast, if we expect to achieve the paradigm of local influence
that Professor Tarlock so eloquently describes.
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INTRODUCTION
The notion of biodiversity conservation is at the same time
potentially one of the most elegant and most dangerous
concepts to emerge in federal environmental law and policy in
decades. Biodiversity conservation is elegant for the way in
which it captures the interdependent and dynamic qualities of
the environment and melds them into a very simple message.
At its most fundamental level, biodiversity conservation means
simply promoting the full range of "variety and variability
among living organisms and the ecological complexes in which
they occur."4 The basic objective of biodiversity conservation
is to "maintain naturally occurring ecosystems, communities,
and native species."5 Those words appeal to strong aspirational goals, held by many in society, to ensure that humans exist
harmoniously within the "balance" of nature. Few would
challenge the notion of biodiversity conservation when expressed at that platitudinal level.
But scratch the surface of biodiversity conservation and the
simple message dissolves into an abstract, unwieldy set of
principles and debates over what the policy of biodiversity
conservation should be. The notion of biodiversity lends itself
to misuse because it is so scientifically nascent and "sufficiently
complex that almost any population biology study, with almost
any conclusion, can be framed as an effort to measure or
conserve biodiversity."6 For that reason, many people fear
biodiversity conservation, not as a concept but as a policy, when
put in the hands of federal regulators. Thus, proponents of
"more" biodiversity, in their call to tap into the potent federal
regulatory network, have unwittingly contributed to the
unraveling of decades of value consensus building experienced
under the major federal environmental statutes encompassing
biodiversity goals.
Until very recently, for example, the

4. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE U.S., TECHNOLOGIES TO MAINTAIN BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 3 (1987) [hereinafter TECHNOLOGIES].
5. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ExECuTIvE OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT,
INCORPORATING BIODIVERSITY CONSIDERATIONS INTO ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ANALYSIS UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 5 (1993) [hereinafter
BIODIVERSITY CONSIDERATIONS].

6. Gordon H. Rodda, How to Lie with Biodiversity, 7 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
959 (1993).
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Endangered Species Act 7 had been sacrosanct in Congress, as

virtually no credibility was given to anyone advocating "less"
species protection.' Today, however, the Endangered Species
Act comes under heavy barrage in Congress, is attacked by
many state and local governments, and is a rallying point for

the so-called "wise use" movement, an amalgamation of extreme
private property rights advocates calling for a massive rethink-

ing of federal land use controls.9
Indeed, the federal government's ownership and control of
hundreds of millions of acres of domestic land' ° and its poten7. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). For a detailed discussion of the role of the
Endangered Species Act in federal biodiversity policy, see infra part I.B.1.
8. All efforts in the 1980s to weaken the Endangered Species Act met
crushing defeats. See generally Donald J. Barry, Amending the ESA: The Ransom
of Red Chief, and Other Related Topics, 21 ENVTL. L. 587 (1991).
9. For a description ofthe backlash the Endangered Species Act has suffered
in recent years in Congress, state and local forums, and under criticism by wise
use advocates, see infra text accompanying notes 73-75 and 263-66.
10. The federal government owns or controls over 650 million acres in the
United States, or about 30% of the nation's total land mass, with 627 million of
those under the jurisdiction of four federal agencies-the National Park Service,
the Bureau of Land Management, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Forest
Service. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., PUB. No. GAO/RCED-94-111, ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADEQUATELY TEST A PROMISING
APPROACH 12 (1994) [hereinafter ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT]. Most of those acres

are located in Alaska and the western states. Id. at 14-15. Through the National
Park System, National Wildlife Refuges, National Wilderness Preservation
System, and similar federal programs for protected areas, over 170 million acres
of federally owned domestic territory are in protected status. UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON ENVT & DEv., UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NATIONAL REPORT 301

(1992) [hereinafter NATIONAL REPORT]. One of the most significant additions to
those federally owned preserve lands was made in 1994 with the enactment of the
California desert bill, which designated over 7.5 million acres of California desert
as a wilderness area and established the Death Valley and Joshua Tree National
Parks and the Mojave National Preserve. California Desert Protection Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-433, 108 Stat. 4471 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 410aaa to
410aaa-83). Additional efforts the federal government could and should expend
on lands it owns to advance biodiversity conservation are beyond the scope of this
article. For comprehensive discussions of that topic, see COUNCIL ON ENVTL.
QUALITY, LINKING ECOSYSTEMS AND BIODIVERSITY 146-51 (1992), reprinted from
COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, 21ST ANNUAL REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

(1990) [hereinafter LINKING ECOSYSTEMS]; Scott W. Hardt, Federal Land
Management in the Twenty-First Century: From Wise Use to Wise Stewardship,
18 HARV.ENVTL. L. REV. (1994); Jon D. Holst, The UnforseeabilityFactor: Federal
Lands, Managingfor Uncertainty,and the Preservationof BiologicalDiversity, 13
PUB. LAND L. REV. 113 (1992); Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line:
Constructing a Law of Ecosystem Management, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 293 (1994);
Robert B. Keiter, ConservationBiology and the Law: Assessing ChallengesAhead,
69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 911 (1994); James A. Siemans, A WHard Look" atBiodiversity
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tially strong influence in matters of international environmental
protection and economic development 1 present vast opportunities for the federal government to protect and enhance biological resources. It is appropriate for the federal government to
develop biodiversity conservation policies for those lands. The
focus of federal involvement, however, increasingly has been to
establish a regime of biodiversity regulation through environmental controls of development actions on nonfederal lands.

The emphasis on regulation of nonfederal lands is not entirely
misdirected, as much of our nation's biological resources reside
there. 2 The approach for dealing with such areas, however,

and the NationalForest Management Act, 6 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 157 (1992); Rebecca
W. Thomson, "Ecosystem Management," GreatIdea, But What Is It, Will It Work,
and Who Will Pay?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1995, at 42; Jeb Boyt,
Comment, Struggling to Protect Ecosystems and Biodiversity Under NEPA and
NFMA: The Ancient Forests of the Pacific Northwest and the Northern Spotted
Owl, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1009 (1993).
11. The most significant recent international statement of commitment to
biodiversity conservation occurred with the approval, on June 5, 1992, of the
Convention on Biological Diversity at the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992) [hereinafter Convention on Biological Diversity]. Over 37 other international treaties and
conventions deal with issues of species protection and other biodiversity goals. See
TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 4, at 258. The United States is a leader among
industrialized nations in terms of maintaining species diversity and protecting
endangered and threatened species, achieving one of the highest species diversity
indexes of animal species and one of the lowest rates of endangered and threatened animal species. Id. at 72. The United States is also a major participant in
the United Nations' Man and Biosphere program, under which the State
Department oversees administration of 46 designated outstanding natural areas
in the United States totalling 17 million acres. See LINKING ECOSYSTEMS, supra
note 10, at 166. Additional efforts the United States could and should take in the
international setting to influence biodiversity conservation in other industrialized
and developing nations are beyond the scope of this article. For comprehensive
discussions of that topic, see JEFFREY A. MCNEELY ET AL., CONSERVING THE
WORLD'S BIODIVERSITY (1990); TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 4, at 23-32; William M.
Flevares, Ecosystems, Economics, and Ethics: Protecting Biological Diversity at
Home and Abroad, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2039 (1992); William J. Snape, III, What
Will Happen to the Critters: NAFTA's PotentialImpact on Wildlife Protection,33
NAT. RESOURCES J. 1077 (1993).
12. According to a 1994 United States General Accounting Office study, over
90% of the species currently listed under the Endangered Species Act as
endangered or threatened have some or all of their habitat on nonfederal
lands-73% have over 60% of their habitat on nonfederal lands, and 37% are completely dependent on nonfederal lands. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., PUB. No.
GAO/RCED-95-16, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: INFORMATION ON SPECIES
PROTECTION ON NONFEDERAL LANDS 4-5 (1994) [hereinafter SPECIES PROTECTION
ON NONFEDERAL LANDS]. Moreover, almost 80% of endangered and threatened
species rely on nonfederal lands for some of the habitat considered critical to the
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has been to inject the federal regulatory scheme into the heart
of the most basic of state, local, and private land use decisions,
often to the sharp resentment of state and local jurisdictions
and private interests.
This article examines the scope and depth of that trend and
explores the alternative approaches the federal government
might take with respect to biodiversity policy. On the one
hand, federal policy could continue on its present course of
patchwork federal regulation glued together by the gestalt-like
theme of biodiversity. Alternatively, this article demonstrates
that a more effective policy would come from melding the
disorganized system of federal biodiversity conservation
regulation into a single law designed principally to promote
biodiversity conservation in a framework sufficiently flexible to
accommodate state, local, and private interests.
One point upon which this article does not dwell is the
question of whether biodiversity conservation is an important
national policy goal. As a general proposition, just like cleaner
air and water, most people would vote in favor of improved
biodiversity conservation, and with sound scientific and policy
justifications. In recent years no serious, credible scientific
commentary has suggested that humans and the environment
would benefit by reduced biodiversity. Likewise, most scientific
and legal commentary on the subject has posited strong
utilitarian, aesthetic, and ethical grounds for promoting
biodiversity conservation."3 As shown in this article, federal

species' survival, and for 40% of the species 80% of such critical habitat is on
nonfederal land. Id. at 6. For additional analysis of the role nonfederal land plays
in connection with endangered species habitat, see Jim McKinney et al., Economic
Incentives to Preserve Endangered Species Habitat and Biodiversity on Private
Lands, in BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INTO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

2 (Defenders of Wildlife ed., 1993) (hereinafter BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES];
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF AM. BUSINESS, WASHINGTON UNIV. IN ST. LOUIS, THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: TIME FOR A CHANGE 30-33 (1994). Of course, federal

and nonfederal lands are not neatly separated-ecosystems know no political
boundaries. Factors such as these have led "[mjany agency officials, scientists,
and policy analysts [to] agree that ecosystem management will generally fall short
of its goal if it is limited to activities on federal lands." ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT,
supra note 10, at 57.
13. See generally BALANCING ON THE BRINK OF EXTINCTION:
THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE (Kathryn A. Kohm ed.,
1991); LINKING ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 10, at 146-51; THE PRESERVATION OF

SPECIES:

THE VALUE OF BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (Bryan G. Norton ed., 1986);

TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 4, at 3-8; EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE

(1992); Doremus, supra note 2, at 269-86; James Drodzdowski, Saving an
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regulatory policy has already responded with significant
measures directed towards strengthening biodiversity conservation.'4 But it is all too easy to say more of a good thing is
better and leave it at that. Many of our legal institutions have
embraced the broad goal of biodiversity conservation, and now
are faced with the truly difficult policy questions-who, what,
when, how, and how much. The backlash which the Endangered Species Act has experienced in recent years suggests that,
when it comes to regulation of nonfederal lands, the federal
government should be focusing more attention on nitty-gritty
details and less on the promotion of biodiversity conservation as
an abstract goal.
Indeed, there is by no means unanimous support that the
federal government should have any meaningful role in shaping
national biodiversity policy. For example, the Cato Institute
advocates a federal biodiversity policy relying on maximum use
of "noncoercive market processes." 5 That policy proposal,
Endangered Act: The Case for a Biodiversity Approach to ESA Conservation
Efforts, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 553, 556-62 (1995); Flevares, supra note 11, at
2041-52; James L. Huffman, Do Species and Nature Have Rights?, 13 PUB. LAND
L. REV. 51 (1992); Tarlock, supra note 3, at 563-67.
14. For a summary of the biodiversity conservation policy formulation
initiatives of 18 federal agencies, see CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., PUB. No.
94-339 ENR, ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: FEDERAL AGENCY ACTIVITIES (1994)
[hereinafter FEDERAL AGENCY ACTIVITIES]. Although this collection of policy
statements evidences the breadth with which biodiversity conservation has taken
hold within the federal environmental and land use management agencies, the
report also illustrates the multitude of different agencies and approaches involved,
leading to dispersed federal policy-making and ad hoc relations with state, local,
and private interests. One commentator has noted the irony of the intensity of the
federal agencies' biodiversity efforts at a time of budget constraints and
downsizing. See Thomas C. Jackson & Joshua S. Wyner, The New Hot Doctrine:
Ecosystem Management, NAVL L.J., Nov. 28, 1994, at C6.
15. Allan K. Fitzsimmons, FederalEcosystem Management: A 'TrainWreck"
in the Making, POLICY ANALYSIS (Cato Inst., Wash., D.C.), Oct. 26, 1994, at 1, 23.
Fitzsimmons' policy analysis does not propose any particular "noncoercive market
processes" or methods of implementing whatever they might be. It is unclear,
therefore, whether he posits that the federal government (or all government?)
simply step aside and let whatever the so-called free market produces be our
national biodivers ity policy result, or that the federal and other levels of
government actively shape the market through noncoercive forms of regulation so
as to promote a particular biodiversity goal. Because Fitzsimmons at no point in
his analysis states what the national biodiversity goals should be were it the latter
approach he is advocating, it is difficult to conclude anything other than that he
is advocating the former approach-a complete hands-off federal policy. In any
event, regardless of whether and how Fitzsimmons believes "noncoercive market
processes" are to be shaped, I show herein that the premises leading him to
propose those processes as the exclusive federal policy tool are unsound.
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which has appeared to galvanize those who lean against an
active federal role, is premised on a trio of assertions: that
"[t]he ecosystem concept ... is inappropriate for use as a
geographic guide for public policies," that "[flederal management of ecosystems would significantly expand federal control
of the use of privately owned land," and that "greater reliance
on market forces, rather than further movement toward6
coercive federal regulations ...should guide federal actions."
Although the second of those propositions accurately defines the
central defect of federal policy at present, this article demonstrates that the first and last of those premises are, at best, half
true, and thus do not lead us in the direction of a passive
federal policy role. Hence, as much as this article demonstrates
that federal biodiversity policy thus far has been excessively
coercive, it also demonstrates that a "no action" policy at the
federal level is not a viable policy alternative. The question is
what the federal government's proper role should be.
As the starting point for analysis of those challenging policy
questions, Part I of this article examines the genesis of
biodiversity conservation from its roots in biological research to
its emergence in the fractured world of federal environmental
regulation of nonfederal lands. Biodiversity is an elusive
concept in science and in law. Scientifically, an "ecosystem"
could reasonably be defined as anything "from a drop of water
to the North American continent to the entire biosphere." 7

16. Id. at 1.
17. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., AN ECOSYSTEM APPROACH TO FISH AND
WILDLIFE CONSERVATION: AN APPROACH TO MORE EFFECTIVELY CONSERVE THE

An
NATION'S BIODIVERSITY 6 (1994) [hereinafter ECOSYSTEM APPROACH].
ecosystem can be thought of as '[the organisms living in a particular environment, such as a lake or forest (or, increasing in scale, an ocean or the whole
planet), and the physical part of the environment that impinges upon them."
WILSON, supra note 13, at 396; see also Convention on Biological Diversity, supra
note 11, at 824 (noting that an ecosystem is "a dynamic complex of plant, animal
and micro-organism communities and their non-living environment interacting as

a functional unit"). These rather imprecise definitions suggest that perhaps, in
the words of Bruce Babbitt testifying as Secretary of the Department of the
Interior, an "ecosystem is in the eye of the beholder." The National Biological
Survey Act of 1993: Joint Hearing on H.R. 1845 Before the Subcomm. on
Environmentand NaturalResources of the House Comm. on Merchant Marineand
Fisheries,and the Subcomm. on NationalParks, Forests,and Public Lands of the
House Comm. on NaturalResources, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1994). Perhaps the
most thoughtful description is that "[an ecosystem is a process.. . .You never step
into the same ecosystem twice." JACK COHEN & IAN STEWART, THE COLLAPSE OF
CHAOS: DISCOVERING SIMPLICITY IN A COMPLEX WORLD 367 (1994). The Fish and
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Determining the diversity of biological resources needed to keep
any particular ecosystem "healthy" is a matter subject to
intense debate and imprecision given the existing limits on
scientific knowledge. It is no wonder that, given the uncertainty of the scientific community about what biodiversity is,
environmental law has charted no clear directions either. No
single federal law purports to encompass all that is meant by
biodiversity conservation; rather, a handful of different statutes
addresses particular facets of biological resource protection on
nonfederal lands. Gluing those laws together without any clear
unifying principles has not created an effective, flexible system
of biodiversity conservation.
Part II of this article explores which models could be used
to advance federal biodiversity conservation policy from its
present adolescence to a mature, cohesive regulatory framework. Federal regulation of nonfederal land use decisions has
generally followed three models with respect to relations
between federal, state, and local jurisdictions--coercion,
coordination, and cooperation.' 8 Statutes built on the coercion
theme involve federal dictates to state and local jurisdictions as
to the regulatory standards and proscriptions, leaving little
room for state and local autonomy. Statutes with no overt
substantive goals and standards, relying instead on the federal
government acting as a facilitator of procedural and informational requirements, define the coordination approach. The
cooperation approach is characteristic of statutes containing a
regulatory framework for states and local jurisdictions to adapt
and use, in cooperation with the federal authority as needed, to
achieve all or some of a federally-defined substantive goal.
Federal biodiversity regulation, though favoring the coercion
theme, appears in statutes fitting each of the models. As shown
by examples from the existing laws dealing with biodiversity
conservation, however, their dispersed and varied approaches

Wildlife Service has amplified this thought in recent ecosystem approach
literature, claiming the agency "is increasing its efforts to think and act in terms
of systems, relationships, and processes to recognize that, in some way, all things
are connected." Denise Henne, Taking an Ecosystem Approach, ENDANGERED
SPECIES BULL. (U.S. Dep't ofInterior/Fish & Wildlife Serv,, Wash., D.C.), Jan.-Feb.
1995, at 6 (emphasis added).
18. I have previously described and applied the three models of federal
approaches to regulation of state and local interests in the context of interstate
pollution. See Ruhl, supra note 2.
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and legal authorities have resulted in confused and ineffective
biodiversity conservation policies at the federal level.
As detailed in Part III of this article, many other legal
commentators have concluded that the issue of biodiversity
conservation cries out for a unified federal law to correct the
deficiencies of the fractured existing framework. Most of those
other commentators, however, have focused their options
principally on the seemingly irresistible impulse to protect
biological resources through more coercive regulation, without
due regard to the regulatory and political fallout such a policy
approach is bound to cause. As shown in this article, one of the
main obstacles a broadly accepted program of biodiversity
conservation has faced thus far is the opposition of state and
local jurisdictions and private interests to additional layers of
coercive federal regulation. Combining and strengthening the
existing web of coercive regulations into a new federal megastatute will only further alienate the nonfederal interests; yet,
those are precisely the constituencies which must be brought
into the biodiversity conservation game if it is to succeed.
Where federal biodiversity goals intersect with state, local,
and private development goals, therefore, more force-fed
regulation is not the solution. Most of the existing federal laws
touching on biodiversity conservation, however, contain little in
the way of flexibility to vary protective levels within defined
ecosystems. Those who would perpetuate or, worse, strengthen
that approach are simply asking for trouble. Rather, where
nonfederal land' and resource use goals might conflict with
federal biodiversity objectives, the twin elements of state and
local involvement in the solution and flexibility in federal policy
regarding the outcome will yield greater participation in and
endorsement of the system by state, local, and private interests.
A balanced solution, therefore, may rest in an approach of
regulation through cooperation, under 'which the federal
government would adopt a unified, free-standing statute dealing
with biodiversity conservation as its principal goal, thus freeing
other federal environmental laws from the burden of having to
squeeze biodiversity values into pre-existing frameworks not
meant to work that broadly or flexibly. A federal initiative
based on the cooperation model would balance the flexibility
needed to respond to state, local, and private concerns with the
uniformity of approach needed to ensure that national goals are
met.
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The central elements of such a statute are outlined in Part
IV of this article. Modeled around the Coastal Zone Management Act, which allows states to establish coastal zone management plans to coordinate federal, state, and local land and
resource use decisions affecting coastal resources, 9 the Biological Resources Zone Management Act proposed in this article
would replace the coercive, confused present system of federal
regulation with a unified federal-state cooperation system.
States opting to designate Biological Resource Zones-areas of
biological resource sensitivity appropriate for tailored, managed
protection strategies-would present a management plan for
each such area to the federal government for approval. In
return for agreeing to manage and enforce the plan for the
particular area, the state and affected local jurisdictions would
be authorized to supplant the existing federal biodiversity
regulatory scheme with the approved management strategy for
all federal, state, and local land use decisions, including
decisions with respect to private projects. Hence, the reward to
nonfederal interests for engaging in biodiversity conservation
would be freedom from the obsolete federal regulatory web.
Based on the experience to date, only through sacrificing some
degree of its potentially coercive power through measures like
the one proposed in this article can the federal government
expect in the long run to retain a large degree of influence over
national biodiversity conservation policy.

I.

BIODIVERSITY IN LAW AND SCIENCE-FROM BIRTH TO
ADOLESCENCE

[Tihe Fish and Wildlife Service's approach to implementing the [Endangered Species] Act in Texas has
become so overreaching that it undermines public
support for protecting our wildlife. During the past
decade, the agency's efforts to enforce the law and
protect wildlife have created enormous problems for
landowners . ...

The Department of Interior,with

leadership from your office, should initiate a thorough review of the Fish and Wildlife Service's overall

19. See infra part I.B.4.

568

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

approach to implementing the Endangered Species
Act in Texas.2°
One source of the fear many segments of society harbor
towards biodiversity conservation efforts is the concern that "a
pervasive federal program to conserve 'biological diversity'" will
be implemented "before it is known what specifically constitutes
biological diversity; what impacts human activities have on
biological diversity; and what cost-effective methods can be
employed to conserve biological diversity."2 ' Although there
may be disagreement over the extent to which "[t]he federal
strategy to conserve biological communities should also take
into account the strategy's impact on people, their livelihood
and their standard of living,"22 the federal strategy will be
politically doomed if the human impacts are not substantially
justified on the basis of demonstrable scientific necessity. As
one federal regulator and scientist has put it, "for scientists to
combine partial data with advocacy is counterproductive in the
long run."23
The scientific understanding of biodiversity, however, is
simply not to the point of allowing that level of public confidence. There remain too many ways to 'end" biodiversity
data, making it "easier to add up the ways in which the concept
of biodiversity can be misused than it is to present a simple
solution to the extremely complex problem of measuring and
maintaining biological diversity."24 The danger is that the
very credibility of biodiversity conservation and ecosystem
management policies will be put at risk when they are "em-

20. Letter from Ann Richards, Governor, State of Texas, to Bruce Babbitt,
Secretary, United States Department of Interior (Sept. 12, 1994) (on file with
author) (emphasis added).
21. DISSENTING VIEWS ON H.R. 585, NATIONAL BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
CONSERVATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH ACT, H.R. REP. No. 259, 102d

Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1991). As a discrete scientific discipline, biodiversity
conservation, or conservation biology, is relatively new, dating back not much
before 1985. See R. Edward Grumbine, What Is Ecosystem Management?, 8
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27, 28-29 (1994). There is a legitimate concern, therefore,
that the law and policy not hurtle forward ahead of the formation of welldeveloped scientific foundations. For an excellent bibliography of the scientific
literature dealing with biodiversity policy, see DEBORAH J. FORESTER ET AL.,
NATIONAL PARK SERVINATL BIOLOGICAL SURVEY COOP. PARK STUDIES UNIT,
SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS AND BIODIVERSITY: A WORING BIBLIOGRAPHY (1994).

22. H.R. REP. No. 259, supra note 21, at 35.
23. Rodda, supra note 6, at 960.
24. Id.
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ployed as manipulative and confusing slogans" 25 to justify
whatever underlying land use policy the federal government
happens to be advancing. Hence, it is essential for the federal
government, if it wishes to be in the business of regulating
nonfederal lands for the purpose of biodiversity conservation
with the support of nonfederal land owners, to establish a
comprehensive knowledge base from which to mold biodiversity
conservation policy around the known rather than the unknown. Although significant strides have been made in the
past decade, both the science and the policy of biodiversity
conservation remain in their adolescent stages, and without
proper management could both lead to wholesale delinquency.
A. Biodiversity-What It Is and How to Conserve It
In its recent comprehensive assessment of "ecosystem
management" policies the federal government should adopt, the
General Accounting Office ("GAO") concluded that the science
side of biodiversity presents significant barriers to formulating
and implementing the policy side:
For example, understanding the ecology of an ecosystem will

require collecting and linking large volumes of scientific data.
In addition, large volumes of socioeconomic data must be
collected, organized, and analyzed to identify important

relationships between human activities and ecological conditions and trends and to make necessary or desired trade-offs
among ecological and socioeconomic values and concerns.

However, available data are often not comparable, and large
gaps in information exist. Furthermore, there is still much
uncertainty about how ecosystems function-uncertainty that
contributes to strong differences in the interpretation of
scientific evidence.26

Hence, to a large extent, the direction and success of federal
biodiversity conservation policy for nonfederal lands will depend
on how well-defined the scientific bases of ecosystem management are and how the chosen implementing land use controls
are demonstrated to relate to that scientific underpinning.

25. William Goldfarb, Watershed Management: Slogan or Solution, 21 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 483, 483 (1994).
26. ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT, supra note 10, at 7.
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1. Defining Biodiversity in Science
Most definitions offered for biological diversity-biodiversity
for short--are similar to the terms Congress chose in the often
proposed, never passed National Biological Diversity, Conservation, and Environmental Research Act: "the full range of
variability among living organisms and the natural communities in which they occur."27 Biodiversity in that sense is
generally thought of as having four hierarchical components:
regional ecosystem diversity; local ecosystem diversity; species
diversity; and genetic diversity.2 Regional ecosystem diversity
encompasses the pattern of local ecosystems across the landscape. Local ecosystem diversity-the real building block of
biodiversity conservation-involves the diversity of all living
and nonliving components within a given area and their
interrelationships. Local ecosystems are the critical biological
operating units in nature. Species diversity describes the
variety of individual species within a local ecosystem. Genetic
diversity refers to the variations within a species, providing a
measure of the species' ability to adapt to changing environments. The four components interrelate in that "[riegional
ecosystem patterns form the basic matrix for, and thus have
important influences on, local ecosystems. Local ecosystems, in
turn, form the matrix for species and genetic diversity, which
can in turn affect ecosystem and regional patterns."29 Hence,
the four components of biodiversity are "not a series of unconnected elements," but rather are believed to describe a continuum in which "reduction of diversity at any level will have
effects at the other levels."30 Therefore, "[a] focus on any one
27. H.R. 305, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §3(1) (1993); see also Convention on
Biological Diversity, supra note 11, at 823 (noting that biological diversity is "the
variability among living organisms. . . includ[ing] within species, between species,
and of ecosystems"); U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THREATS TO BIOLOGICAL
DWvERSITY IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (1990) [hereinafter THREATS TO BIODIVER-

SITY] (defining biological diversity as "the variety of life on all levels of organization, represented by the number and relative frequencies of items").
28. BIODIVERSITY CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 5, at 1. Several early surveys
of the science of biodiversity collapse the local and regional ecosystem components
into one category. See, e.g., THREATS TO BIODIVERSITY, supra note 27, at 10. More
recent scientific commentaries emphasize the importance of the local ecosystem
concept by dividing the hierarchy into the four categories discussed in this article.
See, eg., Grumbine, supra note 21, at 29.
29.

BIODIVERSITY CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 5, at 1.

30. Id.
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level of the biodiversity hierarchy ... is not sufficient."31 To
the extent that humans depend on healthy, functioning
ecosystems for fulfillment of commercial, recreational, aesthetic,
ethical, and cultural values, conserving diversity at every level
of the hierarchy is an important policy goal.
Conserving biodiversity involves, among other things,
identifying and managing the factors that contribute to the
decline of biodiversity. Direct physical alteration resulting from
resource development and changing land use is perceived as the
most pervasive cause of biodiversity loss.32 The physical
impacts of development on habitat areas can destroy, simplify,
or fragment an ecosystem and thereby reduce' the diversity
within and made available by the ecosystem. But there are
other significant contributors to biodiversity impairment,
including pollution, which may indirectly degrade habitat
through acidification or prove directly lethal to species exposed
to pollutants, 33 and overharvesting of species. 34 Indeed, some
factors contributing to biodiversity losses do not readily appear
as such, or may initially appear as actually contributing to
increased biodiversity. For example, the introduction of nonnative species to an ecosystem may initially appear to increase
species biodiversity, but over time may result in depletion of
native species through predation, competition, genetic modification, and disease transmission.3 5 Similarly, resource management activities such as fire suppression, predator removal, and
stream flow controls may initially boost ecosystem diversity, yet
later may lead to ecosystem collapse by facilitatingcatastrophic
fires or species overpopulation.3 6 And some factors which are
believed to contribute to biodiversity decline, such as global
climate change, do so gradually, almost imperceptibly, over
time.3 7 Hence, biodiversity conservation is not just about
regulating changing land use, though clearly that is the most
visible cause of biodiversity decline.38

31. Grumbine, supra note 21, at 29 (emphasis added).
32. BIODIVERSITY CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 5, at 2; see also LINKING
ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 10, at 151-54.
33. BIODIVERSITY CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 5, at 2.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2-3.
37. Id. at 3.
38. For a comprehensive discussion of the proximate causes of anthropogenically-driven biodiversity loss, see THREATS TO BIODIVERSITY, supra note 27, at 25-
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2. The Principles of Biodiversity Management
Based on the components of biodiversity and the factors
identified as contributing to biodiversity decline, the fundamental goal of biodiversity conservation is fairly evident: "to
maintain naturally occurring ecosystems, communities, and
native species." 9 The Council on Environmental Quality

("CEQ") has identified general management principles designed

to promote that basic objective4 ° by embracing several broad
themes. First, successful biodiversity management depends on
recognizing the hierarchy of biodiversity components and the

importance of ecosystems as the basic unit of operation. Hence,
the geographic scale of biodiversity conservation policy must be

36. In close accord with the Council on Environmental Quality's identification of
factors, the Environmental Protection Agency focuses on six major headings: (1)
direct population reduction (intentional and incidental taking); (2) physical
alteration; (3) chemical pollution and solid waste; (4) global atmospheric change;
(5) alien species; and (6) synergistic effects of the interactions of those factors. Id.
39. BIODIVERSITY CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 5, at 5; see also Grumbine,
supra note 21, at 31 (including goals to "[mlaintain viable populations of all native
species in situ" and to "[riepresent ... all native ecosystem types across their
natural range of variation"). Biodiversity conservation finds a strong parallel in
the concept of "sustainable use," the goal of which has been described as "the use
of components of biological diversity in a way and at a rate that does not lead to
the long-term decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to
meet the needs and aspirations of present and future generations." Convention
on Biological Diversity, supra note 11, at 824; see also WHITE HOUSE INTERAGENCY
ECOSYSTEM MGMT. TASK FORCE, ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE OVERVIEW
1 (1994), reprinted in U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., PUB. No. GAO/RCED-94-111,
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADEQUATELY TEST

A PROMISING APPROACH 70 (1994) [hereinafter INITIATIVE OVERVIEW] ("The goal
of ecosystem management is to restore and maintain the health, sustainability,
and biological diversity of ecosystems while supporting sustainable societies and
economies."). See generally James P. Karp, SustainableDevelopment: Toward a
New Vision, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 239 (1994); Mark Mininberg et al., Promoting
Economic Growth and Environmental Protection: The Institute for Sustainable
Development, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 69 (1993); Edith B. Weiss, Environmentally
Sustainable Competitiveness:A Comment, 102 YALE L.J. 2123 (1993).
40. CEQ's eleven principles of ecosystem management are: (1) take a "big
picture" or ecosystem view; (2) protect communities and ecosystems; (3) minimize
fragmentation and promote the natural pattern and connectivity of habitats; (4)
promote native species and avoid introducing non-native species; (5) protect rare
and ecologically important species; (6) protect unique or sensitive environments;
(7) maintain or mimic natural ecosystem processes; (8) maintain or mimic
naturally occurring structural diversity; (9) protect genetic diversity; (10) restore
ecosystems, communities and species; (11) monitor for biodiversity impacts,
acknowledge uncertainty, and be flexible. BIODIVERSITY CONSIDERATIONS, supra
note 5, at 6-8.
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commensurate with the scale of the systems that sustain
biological diversity. Second, CEQ's principles adopt a threetiered preference of management approaches that is already
familiar in federal land use regulation-avoid, minimize, and
mitigate. That is, the preference is to avoid disruption to the
biodiversity components where practicable; however, where
human activity requires intrusion into an ecosystem, sound
management policy is to minimize impacts to the extent
practicable and to mitigate for those impacts which are not
practicably avoided. Third, CEQ's principles encompass a
prioritization system to direct resources and attention to the
biodiversity components most in need of protection and
preservation. Many species and ecosystems are not threatened
or do not require human assistance to thrive, and the reality of
limited financial resources requires that biodiversity conservation policy identify the components that are the most threatened or require the most attention and to direct resources first
to them. Finally, CEQ recognizes that information gaps and
the inherent complexity and uncertainty of biological systems
requires a continual research and monitoring program and an
acknowledgement that uncertainty remains more the norm than
the exception at this time. To the extent that biodiversity
conservation policy portrays itself as. based on certainty and
depends on inflexible regulatory programs for its implementation, it may do more harm than good in the long run.
3. Initiatives for Biodiversity Studies
The CEQ's biodiversity management principles provide a
good start for defining the body of knowledge necessary for
shaping an effective federal biodiversity conservation policy. A
major component of any policy, therefore, will be authorizing
and defining a program for what E.O. Wilson calls "biodiversity
studies," which is "[tihe systematic examination of the full
array of different kinds of organisms, together with a consideration of the technology by which the diversity can be maintained and used for the benefit of humanity."4 There is a
broad consensus that "[e]cosystem management requires more

41.

WILSON, supra note 13, at 393.
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research and data collection ... as well as better management
and use of existing data."42

Fortunately, several states have initiated successful
"biodiversity inventory" research programs to better understand
the locations and conditions of their biological resources.'

Following that lead, in September 1993, Secretary of Interior
Bruce Babbitt established the National Biological Survey, now
known as the National Biological Service ("NBS"), as a, new
bureau within the Department of Interior." Modeled. after the
U.S. Geological Survey, NBS's mission is to serve as the nonregulatory, non-managerial, non-advocacy biological research
arm of the Department of Interior and to gather, analyze, and
disseminate "the biological information necessary to support the
sound management of the Nation's natural resources."'

The

42. Grumbine, supra note 21, at 31. The methods most often mentioned as
critical to the data collection process include "gap analysis," which entails focused
research to fill the holes in scientific knowledge regarding ecosystem dynamics,
and the Geographic Information System ("GIS") method, which involves plotting
all known ecosystem physical and biological characteristics on one "map" so as to
better understand their interrelations. See FEDERAL AGENCY ACTIVITIES, supra
note 14 (summarizing the ecosystem research programs referencing gap analysis,
or GIS methods, or both, of each of 18 federal agencies).
43. All 50 states participate in the Natural Heritage Program, 'which was
started by the Nature Conservancy and serves to identify and catalogue species
and natural communities within each state. See LINKING ECOSYSTEMS, supra note
10, at 182 n.7; William Stolzenburg, The HeritageNetwork: Detectivesof Diversity,
NATURE CONSERVANCY, Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 23. Many states, however, are
initiating more intensive study programs to assess the state of biodiversity within
their boundaries. For example, the State of Missouri initiated a Biodiversity Task
Force, representing the Missouri Department of Conservation, the United States
Forest Service, and three research universities, to inventory the status of
biological resources in the state. The report of the task force provides extensive
information about the locations and conditions of important biological resources
in the state. See BIODIVERSITY TASK FORCE, MISSOURI DEP'T OF CONSERVATION,
THE BIODIVERSITY OF MISSOURI: DEFINITION, STATUS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
ITS CONSERVATION (1992). The Missouri effort has led to the initiation of a statewide program, known as Coordinated Resource Management, through which seven
state and federal agencies will work with public and private landowners to guide
biodiversity conservation. See Partners in CRM, COORDINATED RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT (Missouri Dep't of Conservation, Jefferson City, Mo.), Jan. 1995, at
1, 3 (1995). For an overview of other state biodiversity inventory efforts, see
BIODIVERSITY CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 5, at 11-13.
44. NATIONAL BIOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S. DEPT OF INTERIOR, PUB. No.
940420, FACT SHEET 1 (1994) [hereinafter FACT SHEET].
45. Id. For example, NBS recently released a study demonstrating the
amount and rate of habitat losses in the United States. NATIONAL BIOLOGICAL
SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BIOLOGICAL REPORT No. 28, ENDANGERED
ECOSYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF LOSS AND
DEGRADATION (1995).
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baseline scientific data NBS supplies will be used within the
federal government and shared with the states to improve
The NBS
decisions regarding biodiversity conservation.46
effort will help substantially to improve the data gap and
incomparability problems GAO identified as impediments to
formulating biodiversity conservation policy.
Other efforts underway at the federal level are directed
towards the more problematic issue GAO identified-the
inadequacy of information on how ecosystems function and how
human activities affect those functions-which may be addressed in a series of pilot studies initiated by the Clinton
Administration's recently formed Interagency Ecosystem
Management Task Force ("Task Force"). The Task Force is
charged with developing "a proactive approach to ensuring a
sustainable economy and a sustainable environment through
ecosystem management."4 7 The Task Force has proposed
identifying several pilot study ecosystems, based on a variety of
criteria relevant to biodiversity conservation policy implementa-

46. For example, in March 1994, NBS and the State of California entered
into an agreement under which NBS will support the California Environmental
Resources Evaluation System (CERES), a statewide effort directed at collecting,
integrating, and distributing biological data pertinent to resource management
and conservation decisions. National Biological Survey, U.S. Dep't of Interior,
News Release: National Biological Survey and State Launch Initiatives to Gather
Data for Multi-Species Planning 1, 1 (Mar. 4, 1994) (unpublished document, on file
with author). NBS has entered into agreements with many other state biological
survey agencies and private organizations, such as The Nature Conservancy, to
provide research grants and to develop national standards for biological data
reporting. Joint Hearing on Fiscal Year 1995 Budget Requests for the National
Marine FisheriesService, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National
Biological Survey, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of F. Eugene Hester,
Deputy Director, National Biological Survey) (transcript on file with author). The
agency has requested funding to continue research of the South Florida Everglades
ecosystem, the Pacific Northwest salmon ecosystem, and similar ecosystem-wide
research efforts. Id. at 6-7. NBS now has a budget of over $170 million, over 1800
employees, 4 regional offices, 13 research centers and 100 field stations. FACT
SHEET, supra note 44. For further descriptions of NBS's program, see FEDERAL
AGENCY ACTIVITIES, supra note 14, at 85 (presenting NBS's summary of its
ecosystem research initiatives).
47. See INITIATIVE OVERVIEW, supra note 39, at 1. The Task Force was
formed on the recommendation of Vice President Gore's National Performance
Review. Id. It is chaired by the director of the White House Office on Environmental Policy and consists of one assistant secretary from each of 12 federal
departments and agencies, as well as one representative each from the Office of
Management and Budget and the Office of Science and Technology. Id.
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tion, and using them to test policy initiatives and generate data
and experience to transport more widely to other ecosystems. 4
The federal government's biodiversity studies efforts,
however, are not without their critics. Perhaps acting on the
maxim that information is power, groups such as the Cato
Institute have posited that all efforts to formulate policy around
the concept of an ecosystem management approach will

ultimately crumble because of the inherent difficulties in
mapping the boundaries of any ecosystem. 49 That familiar
mantra has been used in other contexts in an attempt to defer
federal action by requiring that any policy choice be based on a
level of knowledge approaching omniscience rather than
allowing decisions based on sound judgment in the face of some
scientffic uncertainty."0 The net result of the former approach
48. The Task Force's ecosystem selection criteria are: (1) ongoing
interagency and intergovernmental management activities; (2) a mix of resource
management and infrastructure agency involvement; (3) a mix of geographic scales
and efforts in various stages of development; (4) availability and accessibility of
data on the ecosystem; (5) environmental importance of the area; (6) a variety of
environmental, economic, and social issues; (7) public and private support of, and
interest in, the ecosystem; (8) agency support for the selection; and (9) geographic
distribution. Id. at 2. The Task Force intends to identify ecosystems of two
varieties: those in which a mature interagency ecosystem management strategy
exists, but is in need of support, and those in which no such strategy exists and
where introduction of a new approach holds promise. Id. The Task Force
currently has identified four pilot study ecosystems and their study issues:
restoring old-growth forests of the Pacific Northwest; restoring natural resources
damages caused by the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska's Prince William Sound;
restoring the ecological health of the South Florida ecosystem, including the
Everglades; and restoring the health of the Anacostia River in Maryland and the
District of Columbia. ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT, supra note 10, at 36. The Task
Force expects its initial report summarizing its findings from the four case studies
to be published in 1995. Telephone Interviews with Michael Sweeny, Assistant
to the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Management and Budget, United States
Department of the Interior (Nov. 2, 1994 and Feb. 13, 1995). The approach of the
Task Force has been embraced by at least one legislative proposal in Congress, in
the form of the Ecosystem Management Act of 1995, which would establish an
Ecosystem Management Study Commission to examine several case studies of
ongoing federal land ecosystem management approaches in order to better
understand what ecosystem management policy goals and approaches should be
for federally managed lands. S. 93, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Another Task
Force ecosystem study effort can be found in the 1994 amendments to the Marine
Mammal Protection Act creating two ecosystem workshops to study the Gulf of
Maine and the Bering Sea. See Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-238, § 110(c), 108 Stat. 532, 560-61.
49. Fitzsimmons, supra note 15, at 9-16; see also John H. Cushman, Jr.,
Timber! A New Idea Is Crashing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1995, § 4, at 5.
50. For example, although we seldom know with absolute certainty whether
a chemical agent causes cancer in humans, we have long ago abandoned the notion
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is policy paralysis, as we will never achieve the knowledge
necessary to delineate precisely the biological bounds of any
ecosystem. Indeed, there probably is no such thing as a
discrete ecosystem.51 The notion of "ecosystem" is purely an
invention of humans to help simplify for our comprehension the
utterly complex dynamics of the biological world.52 Yet, we
draw artificial geographic lines to delineate complex systems all
the time as a policy tool. Consider, for example, our notions of
such political units as states, metropolitan areas, and enterprise
zones-who can say with absolute socioeconomic certainty
where those begin and end, except purely as political creatures
conceived to allow policy to be formed and implemented? Yet,
we know that differences exist between cities and between
states, that New York has a different "feel" than Los Angeles,
and that people from Maine are "different" than people from
Florida. Similarly, we can conclude with some reasonable
degree of certainty that Death Valley is not the Rocky Mountains, the California coast is not the Mississippi River, and the
Everglades are not the Great Lakes. They are different
"ecosystems." They are interrelated at some level, just as the
economies and cultures of New York and Los Angeles are, but
the species within these different ecosystems unquestionably
are of a different mix, and the systems will often respond
differently to the same stimuli. The more we know about the
dynamics taking place within different ecosystems and affecting
them from without, the better we will be able to understand
that we must possess that level of scientific knowledge before regulating chemical
substances. See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
In establishing worker chemical exposure safety regulations, the federal
government "is not required to support its findings that a significant risk exists
with anything approaching scientific certainty." Id. at 656.
51. Ecosystems unquestionably "tend to overlap; or, more accurately, the
edges between them are blurred; more accurately still, there aren't any welldefined edges." COHEN & STEWART, supra note 17, at 383.
52. To advance our understanding of biological systems beyond mysticism,
it has become necessary for us "to evolve quick-and-dirty feature-recognition
systems in order for us to survive in a hostile world." Id. at 433. Those "mental
models of nature are not so much faithful reflections of reality as cut-down models
that focus on certain essential features" of the biological world. Basing policy
decisions on those imprecise mental models, like "ecosystems," however, is not only
necessary as the only choice we have, but also reflective of the fact that "[olur
brains do not just invent patterns at will." Id. at 435. Rather, "[t]he patterns that
our brains perceive are accurate representations of large chunks of reality, because
our brains and sense organs evolved that way." Id. In other words, we know an
ecosystem when we see one.
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how humans affect them and how to manage those effects. To
consciously decide not to study those boundaries and effects
simply because we will never know everything there is to know
about them is to remain Homo ignoramus.
Hence, as it should, the federal government has taken a
significant step through efforts like NBS and the Task Force
towards leading the scientific inquiries necessary for making
sound biodiversity conservation policy decisions. That function,
perhaps, is the most important biodiversity conservation role for
the federal presence to fill because of the umbrella the federal
government can provide in terms of compatible standards of
research and analysis and centralized data collection. Of equal
importance, however, is how that information is used and the
legal framework for translating scientific data into policy
implementation.
B. Threads of Biodiversity in the FederalEnvironmental
Regulation Web
No single federal law can reasonably be portrayed as
encompassing all the goals of biodiversity conservation and the
authorities needed to carry them out. Rather, even before
scientific knowledge had broadly demonstrated the importance
of biodiversity conservation, a myriad of federal laws regulating
state, local, and private land development had slowly emerged
to form a "web" of substantive constraints and procedural
requirements. To be sure, some of those laws ostensibly include
notions of ecological protection within their policy justifications;
however, only by patching the laws together could any comprehensive biodiversity conservation policy begin to emerge. That
web of regulations, therefore, has served as a convenient, albeit
cumbersome, vehicle for the federal government initially to
address biodiversity concerns on nonfederal lands.53 This
53. Existing somewhere outside the ambit of federal statutory environmental laws, but closely related to it, is the judicially-devised "public trust doctrine,"
which posits that the states, and possibly the federal government, hold the air,
water, and publicly owned land resources as trustees for the public benefit, and
therefore may not redistribute those public "goods" from the public use domain to
the private interest domain in ways which violate that trust. See ZYGMUNT J.B.
PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: A COURSEBOOK ON NATURE,

LAW, AND SOCIETY 365-412 (1992); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471
(1970). Some proposals regarding biodiversity conservation policy suggest that the
public trust doctrine would provide a source of authority for imposing biodiversity
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section reviews the four major components of that existing
structure as it relates to state, local, and private lands-the
Endangered Species Act, the Clean Water Act section 404, the
National Environmental Policy Act, and the Coastal Zone
Management Act. 4

1. The Endangered Species Act
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (UESA)S is without
question the center point of the federal biodiversity regulation
web. As the nation's principal wildlife protection law since its
enactment in 1973, the ESA has become a focal point of federal
biodiversity conservation policy. In that respect, it has been
maligned by biodiversity conservation proponents and opponents alike, either as not doing enough or as running ramshackle over private property rights. The truth is that the ESA
is probably faring about as best as can be expected given its
broad goals and limited powers.56

values in the management of public trust resources, including state and local
lands. See, e.g., JACK A. ARCHER ET AL., THE PuBLic TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE
MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA'S COASTS 124-32 (1994). Even in that context, however,
the public trust doctrine would not provide a source of authority with respect to
private lands, and, because of its judicially-devised origins and state level of
application, would not provide a unifying national theme for the role of biodiversity values on all nonfederal lands. The focus of this article thus remains on
federal statutory environmental law authorities.
54. It is not the purpose of this article to provide a comprehensive overview
of all features of all the federal laws that relate in some way to biodiVersity
conservation. Over 35 federal laws contain authorities that are either expressly
directed at biodiversity conservation or could be implemented with that goal in
mind. See NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 300; see also TECHNOLOGIES, supra
note 4, at 223. Many of those laws, however, apply exclusively on federal lands,
which is not the subject of this article. Moreover, many of the laws that apply to
nonfederal lands, such as the principal federal pollution control laws, have a
primary purpose far more narrow than biodiversity conservation, and could be said
to contribute to that goal only tangentially. But see infra part III.A.1 (discussing
proposals to link administration of all such laws together under the unifying
theme of biodiversity conservation). By contrast, the four laws discussed herein
are the only federal laws that apply to nonfederal lands and have as their
principal objectives some or all of the core features of biodiversity conservation
management principles. The four laws are analyzed primarily with their
biodiversity conservation features and impacts in mind; references are supplied to
alert the reader to sources which can supply more detailed analysis of the basic
statutory framework and issues for each of the laws.
55. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
56. For a comprehensive overview of the ESA's history, implementation, and
impacts, see MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW
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a. Basic Goals and Structure Pertainingto

Biodiversity
The ESA expressly acknowledges that "species of fish,
wildlife, and plants are of aesthetic, ecological, educational,
57

historical, and scientific value to the Nation and its people"

and pledges "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon

which endangered species and threatened species depend may
be conserved."58 It is curious, therefore, that Congress paid so
little attention to the ecosystem side of the equation in the basic
structure of the law.
Section 4 of the ESA authorizes the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior to designate species which are endangered or threatened with extinction and to define their critical
habitat areas.

9

Those functions have been assigned to the

United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") of the Department of Interior and to the National Marine Fisheries Service
("NMFS") of the Department of Commerce. Once so designated,
or "listed," species are protected in several ways. Under section
4 of the Act, FWS or NMFS usually must prepare and imple-

ment a plan for the conservation and survival of the species,
known as a recovery plan.6 ° To ensure that FWS and NMFS
do not act alone in that respect, section 9 of the act prohibits all
persons from committing or attempting to commit a "take" of
listed species in specified circumstances.6 1

(1983); see also RICHARD LITTELL, ENDANGERED AND OTHER PROTECTED SPECIES:
FEDERAL LAW AND REGULATION (1992); DANIEL J. ROHLF, THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT: A GUIDE TO ITS PROTECTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION (1989); Oliver

A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S.
Departmentsof Interiorand Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277 (1993); James C.
Kilbourne, The Endangered Species Act Under the Microscope: A Closeup Look
From a Litigator'sPerspective, 21 ENvTL. L. 499 (1991); Andrew A. Smith, et al.,
The Endangered Species Act at Twenty: An Analytical Survey of Federal
EndangeredSpecies Protection, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1027 (1993).
57. ESA § 2(a)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3). For an overview of the definitions
and procedures used for listing species and designating their critical habitat, see
J.B. Ruhl, Section 4 of the ESA-The Cornerstoneof Species ProtectionLaw, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1993, at 26; see also Houck, supra note 56, at 280315; James Salzman, Evolution and Application of CriticalHabitat Under the
EndangeredSpecies Act, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311 (1992).
58. ESA § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
59. ESA § 4(a)-(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)-(c).
60. ESA § 4(f), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f). For a comprehensive overview of the
recovery planning function, see Houck, supra note 56, at 344-51.
61. ESA § 9(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a).
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In the case of species of fish and wildlife listed as endangered, the take prohibition is automatic and absolute-the
prohibition applies by statute to all persons and places subject
to United States jurisdiction. 2 Section 7 of the ESA imposes
additional duties on federal agencies to consult with FWS and
NMFS to ensure that their programs promote conservation-defined to include species recovery-of all listed species"
and that actions which the agencies carry out, fund, or authorize do not jeopardize the continued existence of listed
species
64
or destroy or adversely modify their critical habitat.
The ESA establishes two procedures whereby a prohibited
take of a listed species may nonetheless be authorized if the
take will be incidental to an otherwise lawful activity. Section
7 allows federal agencies to obtain an incidental take statement
from the FWS or NMFS in connection with the consultation on
jeopardy and critical habitat.65 As many state, local, and
private actions involve no federal funding, authorization, or
other involvement, section 10(a) of the act extends the incidental take authorization procedure to those actions when based on
an approved habitat conservation plan. 6 These procedures
allow FWS and NMFS to impose habitat conservation measures7
designed to protect the ecosystem in which the species exists.

62. ESA § 9(a)(1); 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1). For a comprehensive overview of
the scope and impact of the § 9 take prohibition, see Frederico Cheever, An
Introduction to the ProhibitionAgainst Takings in Section 9 of the Endangered
Species Act of 1973: Learning to Live with a Powerful Species PreservationLaw,
62 U. COLO. L. REV. 109 (1991); Albert Gidari, The Endangered Species Act:
Impact of Section 9 on Private Landowners, 24 ENVTL. L. 419 (1994); Steven P.
Quarles et al., The Unsettled Law of ESA Takings, NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'*,
Summer 1993, at 10. Much of the law of § 9, however, is in question at this
writing pending the Supreme Court's decision in Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert.
granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 (1995), in which the scope of the take prohibition is in
issue. See infra text accompanying notes 80-83.
63. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1). For further discussion of the duty of federal
agencies to conserve listed species, see Kilbourne, supra note 56, at 564-72.
64. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(aX2). For a comprehensive overview of the duty of
federal agencies to consult regarding impacts on listed species and critical habitat,
see Houck, supra note 56, at 315-29.
65. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4).
66. Id. § 1539(aXl)(B).
67. An incidental take statement prepared in connection with an interagency consultation under § 7(a)(2) of the ESA between FWS or NMFS and a federal
action agency may prescribe mandatory "reasonable and prudent measures that
the Secretary considers necessary or appropriate to minimize such impact [of
taking]... [and] the terms and conditions.., that must be complied with by the
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FWS and NMFS can implement more direct habitat
conservation measures through their authority under section 5
of the ESA to "establish and implement a program to conserve

fish, wildlife, and plants, including those which are listed as
endangered species or' threatened species," principally by
acquiring land and waters containing the species' habitat.68

Also, states may seek to enter into cooperative agreements with
FWS and NMFS under section 6 of the ESA, through which
states may receive federal funding for, among other things,
"acquisition of land or aquatic habitat.., for the conservation
of resident
endangered or threatened species of fish or wild9

life."

6

b. Biodiversity Strengths and Shortcomings

The ESA on its face contains the seeds for some potentially
strong biodiversity conservation initiatives. The critical habitat
designation procedure could promote identification and protec-

tion of important habitat areas, albeit tied to listed species.
Similarly, a section 4 recovery plan designed to bring a listed
species back to health by preserving its habitat would promote
the viability of other species residing in the habitat area as
well. Also, the habitat conservation measures derived from
section 7 consultations with federal agencies and section 10(a)
permitting of nonfederal actions could produce meaningful
preserve areas in which biodiversity is promoted as an ancillary
benefit.
Most importantly, the direct habitat acquisition

Federal agency or applicant (if any), or both, to implement the [reasonable and
prudent] measures." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(bX4)(C)(ii), (iv). An incidental take permit
issued under § 10(a) of the ESA to a project not subject to the § 7 consultation
requirement can include as part of the required habitat conservation plan
measures "to minimize and mitigate such impacts [of the taking] ...[and] such
other measures that the Secretary may require as being necessary or appropriate
for purposes of the plan." Id. § 1539(a)(2XA)(ii), (iv). FWS has often required the
applicant in both contexts to establish or contribute to the establishment of
habitat preserve areas as a mitigation measure. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas A.
Grahl, Acting Field Supervisor, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., to Wayne A. Lea, Chief
of the Permits Section, Dep't of the Army (Jan. 7, 1992) (on file with author)
(requiring development project applicant to deed restrict over 200 acres as a
reasonable and prudent measure for the elimination of about 23 acres of
endangered species habitat); Proposed Lake Point Development Notice, 58 Fed.
Reg. 45,353 (1993) (announcing proposed approval of a habitat conservation plan
involving deed restriction of 142 acres in mitigation of the elimination of 80 acres
of occupied or potentially occupiable endangered species territory).
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a).
69. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c)(1)(D).
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authorities in sections 5 and 6 of the act provide the federal and
state governments with a powerful habitat preservation tool,
albeit limited by budgetary constraints. In the case of the
federal authority under section 5, moreover, that tool is not
limited to listed species' habitat.70 Overall, then, the ESA
could serve as an important base for biodiversity conservation
policy.
Indeed, the sheer power of the ESA to influence nonfederal
land use decisions cannot be underestimated. The section 9
take prohibition and federal agencies' section 7 consultation
duties have been construed broadly and applied on many
occasions to alter the plans of state, local, and private interests.7 Even where the act is used principally with respect

70. Section 5 extends to "fish, wildlife, and plants, includingthose which are
listed as endangered species or threatened species .... . 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a)
(emphasis added).
71. Some commentators have pointed to the relatively low rate of jeopardy
opinions-issued when the FWS or NMFS determines that the proposed action
would put an endangered or threatened species at risk of extinction, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(b)-as evidence that the ESA does not significantly impede development.
See Michael J. Bean, Taking Stock: The Endangered Species Act in the Eye of a
Growing Storm, 13 PUB. LAND L. REV. 77, 80-81 (1992); Houck, supra note 56, at
318-19. One study demonstrated that only about 0.02% of the over 70,000 § 7(aX2)
consultations conducted in the study period from 1988 through 1993 resulted in
a jeopardy opinion. Id. at 318. However, one must bear in mind that a jeopardy
opinion may only be issued when an entire species would be eradicated as a result
of the proposed action, and thus is not a finding that should be expected to be
made routinely. Also, over 95% of the total number of consultations cited in the
study period were so-called "informal" consultations in which the FWS or NMFS
confirmed either that no endangered species were present in the project area or
the project posed no possible threat to any such species. The relevant denominator
for determining the prevalence of jeopardy opinions is the number of formal
consultations initiated upon a finding that the project may adversely affect an
endangered or threatened species, which was 2,000 in the study period. The
percentage of jeopardy opinions under that analysis is close to 6.5%. Moreover,
even those statistics would not account for the projects which, because of the
expense, time, and difficulties posed by ESA compliance requirements, either were
abandoned before a § 7 consultation or § 10(a) permit application was initiated,
were abandoned during consultation or permit processing because of the delay
associated with agency review, or were substantially altered in design because of
the reasonable and prudent measures or habitat conservation plan conditions the
FWS imposed. For example, in the Austin, Texas area, where dozens of formal
consultations and habitat conservation plans have been initiated in the past five
years given the presence of nine endangered animal species in the metropolitan
area, projects that the FWS has approved under § 7(a)(2) or § 10(a) have on
average faced over $9,000 in additional costs per acre of development as a result
of ESA compliance. George W. Gau & James E. Jarrett, Economic Impact Study:
Balcones Canyonlands Conservation Plan (June 5, 1992) (unpublished preliminary
draft, on file with author). Many projects proposed for location in the Austin
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only to federal lands, as in the case of national forest lands
housing endangered species, the economic implications of the
restrictions imposed can be felt immensely by nonfederal
interests.72 The ESA has been the subject of intense criticism
by self-anointed defenders of private property rights,73 and on
many recent occasions state and local jurisdictions have sought

relief from the economic impacts of ESA policies through
litigation.74 In Congress, the ESA for the first time in decades
is the subject of a substantial movement to reform its authorities; indeed, there appears to be no one left in Congress willing

to step forward in defense of the present statutory scheme.7v

metropolitan area over the past five years were either abandoned or, more
commonly, modified dramatically once the potential impact and cost of ESA
compliance were fully explored by the project developer. Telephone Interview with
Joe Beal, Secretary, Real Estate Council of Austin, Tex. (Nov. 17, 1994); see also
Kim Tyson, Developer's PurchasesStalled: Investment Slowed by Uncertainties
About EndangeredSpecies, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Sept. 21, 1991, at El.
72. For example, although the listing of the northern spotted owl as an
endangered species affected mainly federal lands, the impacts of restricted private
logging practices on those lands caused a private sector furor. See Elizabeth A.
Foley, The Tarnishing of an EnvironmentalJewel: The Endangered Species Act
and the Northern Spotted Owl, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 253 (1992); Gidari,
supra note 62, at 427-43.
73. For a discussion of the so-called "wise use" movement, see infra notes
263-66 and accompanying text.
74. See Williamson County Comm'rs Court v. Babbitt, No. A-94-CA-219-SS
(W.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 1994), appealfiled, No. 95-50034 (5th Cir. Dec. 30, 1994) (on file
with author) (challenging listing status of three cave invertebrate species);
Memorandum in Support for a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
Summary Judgment, Texas v. Babbitt, No. W-94-CA-271 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 1994)
(on file with author) (challenging FWS's ESA program generally as implemented
in Texas); Board of County Comm'rs v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., No.
93-730-HB (D.N.M. Oct. 13, 1994) (memorandum opinion) (on file with author)
(challenging critical habitat designation); Complaint for Declaratory and Injuctive
Relief, Coalition of Ariz./N.M. Counties v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., No.
94-1058-MV (D.N.M. Sept. 19, 1994) (on file with author) (challenging listing
status of Mexican spotted owl); Douglas County v. Lujan, 810 F. Supp. 1470 (D.
Or. 1992) (challenging critical habitat designation), affd in part, rev'd in partsub
nom. Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995).
75. Thus far in the 104th Congress, the ESA has suffered a nearly daily
barrage of criticism. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S1289, S1290 (daily ed. Jan 20,
1995) (statement of Sen. Craig) (calling for immediate action on the ESA to "make
sure that these kinds of silly bureaucratic activities can no longer go on"); 141
CONG. REC. E134 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bonilla) (proposing
species listing moratorium to bring "sanity and common sense to the ESA
process"); 141 CONG. REC. S825 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1995) (statement of Sen. Packwood) (calling for reform of the ESA "to reflect the needs of people as well as bugs
and plants"); 141 CONG. REC. S790 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Hutchison) (introducing species listing moratorium bill as a measure necessary to
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One would think from that raucousness that the ESA is being
used potently to carry out federal biodiversity conservation
policies on nonfederal lands.
It is ironic, then, to find strong criticism of the ESA coming
also from interests identified with "environmentalism," complaining that the law does not go far enough to promote
biodiversity.76 The principal criticism is that the ESA protects
only species on the brink of extinction, and does so only on a
species-specific basis. Biodiversity conservation, by contrast,
epitomizes protection of healthy ecosystems and all the species

within them whether endangered or not. The one ESA
authority that could be used to address this deficiency-the
section 5(a) authority to acquire habitat for any species-is
woefully underfunded and shows no signs of changing in that

respect." Hence, the ESA is left to parlay biodiversity conser"make the real effect of the Endangered Species Act clear to the rulemakers in
Washington"). In a review of the CongressionalRecord for the first two months
of the 104th Congress's action, I found not a single utterance that could fairly be
described as a defense of the current structure and implementation of the ESA,
albeit no comprehensive reform bills had yet been introduced to focus the debate.
Senator Gorton's introduction of an aggressive ESA reform bill on May 9, 1995, see
S. 768, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), should test the resolve of ESA supporters in
Congress. For a discussion of the leading competing reform measures in the 103rd
Congress, see Nancy K. Kubasek et al., The EndangeredSpecies Act: Time for a
New Approach?, 24 ENVTL. L. 329 (1994); Nancy K Kubasek & M. Neil Brown,
The EndangeredSpecies Act: An Evaluationof AlternativeApproaches, 3 DICK. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (1994); Ike C. Sugg, Caught in the Act: Evaluating the
Endangered Species Act, Its Effects on Man and Prospects for Reform, 24 CUMB.
L. REV. 1 (1993-1994). As reauthorization of the ESA has grown increasingly
contentious, many bills have gone so far as to propose a moratorium on new
species listings until the reauthorization process is complete. See S. 191, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 490, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 2451, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); H.R. 5073, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). One such measure
which has been enacted found its way as an amendment into a defense appropriations and rescission bill, imposing a listing moratorium through September 30,
1995. See H.R. 889, 104th Cong., 1st Seass. (1995) (enacted). Although such
measures may be more symbolic than anything else, the fact that they have been
proposed and now enacted evidences a new era for the ESA in Congress. Similar
erosion of the consensus in favor of endangered species protection is also being
witnessed in the states. See, e.g., Cal. A.B. 137, Reg. Sess. (1995) (proposing to
amend the state endangered species law so as to require economic impact analyses
prior to any listing and to require legislative enactment of all species listing
decisions).
76. See, eg., Doremus, supra note 2, at 304-17; Drodzdowski, supra note 13,
at 567-85; Smith, supra note 56, at 1069-72.
77. From 1967 through 1993, the FWS spent $238,457,238 to acquire
349,405 acres of land pursuant to § 5(a) of the ESA and its predecessors. U.S.
Fish & Wildlife Serv., Department of Interior, Land and Water Conservation
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vation out of a species-by-species triage approach. The narrow
focus of the ESA on harm to and recovery of listed species
limits the agencies' abilities to address broader objectives.
Indeed, a myopic focus on saving78a single species could lead to
decisions adverse to biodiversity.
The regulatory authorities which FWS and NMFS can use
even in the limited context of the ESA are themselves constrained by the structure of the Act as well as by administrative
self-restraint in implementation. For example, the only
significance of critical habitat designation is with respect to
federal agency actions regulated under section 7. Nonfederal
actions are not expressly restricted anywhere in the ESA from
adversely modifying critical habitat, though FWS and NMFS
have imposed policies duplicating the restriction in the. section
10(a) permitting context. 79 Also, the take prohibition is often
a clumsy tool for habitat protection. Of the components in the
statutory definition of take, only the term "harm" does not

Fund: Land Purchase Obligations FY 1967 Through 1993, at 1, 1 (1994)
(unpublished document, on file with author). Increased funding does not appear
to be forthcoming. The agency's budget requests for § 5(a) habitat acquisition for
fiscal years 1992-1994 were $34.5 million, $18.5 million, and $7.7 million,
respectively. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 1994, at 715 (1993). The FWS's appropriations for
implementing all of the agency's ESA programs has been just over $40 million per
year since 1988. See Smith, supra note 56, at 1043-45.
78. For example, in the summer of 1991, the FWS circulated a draft
recovery plan for the endangered black-capped vireo, a songbird found in central
Texas, which included a recommendation that"hundreds of millions, perhaps even
several billion cowbirds" would have to be exterminated in order to promote
recovery of the vireo. Joseph A. Grzybowski, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Blackcapped Vireo Recovery Plan 56 (Alisa M. Shull ed., May 14, 1991) (unpublished
draft, on file with author). The cowbird lays its eggs in vireo nests and the
cowbird's young hatch sooner than do the vireo's, compete more successfully for
food, and often suffocate the vireo hatchlings. Id. at 29-35. FWS abandoned the
proposal after public outcry. Bill Collier, Winds Shift for Cowbird: Plans for
Massive Slaughter Rejected, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Dec. 26, 1991, at B1.
Although the cowbird elimination proposal may have benefitted the vireo, no
attention was given to its possible implication on overall species diversity of the
relevant ecosystem.
79. The FWS takes the position that its issuance of a § 10(a) permit is in
itself a federal authorization action triggering the duty to consult under § 7(a)(2)
of the ESA, thereby requiring the FWS to consult with itself. See Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Prohibitions and Permits, 50 Fed. Reg. 39,681,
39,683-84 (1985) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 13, 17). Hence, even though a
nonfederal project has no duty to avoid critical habitat separate from the duty to
avoid take, the applicant in a § 10(a) permit context effectively inherits all of the
additional § 7 consultation requirements under the FWS's policy.
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expressly convey the notion of direct application of physical
force or effect.8 0 FWS and NMFS have defined harm to
include habitat modification that results in actual death or
injury to a listed species individual."' Courts have focused
narrowly on the requirement of actual death or injury to deny
many claims for injunctive relief based on alleged habitat
modification, 82 and at least one court has determined, in
litigation that is before the United States Supreme Court at the
time of this writing, that the notion that habitat modification
alone can constitute take is beyond the scope of congressional
intent.8 3
Even if the take prohibition extends to habitat modification,

other constraints exist on the scope of ESA programs and their
usefulness in unifying federal biodiversity policy. For example,

the procedure found in many federal environmental laws for
delegation to the states of statutory permitting and enforcement
authority potentially limits the reach of the federal agencies'
section 7 duty to consult regarding the impacts of their actions
on protected species, as states acting under such delegation
authority arguably are not required to consult with FWS or
NMFS as their federal counterparts would when taking the
same action. 4 For a Variety of reasons, moreover, the section

80. Take is defined as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill,
trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(19) (1988).
81. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1992).
82. Several cases have held that the requirement in the harm definition that
the action cause "actual death or injury" must be established through evidence
which is neither speculative nor based on tenuous causation theories. See, e.g.,
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N.R.R., 23 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1994);
American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163 (1st Cir. 1993); Morrill v. Lujan, 802
F. Supp. 424 (S.D. Ala. 1992); Swan View Coalition, Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp.
923 (D. Mont. 1992).
83. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d
1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted,115 S. Ct. 714 (1995). For a description of the
administrative and judicial developments leading up to and culminating in the
Sweet Home case, see Steven G. Davison, Alteration of Wildlife Habitat as a
Prohibited Taking Under the EndangeredSpecies Act, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 155 (1995); Gidari, supra note 62.
84. See Draft Agreement Among the Environmental Protection Agency, Fish
and Wildlife Service, and National Marine Fisheries Service Regarding Enhanced
Protection and Recovery of Threatened and Endangered Species Under Section
303(c), 304(a), and 402 of the Clean Water Act (Oct. 20, 1993) (unpublished
document, on file with author); see also John W. Steiger, The Consultation
Provision of Section 7(a)(2) of the EndangeredSpecies Act and Its Application to
Delegable Federal Programs,21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243 (1994).
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7 jeopardy finding is rarely invoked,85 and there is absolutely
no clear meaning or scope given to the duty of federal agencies
under section 7(a)(1) of the ESA to promote conservation of
listed species.8 6 Finally, like the habitat acquisition program
under section 5, recovery plans are dramatically underfunded,

87
leaving them truly as plans only.
Hence, as presently structured, implemented, and funded,
the ESA simply does not get where biodiversity conservation
policy says we should be headed, and has failed to get even as
far as it has in a manner acceptable to the broad spectrum of
interests. Those criticizing the ESA as too potent are responding to the blunt axe of regulation that often falls on a localized
basis when a species is listed. In the case of fish and wildlife
species listed as endangered, aggressive FWS and NMFS

85. See supra note 71.
86. Few cases have commented meaningfully on the scope of the conservation duty, none with respect to the extent to which § 7(a)(1) imposes affirmative
duties. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. United States Dep't of Navy,
898 F.2d 1410, 1416-19 (9th Cir. 1990) (agency properly exercised its discretion
under § 7(a)(1) in leasing land with water rights); Carson-Truckee Water
Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F. 2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1083 (1985) (agency could justify decision not to sell reservoir water to private
consumer based on impacts to endangered fish); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel,
23 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1089 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (agency could not allow bird
hunters to continue using lead shot because of impact on bald eagle); Connor v.
Andrus, 453 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (agency could not restrict hunting
under § 7(a)(1) where no evidence of harm to listed species was present);
Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977) (agency could not
allow sport hunting of migratory game birds at times when endangered species
might accidentally also be killed). FWS and NMFS recently entered into an
agreement with several other federal agencies in which each agency confirmed
that it has the duty to "[ulse its authorities to further the purposes of the ESA by
carrying out programs for the conservation of Federally listed species," but without
specifying anything about the scope or timing of that duty. Memorandum of
UnderstandingBetween FederalAgencies on Implementation of the Endangered
Species Act, Signed Sept. 28, 1994, [July-Dec.] Daily Env't Report (BNA) No. 188,
at E-1 (Sept. 30, 1994).
87. Just over half of the listed endangered and threatened species are
covered by a recovery plan. See Box Score, ENDANGERED SPECIES BULL. (U.S.

Dep't of Interior/Fish & Wildlife Serv., Wash., D.C.), Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 24. FWS
estimates it would cost over $4.6 billion to bring all currently listed species to
recovery, whereas annual funding for such efforts is less than one percent of that
amount. LINKING ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 10, at 156. A study of the line item
quantified expenditure estimates made in the 306 recovery plans approved by
1993, which by no means reflect full recovery costs, showed total quantified
estimated costs of $884,164,000, whereas FWS requested a fiscal year 1995 budget
of $84,411,000 for that purpose and is unlikely ever to receive even that amount.
NATIONAL WILDERNESS INST., GOING BROKE?: COSTS OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT AS REVEALED IN ENDANGERED SPECIES RECOVERY PLANS (1994).
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implementation of the strict take prohibition can put a strangle
hold on nonfederal land uses in the affected area. Those calling
for an expanded statutory authority, however, are responding
to the fact that the blunt axe often falls too narrowly to
translate into an effective biodiversity conservation tool. The
ESA applies only where a listed species resides or its habitat is
found, and only to protect that species, not the species around
it unless incidentally. The ESA thus is too inflexible both in
substantive effect and biological scope to provide a comprehensive, broadly accepted approach to biodiversity conservation
policy."s
c. ESA Biodiversity Initiatives
Despite the ESA's limitations as a source of biodiversity
conservation policy, FWS and NMFS have instituted several
measures directed expressly at promoting biodiversity. In some
88. Congress has attempted on one occasion to patch the ESA's shortcomings
and balance all the competing economic and biological interests in a specific
ecosystem context. In 1980 Congress enacted the Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Act to address the issues of declining salmon
populations and increasing hydroelectric power, logging, fishery, and other
resource uses in the Columbia River Basin. Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1988)). The act, which was implemented
through a congressionally authorized interstate compact agency, was premised on
the notion of placing fish and wildlife resources in the basin on a par with
hydropower in terms of regional conservation and resource use decision-making.
The act's main objective was to avoid future listings of the salmon populations
under the ESA, which was perceived as a substantial threat to hydropower
interests. So-called parity between the competing interests was to be achieved by
requiring electric power consumers to fund, through the Bonneville Power
Administration, a program "to protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife to
the extent affected by the development and operation of any hydroelectric project
of the Columbia River and its tributaries." 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A) (1988). The
initiative also required maintenance of mainstream "flows ... between such
facilities to improve production, migration, and survival" of the anadromous
species. Id. § 839b(hX6)(E)(ii). For a background of Congress's objectives in
passing the law, see generally Michael C. Blumm & Brad. L. Johnson, Promising
a Process for Parity: The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and
Conservation Act and Anadrornous Fish Protection, 11 ENVTL. L. 497 (1981).
Despite Congress's innovative approach, several of the salmon species have been
listed under the ESA, though differences of opinion preside over whether those
listings represent a failure of the program and, if so, what caused the failure.
Compare Michael C. Blumm & Andy Simrin, The Unravelingof the ParityPromise:
Hydropower,Salmon, and EndangeredSpecies in the Columbia Basin, 21 ENVTL.
L. 657 (1991) with Kai N. Lee, Rebuilding Confidence: Salmon, Science, and Law
in the Columbia Basin, 21 ENVTL. L. 745 (1991). In any event, there have been
no serious proposals to transport the Columbia River Basin approach elsewhere
in the nation.
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cases these measures have taken full advantage of the ESA
structure; in other cases FWS and NMFS have probably
stretched the ESA too far beyond its species-by-species focus
and may find their initiatives subject to serious challenge.
In March 1994, FWS issued its omnibus policy statement on
biodiversity, ambitiously titled An Ecosystem Approach to Fish
and Wildlife Conservation: An Approach to More Effectively
Conserve the Nation's Biodiversity."9 FWS defined the ecosystem approach as "protecting or restoring the function, structure,
and species composition of an ecosystem while providing for its
sustainable socioeconomic use."90 FWS described its "partners" in that effort as "the other federal agencies, states, tribes,
local communities, corporate and individual landowners, and
other organizations,""' and promised that "[t]hrough an
integrated ecosystem approach, the [FWSI, with its partners,
can protect and restore fish and wildlife habitats through
holistic management strategies using a wide variety of tools and
techniques."92 To shape that "partnership" and process, FWS
has divided the nation into fifty-two watershed based units93
and declared nine "Ecosystem Approach Principles" ostensibly
geared towards regulatory flexibility and cooperation among the
"partners."9 4

89. ECOSYSTEM APPROACH, supra note 17.
90. Id. at 1.
91. Id. For the agency's further elaboration on the "partnership" theme, see
Ira M. Heyman, Property Rights and the Endangered Species Act: A Renascent
Assault On Land Use Regulation, 25 PAC. L.J. 157 (1994) (Assistant to the
Secretary of the Interior discusses the Department's desire to include local input
in ESA policy); Ron Crete, Partnershipsfor Habitaton PrivateLand, ENDANGERED
SPECIES BULL. (U.S. Dep't of Interior/Fish & Wildlife Serv., Wash., D.C.), Jan.-Feb.
1995, at 12 (discussing FWS's Partners for Wildlife program, under which FWS
has assisted land owners voluntarily in restoring wetlands and other species
habitat).
92. ECOSYSTEM APPROACH, supra note 17, at 3.
93. Id. at 6; see also Henne, supra note 17, at 8.
94. ECOSYSTEM APPROACH, supra note 17, at 5. Though laden with vague
terms and standards, the nine principles are: (1) an ecosystem approach is a
critically important tool in promoting conservation of biological diversity and an
environmentally sustainable level of development; (2) environmental and
socioeconomic factors and interests are considered; (3) natural resource goals must
be established on an ecosystem-wide basis; (4) full participation of all partners
(federal, state, local, tribal, public, and private) in setting and achieving resource
goals is imperative; (5) service resources and tools must be integrated within FWS
and leveraged with those of our partners to achieve greater resource results; (6)
strategies and implementation actions must be based on the best available science;
(7) efforts must be focused on discrete units of the landscape, of varying but
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In reality, however, FWS has had little success convincing
its hoped for "partners" that something other than a shotgun
marriage is involved in the so-called ecosystem approach. The
four principal initiatives implementing the broad ecosystem
approach policy thus far have been indicator species listings,
large-scale critical habitat designations, multi-species recovery
planning, and regional habitat conservation planning. Each has
had dramatic consequences for state, local, and private interests
and has turned many of them off of, rather than on to, biodiversity conservation.
i.Indicator and Keystone Species
Although the single species focus of the ESA can prove
limiting in terms of biodiversity protection, some species may
serve as a surrogate for biodiversity values. Thus, "indicator
species" are those whose population levels and fluctuations
correlate with the health of the ecosystems in which they
exist, 5 and "keystone species" are those whose continued
presence in an ecosystem is crucial for the ecosystem's normal
Protecting indicator and keystone
ongoing functioning.9"
species may indirectly result in the protection of whole ecosystems in which they exist, and consequently the biodiversity
values of the ecosystems. Hence, ESA listing actions could be
directed towards biodiversity conservation as a very prominent
secondary goal of the listing.
Indeed, as an adjunct to the omnibus ecosystem approach
policy, FWS and NMFS recently issued a joint policy statement
describing their use of the ecosystem approach to specified ESA
97
programs, including particularly the species listing function.

manageable size and with similar resource issues, to promote local action and
involvement; (8) the FWS must encourage flexibility and innovation to achieve
greater resource results; and (9) decisions must be delegated to the lowest
appropriate level and FWS employees must be given the maximum possible
authority. Id.
95. See Peter B. Landres et al., Ecological Uses of Vertebrate Indicator
Species: A Critique, 2 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 316, 317 (1988).
96. See WILSON, supra note 13, at 164-65.
97. Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy for the Ecosystem Approach to
the Endangered Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,273 (1994). The agencies' policy
focuses on the ESA goal of conserving ecosystems and posits that
[sluccess of ecosystem management will depend on the cooperation of
partners (federal, state, and private) ....Species will be conserved best
not by a species-by-species approach but by an ecosystem conservation
strategy that transcends individual species. The future for endangered
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The agencies announced that they would "group listing
decisions on a geographic, taxonomic, or ecosystem basis where
possible.""8 Listing of a species based on ecosystem factors
does not itself impose biodiversity regulation. Where the listing
rule focuses on habitat values as the prime reason for listing,

however, the broad "harm" definition, which prohibits habitat
modification, provides an effective regulatory tool for managing
the species' habitat. Also, recovery planning efforts for such

species can more directly focus on the habitat management
policies. Any measures taken to protect the species' habitat
necessarily accrue to other species depending on that habitat,
as well as to the habitat itself.99
Several examples of this approach have emerged from
recent listing actions that focus on loss or impairment of habitat
as the principal reason for the listing. Many recent proposed
and final listings of this variety involve invertebrate or
otherwise "nonglamorous" species whose direct value to humans
may be minimal, but which serve as indicator or keystone
species for unique or specialized ecosystems. °° Other recent

and threatened species will be determined by how well the agencies
integrate ecosystem conservation with the growing need for resource use.
Id. at 34,274.
98. Id.
99. FWS has also developed a policy for conservation of "candidate species"--species considered candidates for future listing but which are not protected
under the ESA-designed to "recover these species and their ecosystems before
listing becomes a high priority." Notice of Availability of Draft Guidance for
Candidate Species Under the Endangered Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,780 (1994).
The policy builds upon agreements FWS has reached with federal and state
authorities in several instances to establish measures to prevent the need to list
species. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between USFWS and Indiana
Department ofTransportation (Oct. 13, 1993) (on file with author) (regarding cavedwelling invertebrate species). These efforts may become increasingly important
given the fact that FWS considers over 2000 animal species as candidates. See
Notice of Review: Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Animal
Candidate Review for Listing as Endangered or Threatened Species, 59 Fed. Reg.
58,982 (1994).
100. A classic example of an indicator species is the Barton Springs
salamander, which has been found only in three spring outlets of the Barton
Springs aquifer in Austin, Texas. The watershed recharging the Barton Springs
aquifer covers an area of over 350 square miles lying southwest of Austin. Many
creeks and tributaries feed at numerous points into recharge features leading
directly into the limestone aquifer structure. Natural spring outlets exist near
downtown Austin and provide popular human recreational locations. The spring
outlets also provide the only known habitat (besides possibly the subterranean
voids of the aquifer itself) of the salamander. The health of the salamander
population is believed to respond to water quality conditions, and therefore acts
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listing actions reveal FWS's new focus on indicator and
keystone species reflecting the integrity of large ecosystems. 1 1
Some proposed and final listing actions quite overtly are
directed at preserving last vestiges of ecosystem types threatened by development. 10 2 Development is not the only target,
moreover, as some species have been listed based on more
endemic habitat degradation factors such as acid rain.'
One

danger in this approach, however, is that in its quest to protect
ecosystems FWS may overstate the case of the species' endan-

germent and the ecosystem's degradation, thus opening the
as an indicator of the health of exclusively subterranean aquifer species the study
of which is complicated by their elusiveness. Paul Chippendale et al., A New
Species of PerennibranchiateSalamanderFromAustin, Texas, 49 HERPETOLOGICA
248 (1993). FWS has proposed listing the salamander as endangered. Proposal
to List the Barton Springs Salamander as Endangered, 59 Fed. Reg. 7968 (1994)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h)). Because no other species existing in or
depending on the continuing integrity of the aquifer provided such a tangible
"indicator" of the health of that ecosystem, FWS's proposed protection of the
salamander can be seen as a surrogate for protection of the aquifer as a whole, a
theme which resonates through the agency's proposed listing rule. Id. Issues
concerning the adequacy of state water quality regulations and the underlying
biological data regarding the species' status led FWS to postpone its listing
decision until August 1995. See 60 Fed. Reg. 13,105 (1995); U.S. Dep't of Interior,
News Release, Secretary Babbit Delays Decision on Barton Springs Salamander,
Commends Governor Bush for Commitment to Protect Water Quality (Mar. 7,
1995) (on file with author).
101. See, e.g., Determination of Threatened Status for the Delta Smelt, 58
Fed. Reg. 12,854 (1993) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h)) (small fish allegedly
threatened by loss of San Joaquin River delta habitat); Final Rule to List the
Mexican Spotted Owl as a Threatened Species, 58 Fed. Reg. 14,248 (1993) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h)) (decline of owl population allegedly associated
with loss of mature forest habitat in five southwestern states).
102. See, e.g., Determination of Endangered Status for the Delhi Sands
Flower-loving Fly, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,881 (1993) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R.
§ 17.11(h)) (small fly known only in several small areas of scrubby vegetation
native to Delhi sands dune systems, all surrounded by urban uses); Proposed Rule
to List the Hine's Emerald Dragonfly as Endangered, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,604 (1993)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h)) (small fly known only in ten fragmented
wetland habitats in Wisconsin and Illinois, all threatened by urbanization and
agricultural uses); Emergency Rule to List the Pacific Pocket Mouse as
Endangered, 59 Fed. Reg. 5306 (1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h))
(mouse previously known throughout sandy coastal sage scrub habitat found along
the southern California coast, now known only in one site, which is threatened
with development).
103. See, e.g., Proposal to List the Spruce-Fir Moss Spider as an Endangered
Species, 59 Fed. Reg. 3825 (1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h)) (small
spider endemic to high elevation eastern spruce-fir forests threatened by forest
desiccation caused by, among other things, acid precipitation). For a description
of the Spruce-Fir Moss spider's unusual life cycle and threatened status, see Ron
Geatz, ArachniphobiaII, NATURE CONSERVANCY, Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 6.
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listing action up to criticism,"°4 and the agency may overstep
its authority under the take prohibition to prevent further
habitat degradation, thus prompting opposition such as the
litigation challenging the validity of the harm definition.' 5
Nevertheless, since 1992 FWS clearly has embarked on a policy
of focusing on indicator and keystone species as a major
component of the species listing program.
ii. Large Scale Critical Habitat Designations
Although FWS and NMFS's implementation of the critical
habitat designation procedure has been criticized as underused
and ineffective," ° recent designations suggest that the agency
has reversed course in that regard on behalf of biodiversity
conservation. Since 1992, several critical habitat designations
include vast expanses of territory which are also associated
with high biodiversity values. For example, in 1992 FWS
designated almost 6.9 million acres of land in California,
Oregon, and Washington as critical habitat for the northern
spotted owl, which FWS describes as depending on old growth
forests in those states for most of its life functions."°7 On
January 27, 1994, FWS proposed to designate over three million
acres in California, Oregon, and Washington as critical habitat
for the marbled murrelet, a marine bird that nests in inland old
growth forests.'
On February 8, 1994, FWS designated
almost 6.5 million acres in California, Arizona, Nevada, and
Utah, over one million acres of which is on private lands, as
critical habitat for the Mojave population of the desert tortoise." 9 On March 21, 1994, FWS designated a total of 1980
linear miles of the lower Colorado River basin river flow and
shoreline as critical habitat for four endangered fish."0 And

104. Litigation challenging the substantive and procedural bases for FWS's
listing decisions has increased since 1988. See Ruhl, supra note 57, at 68-69.
105. See supra notes 80-83.
106. See Houck, supra note 56, at 296-315.
107. Determination of Critical Habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl, 57
Fed. Reg. 1796 (1992) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11(h) and 17.95(b)).
108. Proposed Designation of Critical Habitat for the Marbled Murrelot, 59
Fed. Reg. 3811 (1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11(h) and 17.95(b)).
109. Determination of Critical Habitat for the Mojave Population of the
Desert Tortoise, 59 Fed. Reg. 5820 (1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.95(c)).
110. Determination of Critical Habitat for the Colorado River Endangered
Fishes: Razorback Sucker, Colorado Squawfish, Humpback Chub, and Bonytail
Chub, 59 Fed. Reg. 13,374 (1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R §§ 17.11(h) and
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on December 7, 1994, FWS proposed the designation of 4.77
million acres in several southwestern states-sixteen percent of
which are nonfederal-as critical habitat for the Mexican
spotted owl."'
Such actions do not characterize a passive or reluctant
approach by the agencies to the critical habitat designation
process. To the contrary, although FWS was forced by litigation
to designate critical habitat in many of the referenced instances 2 and openly acknowledges that critical habitat has a
limited role in the ESA in terms of imposing direct restraints
on land use,"' these large-scale designations also recognize
the important role critical habitat designation can have in
defining ecosystems. Hence, through large-scale critical habitat
designations, FWS has created the base from which to promote
biodiversity through management of a single species' habitat.
Recognizing the potential cloud such a designation can cast over
development opportunities in an area, however, economic interests have responded in kind with a flurry of litigation challenging the agency's emerging approach to critical habitat." 4

17.95(e)).
111. Proposed Determination of Critical Habitat for the Mexican Spotted
Owl, 59 Fed. Reg. 63,162 (1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11(h) and
17.95(b)).
112. See, e.g., Silver v. Babbitt, No. 94-0337-PHX-CAM (D. Ariz. Aug. 11,
1994) (order) (ordering FWS to designate critical habitat for the Mexican spotted
owl); Colorado Wildlife Fed'n v. Turner, No. 92-F-884 (D. Colo. Oct 27, 1992)
(order) (ordering FWS to designate critical habitat for the razorback sucker);
Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621, 625-26 (W.D. Wash. 1991)
(order) (ordering FWS to designate critical habitat for the northern spotted owl).
113. FWS has observed that designation of critical habitat
helps focus conservation activities by identifying areas that contain
essential habitat features ... regardless of whether or not they are
currently occupied by the listed species, thus alerting the public to the
importance of an area in the conservation of a listed species. Critical
habitat also identifies areas that may require special management or
protection. Critical habitat receives protection under section 7 of the Act
with regard to actions carried out, funded, or authorized by a Federal
agency .... Aside from the added protection provided under section 7,
the Act does not provide other forms of protection to lands designated as
critical habitat.
57 Fed. Reg. 1796 (1992).
114. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs of Catron County v. United States
Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 93-730-HB (D.N.M. Oct. 13, 1994); Douglas County v.
Lujan, 810 F. Supp. 1470 (D. Or. 1992), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995).
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iii. Ecosystem Recovery Plans
FWS and NMFS have also been criticized for allowing the
recovery planning process to lag far behind the species listing
process."' In the agencies' "ecosystem approach" joint policy
statement, however, recovery planning featured even more
prominently than species listing as a tool for biodiversity
protection."'
The flexibility that recovery planning offers makes it a
suitable tool for the agency to choose for biodiversity protection.
For example, shortly after issuing its policy statement on
recovery planning, FWS released its draft recovery plan for five
aquatic species found in the San Marcos and Comal river
systems that are fed by major spring outlets of the Edwards
Aquifer in central Texas." 7 FWS had listed the species over
a decade before based on perceived threats to their riverine
habitat from the withdrawal of aquifer water by urban and
agricultural uses."' FWS's 1985 recovery plan for the species
had been largely unimplemented, however, and litigation
resulted in FWS agreeing to develop and implement a revised
plan." 9 The new document describes the river and aquifer

115. See Houck, supra note 56, at 344-51.
116. Significantly, FWS and NMFS chose recovery planning as the subject
for specific reference to the concept of biodiversity conservation, stating they would
work to
[d]evelop and implement recovery plans for threatened and endangered
species in a manner that restores, reconstructs, or rehabilitates the
structure, distribution, connectivity and function upon which those listed
species depend. In particular, these recovery plans shall be developed
and implemented in a manner that conserves the biotic diversity
(including the conservation of candidate species, other rare species that
may not be listed, unique biotic communities, etc.) of the ecosystems
upon which the listed species depend.
59 Fed. Reg. 34,274 (1994).
117. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Draft San Marcos and Comal Springs
and Associated Aquatic Ecosystems (Revised) Recovery Plan (Aug. 1, 1994) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Recovery Plan].
118. Id. at 1-3.
119. See Sierra Club v. Babbitt, No. MO-91-CA-069, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3361 (W.D. Tex. 1991), appealdismissed, 995 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1993). The DOI
later agreed to pay $2 million in litigation costs to the plaintiffs. Sierra Club v.
Babbitt, [1994] 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,743 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 23,
1994).

19951

BIODIVERSITY AND NONFEDERAL LANDS

597

systems in classic biodiversity jargon, 120 and, with those
ecosystem relations in mind, the thrust of the conservation
measures adopted in the plan unmistakably is directed at
biodiversity conservation. 12 1 To the chagrin of the City of San
Antonio and local economic interests, however, the plaintiffs
have posited that enforcement through section 10(a) permits
and section 7 consultations is the means of achieving those
measures.12

120. FWS explained that:
Both the San Marcos and Comal springs and river systems are dependent upon water from the Edwards Aquifer and thus represent components of the larger Edwards Aquifer ecosystem. On a smaller scale, both
the San Marcos and Comal aquatic systems contain unique flora and/or
fauna that do not occur throughout the Edwards Aquifer ecosystem as a
whole .... [and] are considered individual ecosystems with the understanding that they are connected to, and an integral part of, the larger
Edwards Aquifer system.
Recovery Plan, supra note 117, at 2-3.
121. FWS explained that:
[Tihe San Marcos and Comal ecosystems, including the spring runs and
the San Marcos and Comal rivers, have one of the greatest known
diversities of organisms of any aquatic ecosystem in the southwestern
United States.. . . The Edwards Aquifer, itself, is also believed to contain
a great diversity of organisms that live within it, underground.
...
The 1984 San Marcos Recovery Plan
was the first recovery plan
to address the recovery of multiple species through an ecosystem
approach. The importance of conservation of the entire spring ecosystem
as the only viable approach for recovery of these species was recognized
early in the development of that plan. Any recovery plan for these
endangered and threatened species that fails to address the continued
functioning of the ecosystems will fail to achieve the recovery goals set
forth for these listed species. Protection of these ecosystems should also
help conserve the many other unique organisms that reside there,
including species that are candidates for listing.
Id. at 1-3. The recovery actions specified in the plan include scientific research to
increase understanding of the species and their relation to the ecosystems, controls
on groundwater pumping, pollution controls, habitat restoration, and captive stock
management.
122. In April 1994, the Sierra Club sent letters to a variety of federal, state,
local, and private entities, alleging that they were in violation of the take
prohibition as a result of their water pumping withdrawals from the aquifer. See
Letter from Ken Kramer, Director, Lone Star Chapter of the Sierra Club, to Bruce
Babbitt, Secretary, United States Department of Interior (Apr. 15, 1994) (on file
with author). Texas has since challenged the notion that pumping constitutes
take of endangered species requiring ESA authorization. See Texas v. Babbitt, No.
W-94-CA-271 (W.D. Tex. filed Sept. 30, 1994). The district court judge in Sierra
Club v. Babbitt, however, recently held a hearing at which he ordered the parties
to provide written arguments on the issue of his authority under the ESA to order
pumping limits, observing that "[slome people say I [don't have the right to]
regulate pumping. Let me tell you this: I think I do, and until the 5th Circuit
says I can't, I can." Roy Bragg, Aquifer-pumping Curb Threatened, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 25, 1995, at 1A.

598

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

Hence, although FWS faces many hurdles for implementing
the Edwards Aquifer recovery plan and others like it based on
ecosystem protection, not the least of which are funding
constraints and litigation, FWS clearly has shifted its species
recovery focus to an overt acknowledgment that bliodiversity
conservation is a principal goal of the recovery planning
function."12
iv. Regional Habitat Conservation Planning
Indicator and keystone species listings, large-scale critical
habitat designations, and ecosystem recovery planning are not
independent agendas for FWS and NMFS's ESA implementation. Rather, those programs set the stage for implementation
policies based on habitat protection rather than merely species
protection. FWS in particular has been aggressive in that
respect, using the harm definition as leverage for achieving its
habitat protection strategies of the listing and recovery
programs.
In areas where ecosystem management takes on a regional
dimension, most notably southern California, the Pacific
Northwest, and central Texas, FWS has convinced local
authorities and private interests that ,the harm. definition
imposes strong restrictions on habitat development regardless
of the direct impacts of such actions on species individuals.
Although the harm definition has only occasionally been
effective in that respect when tested in court, 24 and indeed
12
has failed completely in that respect in at least one forum, 5
FWS has succeeded in using its specter as a means of promot-

123. See also Memorandum of Agreement for Central Platte River Basin
Endangered Species Recovery Implementation Program (June 10, 1994) (on file
with author)'(FWS and three states agreed to provide recovery efforts on behalf,
of endangered species in the Platte River basin).
124. Although its potential potency is beyond dispute, the harm definition
has only rarely been applied to find that a take has occurred. See generally
Cheever, supra note 62. FWS has seldom prosecuted administrative, civil, or
criminal actions solely on the ground of habitat modification; rather, citizen group
litigation has been the principal source of case law regarding the scope of the
harm definition in that regard. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 82.
125. See Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt,
17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 (1995).
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ing large-scale habitat conservation planning efforts under the
auspices of "regional" section 10(a) permits.1 2

Although the concept of. regional planning has much
application to biodiversity conservation conceptually and
support from FWS towards that purpose, regional permitting

efforts in practice have been mostly uninspiring. While much
regional planning activity appears to be occurring, relatively
little actual regional habitat conservation is being accomplished.'27
Nevertheless, a promising example of what

126. See MICHAEL J. BEAN ET AL., WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, RECONCILING
CONFLICTS UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: THE HABITAT CONSERVATION
PLANNING EXPERIENCE (1991); J.B. Ruhl, Regional HabitatConservationPlanning
Under the Endangered Species Act: Pushing the Practicaland Legal Limits of
Species Protection, 44 SW. L.J. 1393 (1991); Robert D. Thornton, Searching for
Consensus and Predictability: Habitat Conservation Planning Under the
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 21 ENVTL. L. 605 (1991). A regional § 10(a)
permit generally involves issuance of a permit to some regional authority, such as
a consortium of governments, private interests, or both, who will use the permit
to authorize public and private activities that would otherwise require (at least in
FWS's opinion) an individual incidental take authorization under § 10(a) or
through a § 7 consultation. In return for that blanket permit, the regional
authority administers an organized habitat conservation program financed
through fees and land donations obtained from individual users of the regional
permit, as well as through public funding sources. Presumably, the advantage of
the regional approach, as opposed to individualized permitting, is its ability to pool
resources and avoid fragmented habitat losses that impair the overall regional
biodiversity. See, e.g., Lindell L. Marsh, Conservation Planning Under the
EndangeredSpecies Act: A New Paradigmfor Conserving Biological Diversity, 8
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 97 (1994). To promote those advantages and ensure the
regulated community of its resolve to support regional plans, FWS in 1994 issued
its "No Surprises" policy statement outlining measures for assuring lasting
regulatory certainty for private landowners who engage in ESA habitat
conservation efforts. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NATIONAL MARINE
FISHERIES SERV., No SURPRISES: ASSURING CERTAINTY FOR PRIVATE LANDOWNERS
IN ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING (1994)
[hereinafter No SURPRISES]; see also U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., DRAFT INTERIM
HANDBOOK FOR HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING AND INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT
PROCESSING (1994) [hereinafter INTERIM HANDBOOK] (describing planning criteria
for regional habitat conservation plans). Five more § 10(a) permits had been
issued by September 1994. See William E. Lehman, Reconciling Conflicts Through
Habitat Conservation Planning, ENDANGERED SPECIES BULL. (U.S. Dep't of
Interior/Fish & Wildlife Serv., Wash., D.C.), Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 16, 18.
127. Of the 31 section 10(a) permits issued through June 15, 1994, only four
were regional in dimension, albeit several permits issued to individual applicants
were significant in size. See SPECIES PROTECTION ON NONFEDERAL LANDS, supra
note 12, at 18-20. FWS reports that, as of January 4, 1995, more than 100 § 10(a)
applications are pending agency review, with a small fraction of those being
region-wide in scope. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., STATUS OF HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLANS (1995). Regional planning poses both financial and political
challenges. For example, the Balcones Canyonlands Conservation Plan, once
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regional planning could accomplish when consensus is genuinely sought and funding impacts are equitably distributed is
FWS's September 1994 approval of a regional permit for the
metropolitan area around Bakersfield, California.'28 The
Metropolitan Bakersfield Habitat Conservation Plan is the
largest multi-species habitat conservation plan which FWS has
approved to date, covering 17 species in a 408 square mile
planning area. 2 9 The permit grew from true consensus
building efforts between FWS, local governments, environmen-

tal groups, and the affected private interests. Through
reasonable "pay as you go" development fees and tradable
development rights, the permit holds much potential for

amassing significant habitat conservation tracts that will
inevitably promote biodiversity values. The Bakersfield permit
thus provides a model for future regional planning efforts and
an indication of FWS's strong interest in regional planning as
a biodiversity conservation tool. 3 °
touted as the solution for solving all the ESA issues facing Austin, Texas and the
model for all other areas of the country, has been in the planning stage for over
six years, has engendered intense opposition by the purported landowner and
developer beneficiaries, and remains as of this writing just a plan. Public bond
financed funding requirements of over $48 million dissuaded taxpayers from
approving a bond referendum to finance an early version of the plan, and
development fees proposed at one time as high as $40,000 per acre dissuaded
many developers and landowners from endorsing a later version of the plan. In
short, Austin's plan had neither adequate funding nor the support of the regulated
community. See Ruhl, supra note 126, at 1413-23; Melinda E. Taylor, Promoting
Recovery or Hedging a Bet Against Extinction: Austin, Texas's Risky Approach to
Ensuring EndangeredSpecies' Survival in the Texas Hill Country, 24 ENVTL. L.
681 (1994). See generally infra text accompanying notes 243-62.
128. METROPOLITAN BAKERSFIELD HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN STEERING
COMM., CONSERVATION PLAN (1994).

129. Id. at ii.
130. Regional planning efforts under state endangered species protection
initiatives also hold promise as a means of biodiversity protection. For example,
in 1991 the California legislature enacted the Natural Community Conservation
Planning Act ("NCCP Act"), which encourages cooperation with respect to
biodiversity conservation among land managers, environmentalists, local
governments, and state and federal agencies. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 28002840 (West Supp. 1995). The NCCP Act authorizes the state to enter into
agreements with local and private entities to prepare natural community
conservation plans promoting "regional or area-wide protection and perpetuation
of natural wildlife diversity, while allowing compatible development and growth."
Id. §§ 2805(a), 2810. FWS has pledged to support the NCCP Act plans financially
and through regulatory efforts. Memorandum of Understanding Between the
California Department of Fish and Game and the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service Regarding Coastal Sage Scrub Natural Community Conservation Planning
in Southern California (Dec. 4, 1991) (on file with author). Hence, by obtaining
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d. Conclusion
The ESA is rightfully the center stage of biodiversity policy
in the United States today, particularly when local and private
lands are the subject of the biodiversity conservation efforts.
The species-based focus of the law does limit its flexibility, and
its heavy-handed regulatory approach alienates many of the
constituencies whose support is needed for a successful
biodiversity conservation program. FWS's multi-front policy of
indicator and keystone species listings, large-scale critical
habitat designations, ecosystem-based recovery plans, and
regional habitat conservation planning largely overcome the
shortcomings posed by the species-specific focus of the law, but
at the expense in many cases of even further resentment by
state and local authorities and private interests. Where FWS's
policies have been most successful are instances of broad
consensus between government, environmental, and private
interests, such as the Bakersfield regional permit, thus
suggesting that flexibility and consensus in general are key
elements of a successful biodiversity conservation policy.
2. Clean Water Act Section 404
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") 131 takes up
just a few provisions of the nation's principal water pollution
control statute, but has engendered more than passing controversy and litigation regarding its regulation of activities
affecting "wetlands." Perhaps as much as the Endangered

state and federal approval of a plan, the local and private entities will satisfy the
requirements of the ESA and the California Endangered Species Act. See
California Dep't of Fish & Game, Southern California Coastal Sage Scrub, Natural
Community Conservation Planning: Process Guidelines, at 18, § 5.7 (Nov., 1993)
(unpublished document, on file with author). The promise of the NCCP Act and
its initial successes in southern California led FWS to promulgate a special rule
authorizing certain development activities within the range of the threatened
coastal California gnatcatcher. Special Rule Concerning Take of the Threatened
Coastal California Gnatcatcher, 58 Fed. Reg. 65,088 (1993) (describing "the
conditions under which take of the coastal California gnatcatcher would not be a
violation of section 9" of the ESA). For a detailed discussion of the NCCP Act, see
Craig Manson, Natural Communities Conservation Planning: California'sNew
Ecosystem Approach to Biodiversity, 24 ENVTL. L. 603 (1994). Many other states
have initiated similar habitat acquisition and preserve programs. See generally
NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 301-03.
131. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 404, 86 Stat. 884 (1972) (codified as amended at
33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
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Species Act, section 404 has evoked the ire of landowners and
disdain of environmentalists as to the level to which it preserves coastal and freshwater wetland ecosystems. Perhaps
more so than the ESA, however, its specific focus on ecosystems, albeit only a particular kind, presents important opportunities for biodiversity conservation."3 2
a. Basic Goals and Structure Pertainingto
Biodiversity
Unlike the ESA, section 404 does not posit lofty goals for
protection of wetlands. Indeed, the word wetlands does not
even appear in the statutory provisions. Rather, as an exception to the CWA's basic prohibition of discharges of pollutants
into waters of the United States," section 404(a) authorizes
the Secretary of the Army to "issue permits ...for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at
specified disposal sites." 34 Section 404(b)(1) directs the
Secretary of the Army to select disposal sites based on the
application of guidelines promulgated by the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA7).'" The EPA, moreover, may veto
the specification of a disposal site whenever it determines that
the discharge at the site "will have an unacceptable adverse
effect on ... shellfish beds and fishery areas (including
spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas."136 Section 404(f) specifies certain activities as exempt
from the permitting procedure and discharge siting guidelines, 137 and section 404(e) allows the Secretary of the Army
to specify categories of low impact activity, on a state-wide,
regional, or national basis, exempt from permitting on a projectby-project basis if such exemption is consistent with the section

132. Notwithstanding its significant potential for promoting biological
resource conservation, only one other legal commentary on biodiversity conservation even mentions § 404 in any significant way. See Robert L. Fischman,
Biological Diversity and EnvironmentalProtection:Authorities to Reduce Risk, 22
ENVTL. L. 435, 491-98 (1992). For a superb and comprehensive overview of the
§ 404 program, see Margaret N. Strand, FederalWetlands Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., WETLANDS DESKBOOK (1993); see also WILLIAM L. WANT, LAW OF
WETLANDS REGULATION (1989 & Supp. 1994).
133. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
134. Id. § 1344(a).
135. Id. § 1344(bXl).
136. Id. § 1344(c).
137. Id. § 1344(f).
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404(b)(1) guidelines.3 Pursuant to section 404(h), the EPA,
with the Secretary's approval, may also delegate the permitting
and enforcement authorities under section 404 to states, though
13 9
few states have sought such authority.
The Secretary of the Army, through the Corps of Engineers
("Corps"), has implemented the section 404 permitting authorities through regulations which give a healthy dose of attention
to ecosystem considerations."4 Although initially the Corps'
regulations encompassed only waters capable of or affecting
navigation, judicial construction of section 404 required the
Corps to expand the jurisdictional waters to include certain

wetland areas.'' Wetlands, the definition of which has been
a matter of raging debate surrounding the so-called Federal
Wetlands Delineation Manual," now comprise the bull's eye
of the section 404 program.

The Corps' regulations impose a variety of review criteria on
applications for discharge permits." Together these criteria
form a public interest test balancing the expected benefits of
the permitted activity and its potential environmental harms.

138. Id. § 1344(e).
139. Id. § 1333(h). For a discussion of why only two states-Michigan and
New Jersey-have availed themselves of delegation of the § 404 program, see
Survey, Wetlands Protection, Federal and State Coordination: A Survey of
Administrative Law Schemes; 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 447 (1994).
140. 33 C.F.R. pts. 320-30 (1994).
141. For a thorough exploration of the history of the judicial expansion of
the Corps' § 404 jurisdiction, see Virginia S. Albrecht & David Isaacs, Wetlands
Jurisdictionand JudicialReview, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1992, at 29;
Elizabeth A.G. Geltman, Regulationof Non-Adjacent Wetlands Under Section 404
of the Clean Water Act, 23 NEW ENG. L. REV. 615 (1988-89).
142.

U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE ET AL., FEDERAL WETLANDS DELINEA-

TION MANUAL (1989). In 1977 the Corps and EPA adopted a unified definition of
wetlands that remains in effect today. They define wetlands to include "areas that
are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and
duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support,
a prevalence of vegetation adapted for life in saturated soil conditions." 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(b) (1994) (Corps); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (1994) (EPA). Nevertheless, the
agencies have had a tortured history of agreement and vacillation regarding how
to implement the definition in the field. The agencies' so-called FederalWetlands
DelineationManual used for that purpose has undergone several transformations
in recent years as the focal point of political and scientific debate over what really
and what legally constitutes a wetland. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE
FUND & WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, How WET IS A WETLAND?: THE IMPACTS OF THE
PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE FEDERAL WETLANDS DELINEATION MANUAL (1992);

Michael R. Deland, No Net Loss of Wetlands: A Comprehensive Approach, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVT, Summer 1992, at 3; Strand, supra note 132, at 14-16.
143. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (1994).

604

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

On the one hand, for example, the Corps will consider effects on
economics, land use, navigation, recreation, water supply,
energy needs, and, significantly, "considerations of property
ownership.""
Those factors could often pose interests
inconsistent with the goal of promoting biodiversity. On the
other hand, biodiversity could be enhanced under the Corps'
required consideration of conservation, aesthetics, wetlands,
fish and wildlife values, and, as a catch-all, "general environmental concerns." 14
With respect to wetlands specifically, moreover, the Corps'
rules advise that unnecessary alteration or destruction of
wetlands "should be discouraged as contrary to the public
interest"'4 and that "the cumulative effect of numerous
piecemeal changes can result in a major impairment of wetlands resources." 14' Hence, there are strong presumptions
against discharges in wetlands and there are meaningful review
criteria by which to promote preservation of such ecosystems.
The Corps' categorical permits, known as "Nationwide Permits,"
also contain provisions restricting their use by an otherwise
qualifying
project when endangered species may be affect148

ed.

The EPA's section 404(b)(1) guidelines for specification of
disposal sites, 149 which the Corps recognizes as legally binding
on its permitting program,' 5 ° go even farther than the Corps'
regulations in managing activities in wetlands ecosystems. The
principal mechanism in the EPA's rules for prohibiting development in wetlands is the requirement that the Corps not issue
a permit to discharge if there is a practicable alternative with
less adverse environmental impact.' 5 ' If fulfilling the basic
purpose of a project does not require access or proximity to or
siting within jurisdictional waters-i.e., is not "water dependant"-practicable alternatives which do not require discharge
in a wetland are presumed to be available and less environmen-

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id.
Id. § 320.4(b)(1).
Id. § 320.4(b)(3).
Id. § 330.4(f).
40 C.F.R. pt. 230 (1994).
33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(1).
40 C.F.R. § 230.10(aXl).
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tally adverse.'5 2 Even where discharge in wetlands is the
least adverse option and only practicable alternative, a permit
cannot be granted if the discharge would contribute to significant degradation of jurisdictional waters.1" The criteria for
that analysis include the effect on "aquatic ecosystem diversity."15 4 Where the EPA concludes the Corps has granted a
it may
permit in violation of those section 404(b)(1) guidelines,
155
authority.
denial
permit
404(c)
section
implement its
The practical effect of the EPA's section 404(b)(1) guidelines
is to establish a hierarchy of preferred management strategies.
Under the practicable alternatives test, avoidance of disturbances to wetland areas is the highest preference, and the Corps
and the EPA will scrutinize a project proposal to ensure it
affects wetlands only if and where necessary. Minimization of
the degree of impacts in wetlands that cannot be avoided is the
second strategy in the hierarchy and may require project design
measures such as reduced density or construction precautions
to reduce adverse impacts. 1 56 Finally, the last preference, for
impacts that cannot be avoided or further reduced in intensity,
is to require that the project applicant provide compensatory
mitigation for wetlands degradation and losses.'57
b. Biodiversity Strengths and Shortcomings
Among the programs regulating nonfederal lands and
development, the section 404 program stands out in specifically
addressing biodiversity as a regulatory goal and criterion.
Unlike the case of the ESA, therefore, the Corps and the EPA
need not stretch section 404 to fabricate an enforceable

152. Id. § 230.10(a)(3). For an overview of the EPA's practicable alternatives test and its application in administrative and judicial forums, see Robert
Uram, The Evolution of the Practicable Alternatives Test, NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T, Summer 1992, at 15.
153. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c).
154. Id. § 230.10(c)(3).
155. 40 C.F.R pt. 231. For a discussion of how the EPA has implemented
its permit veto authority, see William B. Ellis, Section 404(c): Where's the
Balance?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT, Summer 1992, at 25.
156. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(d), §§ 230.70-.77.
157. Id. § 233.23(c)(9). The Corps and EPA have developed a memorandum
of agreement defining wetlands mitigation policies consistent with the § 404(bX1)
guidelines. See Memorandum of Agreement; Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1)
Guidelines, 55 Fed. Reg. 9210 (1990). See generally Margot Zallen, The Mitigation
Agreement-A Mqjor Development in Wetland Regulation, 7 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENVT, Summer 1992, at 19.
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biodiversity policy; rather, the statutory terms are broad
enough to accommodate promotion of biodiversity, and both the
Corps and, to a greater degree, the EPA took that invitation to

make biodiversity a powerful regulatory goal implemented
through the Corps' permitting authority and the EPA's permit
veto authority. Indeed, if the amount of landowner and
developer ire is any reliable measure of the degree to which
biodiversity protection is coerced under a program, section 404
easily stands side-by-side with the ESA. 158

Yet section 404 also is the subject of harsh criticism by
advocates of biodiversity protection, who point to statistics
reporting the nation's long term wetlands losses." 9 In short,

158. Of the four federal land use regulation programs covered in this article,
§ 404 has been the most frequent target of claims that a federal permitting
decision has led to a taking of private property for which compensation from the
government is due. U.S. GEN. ACcT. OFF., PUB. No. GAO/RCED-93-176FS, CLEAN
WATER ACT: PRIVATE PROPERTY TAKINGS CLAIMS AS A RESULT OF THE SECTION
404 PROGRAM (1993) (examining the financial impact of takings litigation under
§ 404); Jon Kusler & Eric Meyers, Takings: Is the Claims Court All Wet?, NATL
WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. L. Inst., Wash., D.C.), Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 6 (takings
claims have been raised in over 200 wetlands cases). According to Federal Court
of Claims Chief Judge Loren A. Smith, wetlands cases comprise 12% of the court's
docket and 25%, the largest component, of all the court's Fifth Amendment takings
cases. Honorable Loren A. Smith, Wetlands: Past, Present, and Future, Address
Before the Association ofAmerican Law Schools, Sections on Agricultural Law and
Environmental Law (Jan. 6, 1995) (on file with author).
159. Although the United States has lost over 50% of the domestic wetlands
present before European settlement, over 100 million acres of domestic wetlands
remain intact today. Pressure to develop those remaining areas continues to exist.
See generally COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, OUR NATION'S WETLANDS (1978);
THOMAS E. DAHL, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, WETLANDS LOSSES IN THE UNITED
STATES 1780S TO 1980S (1990); TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 4, at 66; Robert E.
Beck, The Movement in the United States to Restorationand Creationof Wetlands,
34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 783, 783-99 (1994); Thomas E. Dahl, Wetlands Losses Since
the Revolution, NATL WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. L. Inst., Wash., D.C.), Nov.-Dec.
1990, at 16. The annual rate of wetland acres filled is believed to have decreased
steadily since the Corps was required to extend § 404 jurisdiction to wetlands.
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., PUB. No. GAO/RCED-92-79FS, WETLANDS OVERVIEW:
FEDERAL AND STATE POLICIES, LEGISLATION, AND PROGRAMS (1991). Estimates are
that about 140,000 to 290,000 acres of domestic wetlands currently are lost
annually to development, agriculture, and other uses. Id. at 11. It is contended
by some, however, that the most recent studies show that the annual number of
filled acres is at the low end of that range, and that about the same number or
more acres of wetlands are created or restored each year pursuant to the § 404
program and other initiatives. In other words, the nation could begin to
experience a net increase of domestic wetlands in 1994. See generally JONATHAN
TOLMAN, COMPETITIVE ENTER INST., GAINING MORE GROUND: ANALYSIS OF
WETLAND TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES (1994). Of course, these statistics all
depend on how one defines a wetland and they do not purport to measure the
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they argue, section 404 is designed to allow discharges in
wetlands, and more often than not, dischargers get close to
their way as to the amount and location of discharge. Whether
those are fair criticisms or not, it is the case that section 404,
like the ESA, is designed to allow activities that would be
fundamentally inconsistent with biodiversity conservation
unless that goal is closely monitored, controlled, and enforced.
Structurally, moreover, section 404 has significant limitations on its role in a comprehensive biodiversity conservation
program. As a threshold matter, of course, it deals with only
one type of ecosystem, albeit an important one. Wetlands,
however, are not the only ecosystem in need of attention.
Moreover, the regulatory definition of a wetland is imprecise
and thus leaves room to define wetlands in the field in different
ways. The amount of land subject to section 404 therefore can
swing dramatically depending on the field definition adopted. 160 Section 404 thus suffers from a "bright line" jurisdictional trigger similar to the one that limits ESA jurisdiction-because the Corps and EPA traditionally have defined
wetlands according to the presence of specified physical and
biological characteristics, which generally do not account for
how those characteristics interrelate with the surrounding
ecosystem, some upland areas which may be important to
adjacent wetland ecosystem management may be left unregulated because they just marginally do not fit the rigid definition of
wetlands in use at the time. Like species that are declining
towards threatened status, stressed near-wetlands receive no
protection. In addition, even areas that qualify as jurisdictional
wetlands may fall through the cracks of biodiversity protection
through application of the statutory exclusions and Nationwide
Permits that limit or preclude closer regulatory scrutiny.
c. Section 404 Biodiversity Initiatives
The principal biodiversity initiative under the section 404
program is known as mitigation banking, the section 404
analogy to the ESA's regional conservation planning effort.
biological quality of wetlands lost and gained. Under a broad definition of what
constitutes a wetland, it would be entirely possible for us to experience a net gain
in wetlands, but a net loss of biological value in wetlands functions, or vice versa.
160. The potential for wide swings in the amount of wetlands covered by
§ 404 is amply demonstrated by the Federal Wetlands Delineation Manual
controversy, discussed supra note 142.
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Although mitigation for wetland losses approved in section 404
permits is the last preference of EPA:s wetland protection
measures, avoidance and minimization being superior in EPA's
view, mitigation is an often-used and a widespread approach to
wetlands protection.
Recognizing the importance of mitigation to the section 404
program, in 1995 the Corps and the EPA issued a joint internal
guidance document to establish general guidelines for the
establishment and use of wetlands mitigation banks under
Wetlands mitigation banking involves the
section 404.16
creation, restoration, or enhancement of wetland or other
aquatic habitats expressly for the purpose of providing compensatory mitigation in advance of discharges into wetlands
permitted under the section 404 regulatory program. Mitigation banks often involve areas larger than the area needed to
compensate for the loss of wetlands authorized in an individual
section 404 permit. The resulting wetland "bank" can be used
by the permittee to compensate for future wetland losses for
which the permittee may seek authorization, or may be sold in
parcels to other permittees whose permit conditions impose
compensatory mitigation measures.
The EPA and the Corps identify many biological, financial,
and regulatory advantages of mitigation banking in their
guidance document. Because mitigation banking occurs ahead
of permitting, it avoids temporal losses of wetland habitat
experienced in post-permit mitigation scenarios. Like regional
habitat conservation efforts under the ESA, moreover, wetland
161. Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of
Mitigation Banks, 60 Fed. Reg. 12,286 (1995). The EPA and the Corps acted with
solid historical support from the White House and Congress in adopting a
mitigation banking policy. In 1991 President Bush had proclaimed mitigation
banking efforts consistent with the overall wetland protection program. Statement
on Wetlands Preservation, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1032 (1991). Congress also had
endorsed mitigation banking in legislation authorizing state highway departments
to use banking as a method of compensation for wetland losses resulting from
surface transportation projects. Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914. For a detailed discussion of the
wetland mitigation banking program and other wetland restoration and creation
initiatives, see Beck, supra note 159, at 799-824; William W. Sapp, Mitigation
Banking: Panaceaor Poison for Wetlands Protection, 1 ENVTL. LAW. 99 (1994);
Jonathan Silverstein, Taking Wetlands to the Bank: The Role of Wetland
MitigationBanking in a Comprehensive Approach to Wetlands Protection,22 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 129 (1994); Robert D. Sokolove & Pamela D. Huang,
Privatizationof Wetland Mitigation Banking, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV T, Summer
1992, at 36.

1995]

BIODIVERSITY AND NONFEDERAL LANDS

609

banking efforts produce larger contiguous wetland ecosystems
than could be expected through individualized mitigation
efforts. If the location of mitigation banks is chosen carefully
based on biological resource factors, the resulting wetland areas
potentially will function more like a complex wetland ecosystem, and can benefit by their size from a buffer effect against
the intrusions of surrounding development. Indeed, it is
entirely possible that the wetland banking area will provide
more biodiversity values than the numerous smaller parcels of
lost or degraded wetlands for which the bank acts as compensation. The economies of scale associated with larger restoration
and creation efforts make banking attractive to developers and
allow the pooled resources to retain greater biological and
planning expertise. Finally, the presence of approved mitigation banks lends greater certainty to the regulatory process, as
permittees and the agencies know ahead of time that mitigation
conditions are satisfied. Mitigation banking is thus firmly
established as an approved policy for compensatory mitigation
under the section 404 program, and holds much promise as a
means of improving the overall biodiversity of the wetlands
ecosystems of the nation.
d. Conclusion
Despite its explicit focus on biodiversity values, section 404
has been largely ignored in biodiversity literature as a significant biodiversity program. Section 404, in short, has few
friends. The regulatory focus of the wetlands protection law
has evoked strong resentment from the landowner and developer communities. Environmental interests bemoan that the
section 404 program has not stopped the tide of wetland losses.
Neither side is being quite fair to section 404 or recognizing the
significant potential it has for biodiversity conservation. The
mitigation banking concept offers a means of ameliorating the
regulatory pinch while at the same time producing meaningful
biodiversity values. Those efforts, however, will succeed only
because of a close consensus of diverse interests, once again
indicating that flexibility of approach and consensus-building
are necessary ingredients to successful biodiversity protection
programs.
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3. National Environmental Policy Act
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA")' 62 establishes an environmental impact review procedure
for certain actions funded, authorized, or carried out by federal
agencies. As such, NEPA presents opportunities to consider
impacts on biodiversity as one of the review criteria, and
thereby to improve the ability of federal agencies to make
decisions promoting biodiversity conservation."
a. Basic Goals and Structure Pertainingto
Biodiversity
NEPA was enacted in 1970 in recognition of "the profound
impact of man's activity on the interrelations of all components
of the natural environment."16 4 Although pronouncing that
"each person ... has a responsibility to contribute to the
preservation and enhancement of the environment"'" and
that the federal government has the responsibility to "use all
practicable means ... [to] maintain, wherever possible, an
environment which supports diversity and variety of individual
choice,"'66 NEPA does not overtly address biodiversity conservation.
Rather, in a manner that has been described as "not
stunning in its specificity,"' 67 NEPA implores the federal
government to attain six broad goals of environmental policy." s In the only concrete program established to carry out
those goals, section 102(2)(c) of NEPA requires that federal
agencies "include in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment"
a detailed statement on, among other things, "the environmental impact of the proposed action ... [and] alternatives to the
162. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
163. For a comprehensive overview of the NEPA program, see RONALD E.
BASS & ALBERT I. HERSON, MASTERING NEPA: A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH (1993);
DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION (2d ed. 1992); WILLIAM H.
RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 800-1023 (2d ed. 1994).
164. NEPA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).
165. NEPA § 101(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c).
166. NEPA § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b).
167. RODGERS, supra note 163, at 802.
168. NEPA § 101(bXl)-(6), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1)-(6).
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proposed action."'69 The duty to compile such reports, known
as environmental impact statements ("EIS"s), has spawned a
plethora of litigation over the meaning of key statutory terms
such as "major Federal actions" and "significantly affecting" and

the scope of "environmental impacts" and "alternatives" to be
considered. 7 ° The magnitude of litigation surrounding those

issues and the weight case law has given to NEPA as a force to
be reckoned with in environmental planning far outstrips what

anyone had in mind or hope when the statute was first enacted.
NEPA established the Council on Environmental Quality
("CEQ") to place the meat on the bones of the broad federal
agency programs outlined in the statute.' 7 ' Hints of biodiversity factors appear in CEQ's regulations defining those procedures. 72 For example, CEQ defines "significantly," as in

"significantly affecting," to include consideration of the "[ulnique
characteristics of the geographic area such as ... ecologically

critical areas" 73 and the "degree to which the action may
adversely affect an endangered or threatened species or its
habitat." 174 The effects of the proposed action that must be
considered in the impact review include effects on "natural
systems, including ecosystems." 75 To the extent different
agencies might implement NEPA differently with regard to

those ecosystem criteria, the EPA's authority to review all other
federal agency EISs 176 acts to ensure that a standard approach to environmental factors is provided throughout the

federal government.

Hence, NEPA, as filled out by CEQ

169. NEPA § 102(2Xc), 42 U.S.C. 0 4332(2)(c).
170. For a comprehensive overview of these and other issues arising under
NEPA's EIS provision, see MANDELKER, supra note 163, at 8-1 to 10-105.
171. NEPA §§ 201-208, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-4347. By Executive Order, CEQ
was authorized to issue the procedural guidelines other agencies must follow in
fulfilling the EIS requirement. See Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 104 (1970),
reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
172. Council on Environmental Quality, 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500-1508,1515-1517
(1994).
173. Id. § 1508.27(b)(3).
174. Id. § 1508.27(b)(9).
175. Id. § 1508.8(b).
176. The EPA is required to review and comment on the environmental
impact of any matter related to its areas ofjurisdiction in connection with federal
agency proposed legislation, construction projects, proposed federal regulations,
and any action subject to NEPA. 42 U.S.C. § 7609(a). EPA has promulgated
procedures for EIS review. 40 C.F.R. pt. 6 (1994). For a discussion of how EPA
could use this authority to promote more thorough consideration of biodiversity in'
federal agency EISs, see Fischman, supra note 132, at 477-78.
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regulations and administered under the EPA's omnibus review
authority, undoubtedly would accommodate a close look at the
impact of a proposed federal action on biodiversity factors.
b. Biodiversity Strengths and Shortcomings
NEPA presents several advantages for promoting biodiversity conservation when compared to the Endangered Species Act
and Clean Water Act section 404 programs. First, it is not
bound by the presence of and impact to a listed species or a
wetlands-it applies potentially to any federal action. Areas
worthy of biodiversity protection are not always associated with
listed species, wetlands, or any specific subjects of other
environmental laws. Wherever federal actions occur, therefore,
NEPA could carry to them the duty to consider biodiversity
impacts. Second, NEPA applies broadly to the ecosystem which
may be affected by federal action, thus expanding the impact
analysis beyond a specific species or ecosystem component.
Only to the extent that a species or ecosystem component acts
as an indicator of or keystone for the health of the surrounding
ecosystem will the ESA and CWA section 404 lend support to
biodiversity goals. Hence, the primary advantage of NEPA is
its breadth and ombudsman-like jurisdiction over federal
actions.
Yet, with NEPA's breadth of jurisdiction has also come a
dearth of substantive effect, thus leading to its shortcomings as
a biodiversity policy tool. First and foremost among NEPA's
limitations is the restriction of the EIS duty to purely procedural implications. Nothing in NEPA dictates the substantive
results of federal agency decisions.'
Federal agencies must
go through the process of complying with the environmental
review procedure in NEPA section 102(2)(c), but NEPA does not
prescribe what the agency must decide based on the information gathered and analyzed in the EIS. Hence, although NEPA
can produce much valuable information about biodiversity,
NEPA alone does not provide a legal tool for directing decisions
towards enhancing biodiversity.' 78
177. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989)
(stating that "NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply
prescribes the necessary process").
178. See generally Cynthia Carlson, NEPA and the Conservation of
Biological Diversity, 19 ENVTL. L. 15 (1988) (advocating revision of NEPA as a
means of addressing biological diversity).
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Moreover, even the procedural benefits of NEPA do not
materialize at all unless the federal action in question will have
significant effects on the environment. If an initial study,
known as an environmental assessment ("EA"), 179 determines
the effects of the action are not significant, a full EIS study is
not required. 8 ° Many federal actions have been classified as
presumptively not significant, thus qualifying for categorical
exclusion from the EIS requirement. 8 ' Indeed, some federal
actions which undoubtedly would pass as significant under
NEPA are considered exempt from the EIS requirement by
operation of other laws, usually because the other laws contain
impact review procedures inconsistent with or supplanting
NEPA, though not always with as broad a set of review
criteria.'8 2 Hence, not every federal action will undergo the
level of scrutiny associated with an EIS, thereby limiting the
opportunities for consideration of impacts to biodiversity.
Finally, unlike the ESA and CWA section 404, NEPA does
not necessarily apply to local and private actions which might
affect biodiversity. To be sure, many local and private actions
require some form of federal funding or authorization that
triggers NEPA's application to the federal funding or approval
agency, but many either do not receive federal funding or
qualify for a categorical exclusion. Such projects would slip
through the NEPA net for purposes of biodiversity consideration, albeit some states have enacted "baby NEPAs" which
might serve to fill that gap."8 On balance, then, while NEPA
offers a tremendous biodiversity conservation planning tool for
many federal actions, its nature as a strictly procedure-driven
law with numerous jurisdictional boundaries will limit its
usefulness towards establishing a system for comprehensive,
flexible promotion of biodiversity conservation on nonfederal
lands.

179. Council on Environmental Quality, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1994).
180. Id. § 1501.4.
181. Id. § 1508.4.
182. See, e.g., Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1981)
(holding that an ESA species listing decision is not subject to NEPA because ESA
already prescribes narrow decisional criteria).
183. See generally MANDELKER, supra note 1683, at 12-1 to 12-79.
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c. NEPA Biodiversity Initiatives
Recognizing that federal agencies' NEPA analyses "have not
usually included the full range of effects or the appropriate
scale required for adequate consideration of biodiversity," and
acting on the premise that "[s]uccessful implementation of the
principles of biodiversity management requires that they be
effectively integrated into the NEPA process," in 1993 CEQ
issued a major policy guidance on ways of incorporating
Significantbiodiversity considerations into NEPA review."
ly, CEQ contends that:
[Bliodiversity cannot be adequately conserved on the federal
level alone. Even though federal lands and resources play a
major role, the protection of biological resources will require
concerted efforts by all levels of government and the private
sector. NEPA addresses the effects of federal actions whether
18 5
or not they involve federally managed land or resources.
Hence, CEQ explicitly has directed its biodiversity policy
initiative at state, local, and private lands.
The CEQ policy identifies four basic deficiencies of NEPA
analyses as implemented generally by the federal agencies: (1)
inadequate consideration of species not listed under the ESA;
(2) inadequate consideration of areas not expressly protected
under other federal laws; (3) inadequate protection of species
which are not economically important; and (4) inadequate
consideration of cumulative impacts of proposed actions.1 "
CEQ thus outlines the techniques federal agencies can use in
NEPA review to ensure that "[wihen agencies undertake NEPA
analysis ... they should consider whether the reduction " in
1 7
biodiversity is likely to be a relevant and significant issue.
The policy document also provides measures which federal
agencies can take to ensure they fulfill their duty under section

184. BIODIVERSITY CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 5, at 16-17.
185. Id. at 16 (emphasis added); see also LINKING ECOSYSTEMS, supra note
10, at 142 (contending that ecosystem "management can not be effective without
considering the interactions between protected and multiple-use areas-public and
private").
186. BIODIVERSITY CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 5, at 18.
187. Id. at 18-19.
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101 of NEPA to "maintain, wherever possible, an environment
which supports diversity and variety of individual choice."" s
The CEQ policy on biodiversity thus represents a significant
recognition of the importance of biodiversity factors in the
NEPA program. To be sure, much of the effect NEPA has on
federal actions depends on how other federal agencies implement CEQ's rules, and the same will thus be true of CEQ's
However, the CEQ policy statement
biodiversity policy.
provides a green light to other federal agencies to broaden
biological resource impacts review beyond listed species and
protected areas, and thus to consider the broad range of
ecosystem management impacts when conducting NEPA
reviews.
d. Conclusion
NEPA provides a broad forum for developing federal
biodiversity conservation policy through its environmental
impacts review procedure. Because the impacts review is not
tied to specific listed species or protected areas, NEPA can
embrace biodiversity values generally as an objective. Of
course, being principally procedural in scope, even a strong
emphasis in NEPA on biodiversity conservation will not
translate into effective conservation measures without the
commitment of federal agencies and state, local, and private
interests. Some regulatory framework ultimately will be
needed to direct what those commitments are, how they are to
be distributed, and how satisfaction of them is rewarded.
NEPA cannot do that alone, particularly on nonfederal lands
where many projects will not fall within the statute's scope, and
thus CEQ may have overstated the case when it concluded that
"[the extent to which biodiversity is considered in future NEPA

188. NEPA § 101(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(4). CEQ's recommended
measures are (1) acknowledge the conservation of biodiversity as national policy
and incorporate its consideration in the NEPA process; (2) encourage and seek out
opportunities to participate in efforts to develop regional ecosystem plans; (3)
actively seek relevant information from sources both within and outside
government agencies; (4) encourage and participate in efforts to improve
communication, cooperation, and collaboration between and among governmental
and non-governmental entities; (5) improve the availability of information on the
status and distribution of biodiversity, and on techniques for managing and
restoring it; (6) expand the information base on which biodiversity analyses and
management decisions are based. BIODIVERSITY CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 5,
at 23-24.

616

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

analyses of federal actions will strongly affect whether biodiversity is adequately protected in the coming decades."' 89 NEPA
could be an important component in that cause, but without
substantially altering NEPA's basic procedural character it will
never provide the framework for a comprehensive biodiversity
conservation policy for state, local, and private lands.
4. Coastal Zone Management Act
The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) 9 ° establishes
federal policies for the use of land in the coastal zone. It
allows, but does not require, coastal states to develop management plans governing coastal zone land uses consistent with
these federal policies, in return for which the states receive
federal aid and cooperation in implementing the program.
Because of its focus on an important ecosystem, the CZMA
presents important biodiversity planning and regulation
opportunities, though it has been largely ignored in that respect
and scientific literature addressing biodiversity
in legal
191
policy.
a. Basic Goals and Structure Pertainingto
Biodiversity
The CZMA was enacted in 1972 to promote the "national
interest in the effective management, beneficial use, protection,
and development of the coastal zone."' 92 Ecological protection
was paramount among the concerns Congress expressed as
reason for addressing the "increasing and competing demands
upon the lands and waters of our coastal zone." 9 ' For example, Congress recognized that "Itihe coastal zone is rich in a
variety of natural ... ecological ... and esthetic resources of
immediate and potential value to the present and future well189. BIODIVERSITY CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 5, at 16.
190. Pub. L. No. 89-454, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
191. For a comprehensive overview of the CZMA as a land use program, see
Jack H. Archer, Evolution of Mqjor 1990 CZMA Amendments: Restoring Federal
Consistency and Protecting Coastal Water Quality, 1 TERR. SEA J. 191 (1991);
Linda A. Malone, The CoastalZone ManagementAct and the Takings Clause in
the 1990's: Making the Case for FederalLand Use to Preserve CoastalAreas, 62
U. COLO. L. REV. 711 (1991); Ronald J. Rychlak, CoastalZone Management and
the Search for Integration,40 DEPAUL L. REV. 981 (1991).
192. CZMA § 302(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1451(a).
193. CZMA § 302(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1451(c).
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being of the Nation, " 194 and that "[t]he habitat areas of the
coastal zone ... are ecologically fragile and consequently
extremely vulnerable to destruction by man's alterations."'9 5
Hence, Congress stated as its principal goal for the CZMA "to
preserve, protect, develop, and where possible, to restore or
enhance, the resources of the Nation's coastal zone for this and
succeeding generations.""9
The approach Congress took in the CZMA, however, is
decidedly different from the regulatory structures of the
Endangered Species Act and section 404 of the Clean Water
Act. Congress was convinced that "[tihe key to more effective
protection and use of the land and water resources of the
coastal zone is to encourage the states to exercise their full
authority over the lands and waters in the coastal zone. "197
The CZMA does this by establishing a method by which the
states, in cooperation with federal and local governments, can
establish "unified policies, criteria, standards, methods, and
processes for dealing with land and water use decisions of more
than local significance."' 9 8 The two CZMA programs for
carrying out that objective are the development and approval of
coastal management plans ("CMP"s) and the review of federal
actions for consistency with established CMPs.
Sections 305 and 306 of the CZMA provide federal grants to
the thirty-five coastal states for developing and implementing
their CMPs.' 9 A CMP must be consistent with guidelines
established by the Secretary of Commerce, which must require
"identification of the means by which the State proposes to
exert control over the land uses and water uses " 2° and the
"priorities of uses in particular areas."2 '
A state's CMP
development must be conducted "with the opportunity of full
participation by relevant Federal agencies, State agencies, local
governments, regional organizations, port authorities, and other
interested parties and individuals, public and private ...,2o2
and must provide "an effective mechanism for continuing
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

CZMA
CZMA
CZMA
CZMA
Id.
CZMA
CZMA
CZMA
CZMA

§ 302(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1451(b).
§ 302(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1451(d).
§ 303, 16 U.S.C. § 1452(1).
§ 302, 16 U.S.C. § 1451(i).
§§ 305, 306A, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454, 1455a.
§ 406(d)(2)(D), 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(2)(D) (Supp. V 1993).
§ 406(d)(2)(E), 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(2)(E).
§ 406(d)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(1).
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consultation and coordination" °3 between those entities. The
CMP must define permissible land and water uses in the
coastal zone and identify in that regard "areas of particular
concern."2"4 The CMP also must demonstrate that land and
water uses can be controlled and coordinated through either
state establishment of standards for local implementation,
direct state regulation, state review of all state, local, and
private development proposals for consistency with the CMP, or
a combination of those three general approaches.2 5
The Secretary's CZMA regulations, promulgated through the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA"),
elaborate on each of those key statutory elements for CMP
development and approval.20 ' Significantly, NOAA's rules for
special management areas address in detail the "areas of
particular concern" feature of the CMP.2 °7 NOAA's rules
recognize that a state's set of controls for the coastal zone may
vary throughout the zone in intensity, scope, and detail. NOAA
requires that "[wihere these policies are limited and nonspecific, greater emphasis should be placed on areas of particular concern [in the CMPI to assure effective management and
an adequate degree of program specificity."0° Among the
areas of particular concern which NOAA requires states to
identify are "[aireas of high natural productivity or essential
habitat for living resources, including fish, wildlife, and
endangered species and the various trophic levels in the food
web critical to their well-being."20 9 Hence, while biodiversity
is not mentioned by name in either the CZMA or NOAA's rules,
the CMP development and approval process provides ample
opportunity for promoting biodiversity interests.
Once a state's CMP is in place, the CZMA requires that all
actions carried out by federal agencies directly, or by nonfederal
entities requiring some form of federal approval or funding, be
concurred with by the state or its designated agency as
consistent with the CMP.21° Significantly, the consistency
203. CZMA § 406(d)(3)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(3)(B).
204. CZMA § 406(d)(2)(C), 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(2)(C).
205. CZMA § 406(d)(11), 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(11).
206. Coastal Zone Management Program Development and Approval
Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 923 (1994).
207. Id. § 923.20.
208. Id, § 923.20(b).
209. Id. § 923.21(b)(1)(i)(B).
210. CZMA § 307, 16 U.S.C. § 1456.
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review requirement applies not only to activities physically
located within the CMP boundary, but also to activities outside
the boundary which may affect the coastal zone.2" NOAAs
regulations
implement a detailed consistency review proce12
2

dure.

b. Biodiversity Strengths and Shortcomings
The chief advantage the CZMA presents for promoting
biodiversity protection is its flexibility, which operates on many
levels. The CZMA allows a state flexibility to adopt the
management approach for the coastal zone most consistent with
that state's general style of land use regulation and management. For example, if the focal point of the state's general
approach is local decision-making, the CMP can adopt that
approach.21 States relying more on centralized controls can
use that approach, either through direct state control2 14 or
through state review of local and regional decisions.215 Hence,
the CZMA is more likely to produce a regulatory system
harmonious with the state's own regulatory culture than are
programs using a rigid, top-down federal regulatory scheme,
such as the ESA and CWA section 404.
The CZMA also exhibits flexibility in terms of geographic
emphasis and intensity of the regulatory program. The
program for areas of particular concern allows states to focus
regulatory efforts on specified areas in need of close attention,
such as those needing intense biodiversity protection. The
CZMA also inherently recognizes that land and water uses will
occur in the coastal zone and must be accommodated. Hence,
rather than requiring a uniform level of regulation throughout
the coastal zone ecosystem, the CZMA recognizes that some
areas will experience more development than others and some
will require a greater degree of protection than others. Also,
the CZMA recognizes that actions outside the coastal zone
boundary may affect coastal resources and thus need to be
addressed. By contrast, for example, the CWA section 404
program for protecting wetlands would not address an activity

211. CZMA § 307(c)(1XA), 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(A).
212. 15 C.F.R. § 930.
213. Id. § 923.42.
214. Id. § 923.43.
215. Id. § 923.44.
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potentially harmful to a wetlands area if the activity takes
place outside the wetlands and involves no fill into the wetlands.
The CZMA's flexibility, however, also imposes burdens in
terms of developing and implementing the CMP according to
the loosely-stated federal guidelines. The danger exists that
goals such as biodiversity protection will become diffusely
enforced and thus ineffective as management tools. In that
sense, then, if the detailed consistency review procedures are
not closely followed, the CZMA could prove ineffective for
biodiversity protection in the coastal zone.
Another potential disadvantage of the CZMA exists with
respect to its perception by the regulated community. Like
NEPA, the CZMA operates within the fabric of other coercive
federal regulations, such as the ESA and CWA section 404.
There is a danger, therefore, that those other programs will
dominate state, local, and private land use issues in the coastal
zone notwithstanding all the flexibility and good intentions of
the CMP. Moreover, the tendency may be for the regulated
community to perceive the CMP as just another layer of
regulation rather than providing the comprehensive management system for the coastal ecosystem. That very issue became
the central point of debate over Texas's recent CMP development efforts, diverting attention away from the more important
issues of CMP substance.216
c. CZMA Biodiversity Initiatives
Of the thirty-five coastal states eligible to participate in the
CZMA program, only six had declined to do so as of 1994. One
of the major holdouts, Texas, reversed course in 1991 with the
enactment of state legislation establishing the Coastal Coordination Council ("CC"), an amalgamation of representatives
from many state resource agencies, and directing the CCC to
develop a CMP for the state.217 Under the leadership of the

216. This was the experience when Texas recently adopted regulations
supporting a CMP, discussed more fully at the text accompanying notes 218-29,
infra. Many public comments on the proposed Texas CMP alleged that the CMP
would result in "loss of local control of the coast" and that it "represented an
additional layer of bureaucracy." 19 Tex. Reg. 5195, 5212-13 (1994) (summarizing
public comments on the CMP and the Coastal Coordination Council's responses
to them).
217. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 33.201-.308 (West Supp. 1995).

19951

BIODVERSITY AND NONFEDERAL LANDS

621

Texas General Land Office, the CCC proposed a CMP and, after
inviting and considering public comments, issued a version it
believed would satisfy the CZMA.21s As the first CMP of any
coastal state developed since biodiversity policy has emerged as
a potent regulatory influence, the Texas CMP offers an example
of the potential for biodiversity initiatives under the CZMA.
From its inception, the Texas CMP adopted the "network"
approach described in the CZMA as one of the means of
demonstrating that state authority exists to implement the
CMP. Hence, the CMP "does not impose or create any requirement which is beyond the existing legal authority of an agency
or local government to implement," but is best described as 219
"a
compendium of existing statutes, rules, and regulations."
The objective in that regard was to ensure that the CCC could
"work closely with local governments to improve management
of the coast, and provide a broader forum for local input into
the actions taken and authorized by state and federal agencies. 1220
The Texas CMP, however, is by no means simply a passive
dictionary of existing state laws. Rather, it provides the
mechanism for coordinating the implementation of existing
state authorities around the unifying theme of coastal zone
management. Although the CMP is premised on the policy that
"economic vitality of the coastal area is dependent upon the
quality and availability of the coastal natural resources, and
neither is treated as superior,"221 the CMP specifies as no

other existing state law could the goals of coastal zone environmental management. Indeed, the express primary goal of the
CMP is to "protect, preserve, restore, and enhance the diversity,
quality, quantity, functions, and values of coastal natural
resource areas."222 The CMP aims at that goal not through a
new layer of coercive regulation, but rather by drawing upon
existing authority in an organized, well-planned manner.

218. 19 Tex. Reg. 7606 (1994) (to be codified at 31 TEx. ADMIN. CODE pt.
XVI) (issued Sept. 27, 1994 and adopting provisions proposed in 19 Tex. Reg. 1895
on Mar. 18, 1994). Public comments to the proposed CMP and the CCC's
responses to them were also published in 19 Tex. Reg. 5195 (1994).
219. 19 Tex. Reg. 5195, 5213.
220. Id. at 5196.
221. Id.
222. 19 Tex. Reg. 7606, 7647 (to be codified at TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 31,
§ 501.12(1)).
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For example, a central purpose of the Texas CMP is the
more efficient and effective use of coastal natural resource areas
("CNRA").223

The biological and ecological characteristics

upon which CNRA status may be based read like a compendium
of biodiversity management factors: "terrestrial and aquatic
wildlife habitat, travel corridors, escape routes, resting areas
and cover; food supply and feeding areas; and breeding,
spawning, nesting, and nursery areas."224 Actions which may
adversely affect those values or "otherwise adversely alter
coastal ecosystem dynamics" of a CNRA are subject to review
under the CMP. 2' Heightened review criteria apply to "critical areas," which are CNRA's "possessing special ecological
characteristics of productivity, habitat, wildlife protection, or
other important and easily disrupted ecological values that
contribute significantly to the general overall environmental
health or vitality of the coastal ecosystem." 226 The CMP also
provides for development of special area management plans for
areas of particular concern within the meaning of the
CZMA. 2 27 The Texas CMP draws on the full authority under
the CZMA to require review of federal actions affecting
CNRA's,22 8 and imposes procedures for review of state and
local actions as well.229
The Texas CMP thus serves as a model for how the CZMA
can be used to integrate biodiversity conservation factors into
223. Id. at 7642 (to be codified at TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 31, § 501.1(a)).
224. Id. at 7643 (to be codified at TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 31, § 501.2(a)).
225. Id. (to be codified at TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 31, § 501.2(d)(1)).
226. Id. at 7645 (to be codified at TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 31, § 501.3(aX8)).
227. Id. at 7659 (to be codified at TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 31, § 504).
228. Id. at 7695 (to be codified at TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 31, § 506).
229. Id. at 7670 (to be codified at TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 31, § 505).
According to officials with the Texas General Land Office's Coastal Management
Division, Governor Richards submitted the state's CMP to the Department of
Commerce in December 1994, before leaving office. Also, the CCC delayed the
effective date of the CMP until July 31, 1995, to allow the Texas legislature to
approve of or alter the basic structure. Two bills, one to endorse the CMP as
proposed and one to require adjustments, currently are under consideration in the
legislature. Telephone Interview with Tom Nuckols, Texas General Land Office,
Coastal Management Division (Mar. 9, 1995). To allow that process to unfold, in
March 1995 Governor Bush withdrew the state's CMP from Commerce Department review. See Letter from George W. Bush, Governor, State of Texas, to
Jeffrey R. Benoit, Director, Office of Ocean and Coastal Resources Management,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, United States Department of
Commerce (Mar. 8, 1995) (on file with author). See generally Dave McNeely,
Revenge for PerryNot So Sweet for Bush, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Mar. 14, 1995,
at All.
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the existing web of land use controls, albeit with respect to only
one ecosystem type. Without increasing the regulatory burden,
Texas has shifted the focus of those burdens to account for
biodiversity as a coordinating goal.
d. Conclusion
The CZMA represents a hybrid approach to biodiversity
conservation policy in that it serves as a vehicle for expressing
specific biodiversity goals for a defined ecosystem, but it
implements those goals through what is functionally a review
procedure without independent substantive regulatory authority. The regulatory brunt of the CZMA is softened compared to
the ESA and CWA section 404, but the procedural duties are
strengthened compared to NEPA. Through explicit reference to
biodiversity as a CZMA review factor and vigilant adherence to
the review procedures and criteria, the CZMA thus can be used
to influence the federal, state, local, and private interests in the
coastal zone to cooperate towards a comprehensive biodiversity
management policy.

II. PROSPECTS FOR THE MATURATION OF BIODIVERSITY
CONSERVATION POLICY

The way in which the Department of Interioris going
about protecting many species puts unjust limits on
the use, market value, and transferabilityof certain
property.... This debate is no longer aboutprotecting our treasured natural resources from harm, it's
about the federal government seizing control of
Texans' land. We must put a stop to this, and we
must point the Department of the Interior in a new
2 s°
direction.
The four statutory programs discussed in Part I encompass
the core of federal biodiversity regulation of local and private
lands. Two features of the statutes as a group contribute to
forming the "web" of regulation and to the complexity of that
web. First, the statutes are interrelated through several
feedback loops. The ESA, for example, applies its take prohibi-

230. Kay Bailey Hutchinson, New HabitatPlan Hides an Old Game, AUSTIN
AM.-STATESMAN, Jan. 16, 1995, at All, All (discussing her views on an ESA
regional habitat plan proposal the Department of Interior had just issued the
previous week).
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tion to all persons but adds additional responsibilities for
federal approvals issued under programs such as section 404 of
the CWA. NEPA depends on the presence of federal action or
approvals as well, and thus potentially applies in any ESA or
CWA section 404 permitting situation. The CZMA consistency
review procedure also would potentially apply to ESA and CWA
section 404 permit decisions. Hence, these four laws are tied
together, and likewise they are tied into the larger network of
federal environmental laws regulating such matters as air
pollutant emissions, waste water and storm water discharges,
and historic and cultural resources.
Nevertheless, the federal biodiversity regulation web is not
as orderly and tight as it may seem. Six different agencies are
involved in the administration of the four principal biodiversity
laws. They may not always agree about how to administer the
interrelations that exist between the laws and the agencies.
Fundamental differences exist in the style, structure, scope, and
approach of the four laws and those six agencies. The ESA and
section 404 are administered through large federal agencies
relying on detailed, command-and-control style regulations. By
contrast, CEQ is a small agency, and its rules guiding other
federal agencies in NEPA implementation merely establish a
framework within which the other agencies have considerable
flexibility. The result is a very decentralized approach to NEPA
policy and procedure within the federal system. Different from
both of those approaches is the CZMA's strong reliance on state
involvement as the principal architect of coastal zone protection.
Like the ESA and CWA section 404, the CZMA establishes
detailed federal objectives; however, like NEPA, the CZMA
embraces flexibility and decentralized regulation as the means
of achieving those objectives.
The differences between the four statutory programs makes
gluing them together into the web of interconnected regulations
an ineffective means of promoting biodiversity conservation. As
a threshold matter, since none of the statutes establishes
biodiversity as its central goal-the ESA is too narrow and the
other statutes too broad for that purpose-the web cannot be
said to position biodiversity conservation as the principal
objective. Nor is there a single agency that is charged with
spinning a biodiversity policy from the web. As shown above,
each of the agencies is pursuing biodiversity initiatives, but
often independently of the other relevant agencies. It is
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difficult, therefore, to expect the regulated community of local
and private land owners to enthusiastically embrace biodiversity as a goal when the federal government's own biodiversity
policies are fractured and buried in obscurity in various
provisions of four very different laws.
Hence, if the federal government wishes to assume a leading
role in the biodiversity policy realm, as it should, it is imperative that it adopt a single law to crystalize and implement a
unified federal biodiversity policy for local and private lands.
The differences that exist between the laws currently used for
biodiversity regulation of local and private land uses offer some
insight into how that single biodiversity protection law might
be structured with respect to the manner in which the federal
program influences the local and private decisions. Three
models of regulatory approach can be constructed from the
existing regulatory landscape: (1) the command-and-control
approach of the ESA and CWA section 404, which we can call
the "Coercion" model; (2) the decision-making review and
analysis procedure approach of NEPA, which we can call the
"Coordination" model; and (3) the CZMA's approach of using
states to hand craft regulatory structures for implementing
prescribed federal objectives and standards, which we can call
the "Cooperation" approach.
The experience of the four existing statutes in addressing
and accomplishing the goals of biodiversity conservation on
local and private lands can be used as an indication of the
appropriate manner of structuring a unified, comprehensive
federal biodiversity program. Of course, defining the goals of a
biodiversity conservation program is the important first step in
the process of evaluating the models. Those goals must balance
the aspirational values lying behind biodiversity conservation
which lead to a "more is better" approach, with the realities of
scientific uncertainty, administrative practicality, and political
controversy that have burdened efforts to achieve biodiversity
conservation under the ESA, CWA, NEPA, and.the CZMA.
A. The Goals of a Comprehensive Biodiversity
ConservationProgram
The basic goal of a biodiversity protection program must be
to "maintain naturally occurring ecosystems, communities, and
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native species."231 In order to do so, the biodiversity conservation program must be effective at identifying and locating
activities in less sensitive areas, minimizing impacts of actions
232
taken in sensitive areas, and restoring lost biodiversity.
That involves implementing the principles of biodiversity
management which the CEQ outlined in its 1993 policy
Additionally, those goals must be
statement for NEPA.
implemented without alienating local and private interests to
the point of broad resistance; indeed, local and private interests
ideally would see the biodiversity conservation program as
significantly superior to the existing framework in terms of
promoting land use value and sensible land use decisionmaking. With those broad programmatic goals in mind, any
proposal for a unified, comprehensive biodiversity law applicable for local and private lands must answer five basic questions:
who, what, when, how, and how much.2

3

1. Who
The who questions come in three forms: who shall establish
the policies and objectives of the program, who shall implement
them, and who shall be subject to the program as implemented?
The first two questions require a decision as to the degree to
which the federal government prescribes and implements the
program, and through what entity, versus relying on other
governmental units such as states and their political subdivisions. Section 404 of the CWA and the CZMA define the range

BIODIVERSITY CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 5, at 5.
232. Id.
233. The question of where to focus biodiversity conservation policy is
implicitly answered in part by the title of. this article-nonfederal lands. A
fundamentally different policy may be required for an effective biodiversity
231.

program on federally owned lands. Indeed, the central point of this article is that,

although ecosystems may not respect those ownership boundaries, landowners and
their perception of the reasonable expectations that come with land ownership do
pay very much attention to those boundaries. While there is no question that the
biodiversity policies for federal and nonfederal lands must be coordinated and
work together where both kinds of properties are mixed together within an
identified ecosystem, it has been a fundamental mistake of the federal government
thus far to assume that policies that seem to work in one realm-federally-owned
land where the federal government is its own master-will necessarily work in the
other realm. Indeed, as shown herein, the federal government is learning that

lesson the hard way in parts of the country where only a small portion of the land
which is the subject of federal biodiversity conservation efforts is owned by the
federal government. See infra text accompanying notes 243-45.
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taken under the four existing programs, with section 404
representing a dominant federal program and the CZMA relying
heavily on state implementation of federal objectives, albeit
under close federal scrutiny. Based on the experience under the
four existing statutes, the goals in those respects should be
defining the federal objective with clarity and enlisting the
enthusiastic participation of whatever local jurisdictions will
feel the effects of regulation directed towards those objectives.
As to who shall be subject to regulation, the four existing
programs offer an array of possibilities. The wetlands protection program under CWA section 404 extends broadly to all
persons. By contrast, only federal agencies are subject to the
duty under NEPA to conduct pre-decisional review of the
environmental impact of their actions, albeit that duty reaches
deeply into state, local, and private affairs given that it is
triggered by federal approvals of nonfederal actions. The ESA
takes both approaches: all persons are subject to the section 9
prohibition against take of endangered species, but only federal
agencies (and nonfederal projects they fund or authorize) are
subject to the duty to consult under section 7. That approach
has not always provided a clear picture of who is the appropriate regulated party, however, as some questions of species
protection have no clear nexus to any particular "taker" or
federal action.3 4 The CZMA takes an unusual approach,
acting mainly as a funnel for whatever form of state regulation
the state adopts in its coastal management plan, so that the
persons subject to those state regulations are subject to the
CZMA. The CZMA's federal consistency review program further
sweeps in all federal actions, and nonfederal actions subject to
federal funding or approval.
Based on the experience under those four statutes, the goals
for whom to regulate under any approach for a biodiversity
program should be identifying the persons whose actions most
affect biodiversity and who can be enlisted for support of the
biodiversity conservation program.

234. For example, the Spruce-Fir Moss spider, which FWS has proposed for
listing as an endangered species, is believed to be threatened principally by the
foliage desiccation caused by acid deposition. See supra note 103. Who causes
that?
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2. What
The science of biodiversity appears to be approaching the
point of enabling us to identify areas of biodiversity wealth and
of informing us as to which of those areas are in need of legal
protection. We also have developed an understanding of some
of the major threats to biodiversity and how they contribute to
biodiversity degradation, including habitat alteration, pollution,
overharvesting, introduction of exotic species, disruption of
natural processes, and global climate change. That knowledge,
however, does not tell us what to regulate-that is, the
regulatory targets. Targets of environmental regulation include
products, pollutants, facilities, government agencies, individuals, and specified land uses.235 For biodiversity conservation,
the targets might include defined biodiversity areas, specific
biological traits of areas, pollutants of concern, certain activities
perceived to injure sensitive areas, or all of those and others.
The four existing programs exhibit a broad range of
approaches with respect to the targets of regulation. The ESA,
for example, focuses on individual species. When critical
habitat is designated for a species, further definition of the core
area of the regulation is available; however, critical habitat
designation remains of little legal significance and is seldom
used. To compensate, FWS has created the unwieldy notion of
behavioral habitat under the harm definition, which has invited
judicial chastising. By contrast, the CZMA and CWA section
404 programs rely on carefully defined ecosystems. Section 404
relies on physical characteristics to define wetlands, whereas
the CZMA uses geographic characteristics to define the coastal
zone. At the extreme is NEPA's procedural review program,
which requires consideration of environmental impacts generally, using as broad a definition of environment as possible. Each
of those approaches has shortcomings. The ESA's species focus
does not inherently equate with biodiversity. The identification
in the CZMA and section 404 of discrete ecosystems limits the
usefulness of those laws outside such defined areas. Conversely, NEPA's breadth dilutes its effectiveness in specific contexts.
The goal of a biodiversity program, therefore, should be to
define the what of biodiversity regulation in a manner that is
235. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 143-45 (1992).
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geographically and scientifically capable of identification, study,
and evaluation, and which encompasses all the factors needed
to effectively manage the biodiversity of the defined geographic
area and ecosystem entity.
3. When
The when factor of biodiversity regulation focuses on the
timing of regulatory response. NEPA's environmental impact
review procedure, for example, focuses on the point of administrative commitment to an action, as do the CZMAs federal
action consistency review and ESA section 7 consultation
procedures. The CWA section 404 and ESA section 10(a)
permitting procedures are triggered when persons subject to
those statutes-effectively everyone-propose to take actions
which would be prohibited in the absence of a permit. Under
either approach, the regulatory program is triggered prior to
the regulated action, but only when an action is under consideration. Only by establishing uniform standards and applying
them consistently program-wide and over time to all actions
subject to review could any form of comprehensive, proactive
biodiversity policy emerge from that approach. The existing
programs taking that approach have had mixed measures of
success in that regard. By contrast, the duty of federal agencies
under section 7(a)(1) of the ESA to conserve species implies an
affirmative, ongoing program independent of specific proposed
actions. That broad implication, however, is seldom followed,
and no clear set of principles, whether legislative, administrative, or judicial, has emerged to guide what the conservation
duty entails.
Based on those experiences, the goal of when to regulate
under a federal biodiversity law should be to instill some form
of meaningful ongoing and proactive protection efforts, while
ensuring that proposed actions and their cumulative effects on
existing and other likely future actions are evaluated early in
their planning stages.
4. How
Once we have decided who should regulate and be regulated, what to regulate, and when to regulate, the how question
asks which tools and methods of environmental regulation
should be used to meet the regulatory goals. For example, some
of the tools of regulation used in environmental law include
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design standards, performance standards, ambient standards,
emissions limits, marketable allowances, taxes and other fees,
subsidies, liability rules, planning requirements, and information gathering and disclosure requirements.2"' Depending on
which tools are considered most effective, the methods chosen
may include a permitting program, used most often when
design or performance standards are the option, or a procedural
review requirement, used when information gathering, analysis,
and dissemination are the objective, or some form of grant or
incentive program, used when subsidies or other financial
mechanisms appear to be the most promising approach.
The four existing biodiversity programs define a broad range
of tools and methods. NEPA adopts a procedural review
methodology for imposing planning and informational requirements. As CEQ's biodiversity initiatives suggest, however, that
approach may prove too passive to produce meaningful biodiversity conservation. The CZMA strengthens the planning step
considerably by providing incentives to states to network
regulatory authorities in their coastal management plans and
imposing the consistency review procedure on state and federal
agencies. The added measure of substantive force the CZMA
offers over NEPA allows states to develop and enforce comprehensive coastal zone protection programs in a flexible manner.
By contrast, the ESA and CWA section 404 go the full distance
in terms of prescriptive tools and methods, by imposing a
permitting requirement as the only means of avoiding a direct
prohibition of specified actions deemed harmful to the statutory
goals. The ESA and section 404 thus are able to take a more
direct route to bring about biodiversity conservation measures
than is possible under NEPA and the CZMA, but at the expense
of relations with the regulated entities.
The goal of a biodiversity conservation program, therefore,
should be to incorporate meaningful tools and methods of
substantive regulation,rather than simply procedures, but to do
so in a flexible framework which avoids alienating the regulated
community.

236. Id. at 149-52.
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5. How Much
One of the most difficult policy decisions when designing a
regulatory program is to determine how much regulation to
impose through whatever tools and methods provide the
regulatory framework. There must be some mechanism for
measuring the need for and requisite intensity of the regulatory
response, as well as for evaluating the ongoing success of the
program. For example, the criteria adopted in environmental
regulations include measures of public health, environmental
quality, safety, technological feasibility, economic practicability,
or a balancing of those factors.237
Most of the existing biodiversity conservation programs
adopt a balancing approach, in which specified interests
including biodiversity are weighed to determine the overall
thrust and success of the program. The Corps' description of
public interest review criteria under the CWA section 404
program provides a classic example of such a balancing
approach. NEPA and the CZMA are less explicit in that
respect, but involve principally a balancing of competing
interests. By contrast, the ESA focuses almost exclusively on
species protection criteria.2
That narrow focus has led to
intense criticism of the ESA by state, local, and private
interests, portraying it as an inflexible tool capable of absurd
results. A successful biodiversity program may need to depend
more on the flexibility inherent in multiple-focus statutes such
as NEPA, CWA section 404, and the CZMA.

237.

Id. at 146-47.

238. Only in the limited contexts of critical habitat designation and recovery
planning does the ESA expressly allow other criteria, such as economic impact, to
weigh in the balance. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1988) (critical habitat); 16 U.S.C.

§ 1533(f)(1)(B)(i)-(iii) (1988) (recovery planning). Moreover, FWS takes the
position, with CEQ's support, that its species listing and critical habitat
designation decision making functions are not subject to ESA, insulating them
even further from broad based criteria review. See 48 Fed. Reg. 49,244 (1983); see

also Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 836 n.6 (6th Cir. 1981) (listing
decisions not subject to NEPA); Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir.
1995) (critical habitat designation is not subject to NEPA). For the view that
FWS's implementation of the ESA is accommodating to economic interests, see Jon
A. Souder, ChasingArmadillos Down Yellow Lines: Economics in the Endangered
Species Act, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1095 (1993).
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B. Assessing the Models
The foregoing examination of the regulatory imperatives of
a biodiversity conservation program suggest that the central
necessary feature must be flexibility. Flexibility will be needed
to respond to different types of ecosystems facing different types
of pressures. Flexibility will be needed to adapt regulatory
responses to existing state and local regulatory culture. And
flexibility will be needed to shape regulatory consequences
according to realistic appraisals of where protection is needed
most, will be most efficacious, and will not cause undue adverse
social and economic consequences. Although each of the three
regulatory models is capable of supplying the who, what, when,
how, and how much, they differ markedly in terms of doing so
with the flexibility needed for an effective biodiversity conservation program.
1. Coercion Model-Cannons Aimed at Anthills
Statutes fitting the Coercion model, such as the ESA and
CWA section 404, start from the premise that a specified
activity or condition is flatly prohibited. Thus, the ESA
prohibits taking of listed species, and section 404 prohibits
discharges in waters of the United States. The stronger the
initial prohibition is made and the more broadly its scope in
terms of persons subject to the prohibition, the more potent the
coercive effect will be. For example, the ESA's take prohibition
with respect to fish and wildlife species extends broadly to all
persons on all lands, and thus is an extremely heavy hammer;
whereas the prohibition Of take of plant species applies
narrowly to actions on federal lands and to state law violations,
and thus receives very little attention.
The coercive effect of the prohibitory element is translated
into extraction of benefits through the second major premise of
Coercion model statutes-the permitting or variance procedure.
By authorizing the implementing agency to permit the prohibited activity under prescribed conditions, the Coercion model
statutes extend a carrot as a reward for obeying the stick of the
prohibitory provision. The Coercion model statutes thus define
the playing field by delineating how the otherwise proscribed
activity or impact must be carried out in order to take advantage of the permitting opportunity.
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But the reward of a permit comes at high cost through the
third major premise of Coercion model statutes-the mitigation
condition. Mitigation is simply the coerced payment required
for the permit. As the EPA's guidelines under the section 404
program illustrate, compensatory mitigation, though subordinate to avoidance and minimization of effects on wetlands as a
policy, plays a large role in shaping the impact of section 404 on
nonfederal lands.
The reason so many environmental statutes employ the
Coercion model is that it is so easy to design and implement,
and virtually nothing stands in the way of an aggressive use of
the coercive tactics with respect to nonfederal lands. Under the
Commerce Clause Congress has nearly boundless jurisdiction to
impose the coercive structure on nonfederal lands in response
to almost any perceived environmental deprivation.23 9
Moreover, through the extension of a permitting procedure as
relief from the prohibitory element, the Coercion model statute
can avoid a facial attack alleging it is contrary to the requirement that government justly compensate takings of private
property. By judiciously using the mitigation requirement to
extract only so much as the permit applicant can tolerate and
still be left with an economically viable project, the implementing agency can avoid most claims that denial of a permit or the
functional equivalent thereof has caused an uncompensated
taking.2" Hence, for example, no case has found the exercise

239. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121
(1985) (confirming that Corps jurisdiction under § 404 extends to wetlands located
adjacent to navigable waters because of their possible influence on such waters).
The only case in the past three decades even to suggest a commerce power
limitation on the scope of federal environmental regulation, Hoffman Homes, Inc.
v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 961 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1992) (section
404 does not reach isolated wetlands which have no demonstrable connection to
interstate commerce), was later vacated by the en banc court of appeals. Hoffman
Homes, Inc. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 975 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir.
1992).
240. For thorough discussions of why private property takings law does not
pose substantial obstacles to the land use impacts wrought by federal environmental regulatory programs, see Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369 (1993); Robert
Meltz, Where the Wild Things Are: The Endangered Species Act and Private
Property, 24 ENVTL. L. 369 (1994); Glenn P. Sugameli, Takings Issues in Light of
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Decision Full of Sound and Fury
Signifying Nothing, 12 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 439 (1993). For the contrary view,
depicting takings law as increasingly posing an obstacle to aggressive federal
environmental land use regulation, see Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the
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of ESA jurisdiction to be a taking of property,241 and only in
cases of outright permit denial has section 404 been found to
cause an uncompensated taking.2 2 In short, the only viable
check on congressional use of the Coercion model and the
implementing agencies' aggressive application of it is political
self-restraint.
The central advantage the Coercion model offers to biodiversity conservation, therefore, is its potent ability to translate
specified uniform federal goals into desired behavior responses
by the regulated community. The Coercion model is fast, easy,
and cheap in that respect. It is fast in the sense that the
structure for compliance can be established within the framework of the legislation itself; no third party contribution is
needed. The Coercion model is easy in the sense that the
desired response by the regulated community can be shaped
with a great degree of precision through the coercive qualities
of the prohibition and permitting elements. And the Coercion
approach is cheap because, other than the cost of administration and enforcement necessary to support the coercive framework, the desired behavior response comes at no cost to the
federal government.
Those strengths, however, are the source of the Coercion
model's ultimate downfall. Fearing the potential for runaway
administrative policies when agencies are armed with too much
coercive power, Congress tightly controls both the scope of the
prohibitory element of the Coercion model statutes and the
criteria for administration. For example, the ESA limits the
broad reach of the take prohibition to fish and wildlife species,
details the criteria by which species must be listed, and
establishes the standards for measuring incidental take
authorizations. FWS is left having to squeeze its broad and
ambitious "ecosystem approach" into the ESA's more narrow
species focus.
Economy of Nature: UnderstandingLucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1433 (1993); Susan Shaheen, The Endangered Species Act:

Inadequate Species Protection in the Wake of the Destruction of Private Property
Rights, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 453 (1994). For a very broad discussion of the history of
land use patterns within the context of environmental regulation and takings law,
see Fred Bosselman, FourLand Ethics: Order,Reform, Responsibility,Opportunity, 34 ENVTL. L. 1439 (1994).
241. See Sugameli, supra note 240, at 491-93.
242. See, e.g., Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir.
1994); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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The Coercion model thus poses a dichotomy of tremendous
potency channeled into narrowly defined zones of jurisdiction
and authority. Administrative agencies faced with carrying out
broad policy mandates set by Congress under Coercion model
statutes generally respond to that dichotomy by regulating
fiercely within the prescribed zone. The result, very often, is a
backlash by the regulated community of equally fierce and
focused intensity. The all-or-nothing warfare mentality that
develops in such cases threatens the viability of the underlying
goals of the regulatory program, notwithstanding that consensus often exists as to the basic desirability of achieving those
goals.
A classic case in point is provided in the city of Austin,
Texas and surrounding Travis County. Beginning with a public
meeting FWS convened in February 1988, federal, state, and
local governments joined with environmental and development
groups from the Austin area in an attempt to forge a regional
solution to the many issues posed by the presence of endangered species within the urbanized area. 2" Although the
effort suffered many fits and starts at first, by 1993, five years
after the process was initiated, a plan had been developed in
principle, the City of Austin had successfully passed a bond
referendum to finance its portion of habitat acquisition, and
Travis County had placed a $49 million bond referendum on the
November 1993 ballot to finance the remainder.24'
Most of those efforts, however, had been coerced, in the
sense that FWS's strident application of the harm definition
had gridlocked development in the prime development areas of
the county. During the six years of regional planning, FWS had
exercised little restraint in posing the harm definition as a
weapon to be used against anyone daring to develop in areas
that FWS had declared should be preserved.2" FWS extract-

243. See generally Ruhl, supra note 126, at 1413-23.
244. See generally Taylor, supra note 127, at 595-601.
245. FWS eventually became nothing short of the gatekeeper of land use in
the Austin area by using the harm definition as its ground for claiming that
persons could not develop in or near the habitat of several listed endangered song
birds and cave-dwelling invertebrate species. Developers and their financiers, as
well as owners of individual lots, deluged FWS with requests for advisory opinions
as to the need for incidental take authorization. Several thousand of these socalled "bird letters" and "bug letters" were sought. A frequent response FWS
offered was that the possibility of causing harm, even when remote, could not
conclusively be ruled out, and thus an incidental take permit should be sought.
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ed expensive mitigation conditions from the few developers and
companies brazen enough to seek individual take authorizations
before the regional plan was put in place. 2" FWS's unmistakable message was that individual permitting would be expensive and time consuming, so wait for (and support) the regional
plan. Regardless of whether FWS's policies faithfully implemented the ESA as Congress intended or stretched it beyond its
legal bounds, a question now squarely in Congress's court, the
regulated community in Austin at the time perceived that it
had a gun held to its head, leaving it no choice but to engage in
the regional planning effort.
Indeed, notwithstanding general agreement among landowners and development interests that regional planning offers an
efficient, sensible way of managing local biological resources,
the coercive nature of FWS's policies eventually built pervasive
resentment and distrust of FWS and the regional planning
process within the regulated community. In quick succession,
events from November 1993 to November 1994 eroded anything
that had been gained towards a solution. First, a grass roots
campaign by landowner and anti-tax interests defeated the
county's bond election, leaving the regional plan without a

Telephone Interview with Steven D. Paulson, Austin Office Director, SWCA, Inc.
(Nov. 18, 1994) (consultant who prepared many requests for a "bird letter" or "bug
letter"); see, e.g., Letter from Sam D. Hamilton, Austin Field Supervisor, United
States Fish and Wildlife Service, to Don Walden, Riata Associates, Inc. (Dec. 18,
1991) (on file with author) (reciting the agency's prototype response that "[w]e do
not have sufficient information at this time to state that development of the
remainder of the tract would not adversely affect the warbler"). Of course, as no
simple or inexpensive procedure for securing such authorization exists, many
individual lot owners either suspended plans for their homes or simply risked the
consequences of building. Ironically, developers with deeper financial resources
began seeking incidental take authorizations, which FWS was obligated to process,
thus reducing the need within the development community for a regional plan.
See, eg., Ralph K.M. Haurwitz, FM PropertiesQualifies for Permit,AUSTIN AM.STATESMAN, Feb. 1, 1994, at B1 (4700-acre development approved for ESA § 10(a)
permit in return for dedication of 4000-acre preserve area). FWS also eventually
issued a simplified, reduced cost permitting procedure for a limited class of single
family lots, see AUSTIN FIELD OFF., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT COMPLIANCE PROCESS FOR SINGLE FAMILY RESIDENTIAL LOT (Jan.

1995) (on file with author), and Texas sued the agency as parens patriae for its
citizens to challenge the need for any permits in the first place. Texas v. Babbitt,
No. W-94-CA-271 (W.D. Tex. filed Sept. 30, 1994).
246. Permit application and take mitigation costs for the projects that
received FWS approval under § 10(a) or § 7(a)(2) of the ESA through June 1992
averaged $9000 per acre of development. See Gau & Jarrett, supra note 71, at 4-
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funding source."' To fill the funding gap, the city proposed
a plan that relied on development fees approaching $40,000 per
acre of development, a deal developers found easy to do
without.2
The March 1994 decision Sweet Home Chapter of
2 4 9 which invaliCommunities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt,

dated FWS's harm definition,25 ° served as a rallying point for
Austin area landowner interests, a vindication that they were

"right" about FWS's coercive excesses. Because no cooperative
incentives had ever been established between FWS and
landowners,25 ' the landowner community has little reason

247. See generally Taylor, supra note 127, at 596 n.81.
248. Letter from J.B. Ruhl, Conserve As You Grow (CAYG) Task Force
Representative, Real Estate Council of Austin, to George Avery, CAYG Task Force
Representative, Sierra Club 2 (Feb. 28, 1994) (on file with author). I was a
member of the task force the Mayor of Austin convened to determine whether the
City's proposal would have been acceptable to the variety of competing interests
involved as a means of meeting the funding needs, which were in excess of $200
million for the preserve acquisition and maintenance. See CITY OF AUSTIN,
CONSERVE As You GROW (CAYG) PLAN FUNDING ASSUMPTIONS 5 (Apr. 11, 1994)
(on file with author). The City's proposal, known as the "Conserve As You Grow"
plan, involved a mixture of development fees and mitigation ratios which would
have resulted in the typical real estate developer facing the prospect of having to
recover over $40,000 for each acre of development authorized under the regional
permit. See CONSERVE As You GROW: A STRATEGY FOR REGIONAL HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLAN IMPLEMENTATION IN THE BALCoNES CANYONLANDS (Draft

Feb. 14, 1994) (on file with author) (describing the development fees and
mitigation ratios to be used); Letter from J.B. Ruhl, CAYG Task Force Representative, Real Estate Council of Austin, to George Avery, CAYG Task Force
Representative, Sierra Club (Feb. 28, 1994) (on file with author) (describing
application of the proposed development fees and mitigation ratios to a typical
development project). An alternative proposal from the development community
would have capped development fees at $6000 per acre. See Letter from Paul J.
Bury, President, Real Estate Council of Austin, to Bruce Todd, Mayor, City of
Austin (Mar. 17, 1994) (on file with author). The Task Force vote rejected the
City's proposal and resulted in a tie vote on the development community's
alternative, City of Austin, Mayor's Task Force Ballot Final Tally (Apr. 11, 1994)
(on file with author), and the City Council of Austin and Commissioners Court of
Travis County rejected both approaches.
249. 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 (1995).
250. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
251. For a discussion of the breakdown of relations between the landowning
community and the governmental entities promoting the regional plan, see
Catherine M. Allen, Regional Habitat Conservation Planning: Is It Really the
Answer to Reconciling Conflicts Under the Endangered Species Act? (June 1994)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George
Mason University) (on file with author); see also TRAVIS COUNTY COMMISSIONER'S
COURT, TRAVIS COUNTY LANDOWNER SURVEY: FOCUS ON ENDANGERED SPECIES
ISSUES (Mar. 1993) (on file with author) (revealing widespread distrust of ESA
authorities and policies among the surveyed property owners).
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after Sweet Home to continue the regional planning dialogue, at
least not until the final word on Sweet Home is spoken. This

was particularly so given that the estimates at the time of the
total cost of acquiring and maintaining the habitat preserve
areas for the thirty-one-year life of the permit would be in
excess of $219 million.2 52

The last straw came when news

leaked of alleged plans by FWS to designate thirty-three central
Texas counties as critical habitat for the Golden-cheeked
warbler, a migratory songbird that nests exclusively in central

Texas. 2" The critical habitat issue became the cause celebre
for a broad "wise use" property rights movement known as
action
"Take Back Texas," which demanded local and state
25 4
against FWS and the federal government generally.
Being an election year, Governor Ann Richards answered
those pleas and more, albeit to no apparent advantage given
her resounding defeat in the election. Her plans to designate

a sensitive watershed in Austin as protected under the Clean
Water Act were tabled.25 Her stem letter to Secretary of
Interior Babbitt 256 evoked an agreement not to designate any

critical habitat.5 7

Ironically, Secretary Babbitt's purported

252. See CITY OF AUSTIN, supra note 248, at 5.
253. See Jerry Needham, Songbird Plan Hits Sour Note with Lawmaker,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, July 13, 1994, at lB.
254. See Ralph K.M. Haurwitz, Land Groups Unite to Protect Private
Property Rights, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Aug. 24, 1994, at BI; Michele Kay,
EnvironmentalistsExperience 'Backlash," AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, July 29, 1994,
at Al; Linda L. Welch, Crowd Blasts Species Act at Meeting, AUSTIN AM.-.
STATESMAN, Sept. 22, 1994, at B1.
255. See Letter from Ann Richards to John Hall, supra note 1.
256. See Letter from Ann Richards to Bruce Babbitt, supra note 20.
257. See Letter from Bruce Babbitt, Secretary, United States Department
of Interior, to Ann W. Richards, Governor, State of Texas (Sept. 22, 1994) (on file
with author); see also Ralph KM. Haurwitz, Babbitt Backs Down Once Again,
Critics Say, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Sept. 29, 1994, at Al; Stefanie Scott, Feds
Ground Warbler Plan, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 28, 1994, at 1A The
Interior Department's efforts to quell private landowner criticisms of the ESA
subsequently broadened to include, for the first time in the Clinton administration,
advocating limited legislative reforms designed to ease the impact of small
landowners in the hope, apparently, that such acceptance of mild reform will stave
off a complete statutory overhaul in Congress. See U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR,
PROTECTING AMERICA'S LIVING HERITAGE: A FAIR, COOPERATIVE, AND SCIENTIFICALLY SOUND APPROACH TO IMPROVING THE ESA (Mar. 6, 1995); United States
Department of Interior, News Release: Administration Proposes Endangered
Species Act Exemptions for Small Landowners; "Guideposts for Reform" Would
Give More Authority to States (Mar. 6, 1995) (on file with author). See generally
John H. Cushman, Babbitt Seeks to Ease Rules in Bid to Rescue Imperiled Species
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1995, at B7.
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reason for not pursuing critical habitat was the existence of the
regional planning effort, which by then was in shambles. To

top it off, the Texas Attorney General sued Secretary Babbitt
alleging a litany of illegal, overreaching actions by FWS in its

ESA implementation in Texas,2" and the Texas legislature
initiated a series of property rights hearings putting FWS on
the hot seat.25 9 It remains to be seen whether a new version
of the regional habitat plan FWS unhatched in January 1995,
ostensibly to inject local involvement into the process, can heal
the wounds the agency's past practices inflicted on relations
with nonfederal stakeholders.26 Initially, Secretary Babbitt's
description of the plan as being as "local as the corner grocery
store"26 ' contrasted sharply with United States Senator Kay
Bailey262 Hutchinson's description of the proposal as "extortion."

258. See Texas v. Babbitt, No. W-94-CA-271 (W.D. Tex. filed Sept. 30, 1994).
259. See Subcommittee on Mitigation of Private Property Rights, Texas
House of Representatives, Press Release (June 3, 1994) (on file with author)
(announcing public hearings).
260. The new version proposes that development fees initially be set at
$5500 per acre of occupied habitat and $2750 per acre of "possible" species habitat,
subject to future adjustments according to the market price of the 9500 acres of
preserve lands sought to be acquired through such private funding sources. See
United States Department of Interior and the City of Austin, Balcones Canyonlands Conservation Plan (BCCP): Shared Vision (Jan. 18, 1995) (on file with
author); City of Austin, Participation Fee Calculations Under the Balcones
Canyonlands Conservation Plan (Jan. 1995) (on file with author). If the proposed
development fee approximates the market price of the preserve lands, therefore,
the private sector would fund about $52 million of the regional plan's cost. The
agency's latest proposal nonetheless would thereby, according to FWS's press
release, dramatically lower the private sector burden of the regional plan. See
Office of the Secretary, United States Department of Interior, Press Release:
Babbitt Agrees to Balcones Development Proposal; Would Allow Faster, Less
Expensive Permit Process for Major Development Projects (Jan. 10, 1995) (on file
with author). See generally Ralph K.M. Haurwitz, New Balcones Plan Counts on
Capitalism, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Jan. 12, 1995, at B2.
261. See Office of the Secretary, United States Department of Interior, supra
note 260, at 2.
262. See Hutchinson, supra note 230, at All. Many property rights
advocates also criticized the most recent proposal as being "nothing but bribery."
See Ralph K. M. Haurwitz, Landowners Deride Conservation Plan, AUSTIN AM.STATESMAN, Feb. 1, 1995, at B6 (quoting the president of the Take Back Texas
organization). At least one influential development industry representative, the
Capitol Area Builders Association, withdrew support from the plan as proposed
shortly into the negotiations the Department of Interior convened through a
"Community Conservation Plan Working Group." See Tim Lott, Builders Group
Withdraws From BCCP Talks, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Feb. 11, 1995, at B4. The
group apparently did not believe the proposal would provide sufficient long-term
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Austin's experience illustrates the Coercion model's limitations when solutions require a strong measure of local and

private autonomy. Even though Austin's regional planning
effort ostensibly was local in nature, its motivation was
essentially coerced by rigid federal policies. By no means is

Austin alone in this experience with Coercion model regulation.
Litigation throughout the nation challenging implementation
decisions under ESA and section 404 is simply the manifestation of a more deeply rooted movement challenging Coercive

model federal land use regulations in courts, state and federal
legislatures, and the media. Known as the "wise use" movement, its theme focuses on three alleged deficiencies of Coercive
model laws: (1) intrusion on private property rights; (2)
creation of underfunded regulatory mandates; and (3) insensi-

tivity to economic efficiency and cost-benefit analysis of
regulatory policy.2" Regardless of the merits of the arguments employed to articulate that so-called "Unholy Trini-

development certainty, or was even necessary given the limited scope of the harm
definition. See Letter from James R. Irvine, President, National Home Builders
Association, to Bruce Babbitt, Secretary, United States Department of Interior
(Feb. 21, 1995) (on file with author).
263. The so-called "wise use" movement has emerged from a grass roots
level response that has been remarkably effective despite its nearly invisible
formal structure, financial backing, and written imprint. See AMERICANS FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT, THE POLITICAL AGENDA OF THE "WISE USE" MOVEMENT (1993)

(citing newspaper editorials by "wise users"). Ironically, the most organized,
accessible descriptions of the wise use philosophy appear in documents prepared
by environmental groups opposed to the wise use agenda, most of which are
presented in hyperbolic invective. See, e.g., THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY, THE WISE
USE MOVEMENT:

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS AND FIFTY STATE REVIEW (3d printing,

revised Mar. 1993). Most of the environmental groups following the issue trace
the origin of the wise use movement to the August 1988 Multiple Use Strategy
Conference in Reno, Nevada. See, e.g., id. at 6. Although there appears to be no
leading, formally structured wise use organization, environmental groups identify
several organizations as the core of the wise use movement, including the Center
for the Defense of Free Enterprise, Alliance for America, and People of the West.
Id. at 6-11; see also CENTRAL ROCKIES REGION, THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY, THE
WISE GUYS: DISMANTLING THE PUBLIC LANDS (1993). Whatever, whoever, and
wherever it is, the wise use movement clearly has rattled the environmental
groups most interested in biodiversity issues, causing the presidents and executive
directors of 15 national environmental groups jointly to publish an appeal to their
combined memberships to implement a "Citizen Action Plan" in opposition to the
wise use movement's message. Letter from Ted Danson, President, American
Oceans Campaign et al.,
to "Environmentalists" (July 5, 1994) (on file with
author).
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ty,"264 the political reality is that the wise use movement,
with its deceptively simple theme, has captured the attention
of state and local jurisdictions, 2
many federal legislators,2" and, apparently, the electorate in the 1994 national

election.
As this recent history illustrates, FWS's efforts to work with

state, local, and private interests as "partners" will continue to
fall flat as a biodiversity conservation policy so long as the ESA

forces the partners to the table, makes up all the rules, and
keeps the deck stacked in its favor. There is little basis for

concluding that any other Coercive model approach to federal
biodiversity conservation policy will fare any better. As most of
the proposals in legal literature on biodiversity demonstrate,
however, the typical response to the failure of coercive mechanisms is to enlist yet more coercive mechanisms as reinforce-

ments in the effort to dictate nonfederal behavior.

The

regulated community responds only by digging its bunkers

deeper and stronger. The building of more coercive tools and

264. I am not sure from whom or where the description of the wise use
agenda as the "Unholy Trinity" first arose, or for that matter who coined the term
"wise use," though both appear to be the widely accepted monikers for what is
represented, or purported to be represented, by the movement. See, e.g., sources
cited supra note 263.
265. Many state legislatures have proposed or adopted so-called "takings
bills," under which the state law defines procedures and standards for weighing
whether a state environmental regulation has caused a taking for which
compensation is due under state law. See generally NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY,
STATE TAKINGS LEGISLATION: A RESOURCE BOOK FOR ACTIVISTS (1993); John
Martinez, Statutes EnactingTakings Law: Flying In the Face of Uncertainty, 26
URB. LAW. 327 (1994). Several states have pending legislation to this effect. See,
e.g., Colo. S.B. 136, 60th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1995); Ill. H.B. 276, 89th Gen.
Asembly, Reg. Sess. (1995-96); Tex. H.B. 665, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1995).
266. Several bills introduced in the 1O3d Congress would have altered
federal takings law in the context of programs such as the ESA and section 404
by imposing additional compensation duties not presently applied under the
constitutional takings analysis. See ROBERT MELTZ, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERV., POINTS OF DIVERGENCE BETWEEN COMPENSATION PROVISIONS OF THE
"PRIVATE PROPERTY OwNER's BILL OF RIGHTS" (H.R. 3875) AND SUPREME COURT
TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE (1994); see, e.g., H.R. 1490, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993)
(requiring compensation under the ESA in specified circumstances); S.177, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1993). Similar measures have begun to emerge, quite successfully
this time, in the 104th Congress as well. See, e.g., Private Property Rights Act of
1995, S.22, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 135, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995);
S. 145, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (passed
the House Mar. 3, 1995; incorporating in full the provisions of the Private Property
Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), as amended
through Mar. 3, 1995).
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more resentment in response takes on synergistic qualities and,
ultimately, leads to submission by one side or the other and the
loss of all sense of cooperative solution. The real victim, of
course, is the policy goal itself, which, in the case of biodiversity
conservation, implicates very real consequences to human
existence.267
2. Coordination Model-Popguns Aimed at
Elephants
Whereas the Coercion model relies on extensive power
directed in a narrow zone of focus, Coordination model statutes
rely on diffused regulatory burdens aimed at a wide target.
The basic structure of these statutes begins with a broad
statement of federal goals and policies geared towards coordinating "federal action." The Coordination model statutes then
inject a procedural review step into the decision-making process
of the covered federal actions to ensure the decisions are made
with at least some level of coordination around the goals and
policies expressed in the statute. Because federal action
typically is defined as involving nonfederal projects receiving
federal funds or authorization, the Coordination model achieves
the overall objective of coordinating a substantial portion of
nonfederal projects under the federal policies.
As is true of NEPA, Coordination model statutes seldom
have a substantive dimension in the sense of requiring or
influencing a particular outcome in the underlying decisionmaking process. Given the wide jurisdiction of the statutes
(usually all federal actions are covered) Congress may be leery
of providing real power over decision-making outcomes. Hence,

267. Although I disagree strenuously with and demonstrate the fallacies of
two of the Cato Institute's three premises advanced in support of a "no action"
federal option for biodiversity policy, see supra text accompanying note 16, I am
hard-pressed to summarize better than the Institute the central defect of relying
on the Coercion model as the guiding principle of federal biodiversity policy:
To imagine ... that the federal government has the wisdom and
knowledge to determine a single set of ecosystems for the nation and
precisely locate potentially tens of thousands of miles of ecosystem
boundaries, establish agreed-upon and measurable goals for the
performance and desired condition of each of those ecosystems in all its
complexity, and manage the intricacies of all the natural and human
forces that affect the living and nonliving things on the landscape to
reach those goals is to credit the federal government with an omniscience
that simply does not exist in the real world.
Fitzsimmons, supra note 15, at 22.
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although the procedural requirement can act as a sword against
administrative action, as it has quite effectively under NEPA,
in the final analysis the Coordination model seldom achieves
the broadly stated goals and policies of the statute.
Indeed, NEPA represents about as much as one could ever
hope to accomplish under a Coordination model statute in terms
of shaping substantive policy, and its influence in federal land
development regulation has been eclipsed by more coercive
regimes such as the ESA and section 404. Other Coordination
model statutes, such as the Fish and Wildlife Coordination
and section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation
Act
26
9
have left small footprints in the substantive body of
Act,
law. Those laws contrast sharply with the impact of section 7
of the ESA, which blends the consultation procedure with
powerful substantive regulatory and enforcement consequences,
and which has thus had considerable effect on federal policy.
It is unlikely, therefore, that the Coordination model on its
own can serve as an effective tool for molding federal biodiversity conservation policy. CEQ's efforts to infuse biodiversity
thinking into NEPA analysis, while commendable, offer little
real promise of bringing about substantive results. By contrast,
FWS's "ecosystem approach" under the ESA has taken advantage of the ESA's immense regulatory clout to impose biodiversity factors as a mandatory consideration in ESA proceedings.
With neither a stick nor a carrot to offer, the Coordination
model itself offers little on behalf of long term biodiversity
results.
3. Cooperation Model-Choosing the Right-Sized
Gun for Each Target
The Cooperation model offers some measure of balance
between Coercion and Coordination model statutes, holding
traits of each. The essence of the Cooperation model is the
expression of strong federal goals and policies in the context of
a flexible partnership between federal, state, and local interests
in seeing to it that the federal policies are implemented in the
form of substantive legal requirements. Cooperation model

268. Pub. L. No. 85-624, 48 Stat. 401 (1934) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 661666c (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
269. Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 4(f), 80 Stat. 934 (1966) (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 303 (1988)).
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statutes often hold out some form of regulatory carrot or stick,
or blend of both, as an incentive for the partners to act together
within the framework of the federal goals and policies, but
substantive review criteria and outcomes generally are not
prescribed. Rather, it is left to the cooperative process to
formulate a regulatory response directed at the particular state
or local planning area.
The Cooperation model statutes thus are expensive to
operate. They involve substantial transactions costs and time
as the cooperating partners forge consensus over the final
substantive shape of the regulatory policy. But the final result
offers promise of achieving the substantive outcome with
greater impact than the Coordination model offers, and with
greater consensus than the Coercion model offers.
An example of both the cost and potential the Cooperation
model might entail in furtherance of biodiversity conservation
is the National Estuary Program,27 ° which CEQ has described
as a model for biodiversity conservation efforts.2 7 ' Authorized
in 1987 under the Clean Water Act, the program allows a
governor or the EPA to nominate an estuary, which may be in
more than one state, and request a management conference to,
among other things, "develop a comprehensive conservation and
management plan that recommends priority corrective actions
and compliance schedules addressing point and nonpoint
sources of pollution to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the estuary."2 72

The

convening of such a conference rests in the hands of the EPA
and must be based on such factors as pollutant loads, ecosystem
assessment, and "the impact of nutrients, sediments, and
pollutants on water quality, the ecosystem, and designated or
potential uses of the [estuary]."27
The EPA may extend
grants for research of those factors and administration of a
plan, and the federal government then must commit to cooperate by carrying out its actions in a manner consistent with the
plan.
Among the identified advantages the estuary program has
offered for such important areas as the Chesapeake Bay, which
270. Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 320, 100 Stat. 7 (1987) (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§ 1330 (1988)).
271. LINKING ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 10, at 172.
272. 33 U.S.C. § 1330(b).
273. Id. § 1330(j).
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would not have been realized through a coercive regulatory
approach, is that "by establishing partnerships with the state
and local governments, EPA is better able to address land use
issues."2 74

Also, because of the broad focus of the National

Estuary Program, it allows "planning for an ecosystem rather
than a medium," making it "better able than conventional

regulatory approaches to respond to cross-media pollution
problems."275
Hence, like the CZMA and other Cooperation model
statutes, the National Estuary Program offers benefits of

allowing state and local interests to hand craft a plan responding to federal goals, and to implement the plan with federal

financial and management support.

When state and local

interests motivate such efforts, rather than relying on federal

coercion, the outcome is more likely to correspond to the private
interests whose land and economic fate is affected by the plan.
The land use measures necessary to achieve the federal goals

thus are more likely to be implemented without disruptive
confrontation and backlash against the federal goals.

The

Cooperation model, therefore, offers the most promise as the
structure around which a unified federal biodiversity conserva-

tion policy should congeal.276

274. See Fischman, supra note 132, at 500.
275. Id.
276. Another recent example of the potential for state-led cooperative efforts
comes from the San Francisco Bay-San Joaquin River Delta Estuary area of
southern California ("Bay-Delta"), where state and federal agencies have agreed
to a framework for managing water diversion practices which the federal
government had alleged were causing takes of endangered aquatic species, most
notably the Delta Smelt. See Principles for Agreement on Bay-Delta Standards
Between the State of California and the Federal Government (Dec. 14, 1994) (on
file with author). The Bay-Delta provides water for 20 million people, irrigation
for 45% of the nation's fruits and vegetables, and life support for 120 species of
fish, and yet the history of Bay-Delta management negotiations between the
federal and state governments is routinely described as a decade of "combat." See,
e.g., California,U.S. Set Water PlanAffecting Farmers,WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 1994,
at A7; Deadline for Delta Standards, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 14, 1994, at A22; Water
Wars Near An End?, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Dec. 13, 1994, at B6. On the one
hand, therefore, the landmark agreement, which at best is still only the template
for an experiment in cooperation, suggests that the state and federal governments
can achieve ecosystem management frameworks affecting nonfederal lands and
resources through cooperation. On the other hand, there is no question that the
history of the Bay-Delta agreement was complicated and confused by the lack of
a federal framework for promoting that cooperative process.
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III. A SURVEY OF RECENT AND CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR
ENHANCING BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION

Most of the well-developed biodiversity conservation
program proposals dealing with nonfederal lands come in one
of three forms. One approach bolsters existing regulatory
controls an order of magnitude by either creating one omnipotent statute or spinning more wire into the existing regulatory
web. A second form, perhaps recognizing the tailspin the ESA
has experienced as a harbinger of things to come for the
Coercion model, attempts to soften the blow of coercive regulation of nonfederal lands by building "incentives" into the
programs in order to induce greater compliance and less
resentment among nonfederal actors. Under the third alternative, many proposals would embed procedural review steps in
existing programs such as NEPA as a way of promoting
biodiversity. None of these approaches deals head on with the
levels of intensity and flexibility needed to establish a truly
meaningful, workable federal biodiversity conservation program.
A. Mega-Regulation Proposals
Three significant proposals relying on the Coercion model
differ in the "who" and "what" of regulatory choices. One
proposal depends on enhancing the EPA's biodiversity regulation role under existing environmental laws. Two other
proposals call for a unified federal biodiversity regulation
statute, one as an extension of the ESA and the other as an
extension of NEPA.
1. The EPA as Biodiversity Czar
Conspicuously absent from the existing web of federal
biodiversity regulations is the EPA, whose role is limited to
oversight of the Corps of Engineers' permitting under CWA
section 404 and review of federal agencies' EISs prepared under
NEPA. Hence, it is not surprising that a proposal has surfaced
for expanding EPA's role by addressing biodiversity conservation through an even wider network of environmental authorities.
In 1993, the Environmental Law Institute ("ELI"), with the
EPA's financial support, outlined the measures the EPA could
take to enhance biodiversity conservation by leveraging the
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EPA's existing pollution control authorities.2 77 The thesis of
ELI's work is that the EPA's duty under ESA section 7(a)(1) to
promote conservation of species "requires the EPA to engage all
of its available powers and authorities to protect and recover
species. Carrying out this conservation duty can provide
further basis for the agency's use of its statutory authorities to
provide affirmative protection to ecosystems and biological
diversity in a variety of contexts."2 7
The ELI report examines how, through its authorities under
ten major environmental statutes,2 79 the EPA could institute
a regime of biodiversity regulation through changes to the way
the agency implements six principal administrative functions:
(1) permits and related approvals; (2) standard setting; (3)
enforcement related activities; (4) delegating programs to states;
(5) financial assistance; and (6) information gathering. 20 ELI
concludes that these statutes and the EPA's implementation
functions provide "an extensive array of pollution control
authorities that can be mobilized by both federal and state
agencies for reducing ecological risks and for protecting
[threatened and endangered] species and their habitats."2 '
Although ELI's recommended measures include such steps
as improving employee training and links with FWS, the bulk
of ELI's proposal focuses on coercive regulatory measures the
EPA could impose on the largely nonfederal community
regulated under the pollution control statutes. For example,
under the EPA's various Clean Water Act authorities ELI
recommends that the agency take such measures as incorporating ESA compliance into the pollutant discharge permitting

277. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., USING POLLUTION CONTROL AUTHORITIES
TO PROTECT THREATENED AND ENDANGERED SPECIES AND REDUCE BIOLOGICAL

RISK (1993) [hereinafter POLLUTION CONTROL AUTHORITIES]. The thesis of ELI's
work is also explored in an article prepared by Professor Robert L. Fischman while
he was on leave from ELI. See Fischman, supra note 132.
278. POLLUTION CONTROL AUTHORITIES, supra note 277, at 4 (discussing
ESA § 7(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)).
279. The ten statutes covered in the ELI report are the Clean Water Act, the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, the Toxic Substances Control
Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Clean Air Act, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, the
National Environmental Policy Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Emergency
Planning and Community Right to Know Act, and the Pollution Prevention Act.
280. POLLUTION CONTROL AUTHORITIES, supra note 277, at 5.
281. Id. at 131.
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process,282 vetoing Corps permits the EPA concludes to be
inconsistent with ESA concerns, establishing federal water
quality criteria2" that incorporate protection of species and
habitats, targeting CWA enforcement towards violators that are
believed to be adversely affecting species and habitats, and
conditioning grants to states for nonpoint source pollution
controls,284 and other programs based on ESA concerns. 2
The EPA has embraced ELI's thesis aggressively. The
agency formed an Ecosystem Protection Workgroup ('Workgroup"), which met on March 15, 1994 to outline the agency's
strategy for ecosystem protection.286 The basic finding of the
Workgroup was that "[b]ecause EPA has concentrated on
issuing permits, establishing pollutant limits, and setting
national standards, the Agency has not paid enough attention
to the overall environmental health of specific ecosystems. In
short, the EPA has been 'program-driven' rather than 'placedriven." 28 Meeting attendees outlined a variety of measures
the agency could institute in order to fulfill ELI's vision,
including reinterpreting existing laws to include biodiversity
goals, elevating biodiversity as a prominent factor in permits,
grants, and other program functions, making biodiversity a
specific budget item for programs, and reorienting the EPA
leadership towards a biodiversity conservation focus.288 The
Workgroup prescribed a six-month time frame for identifying
and evaluating regional ecosystem "demonstration area plans"
designed to implement the place-driven focus of ecosystem

282. No person may discharge pollutants to waters of the United States
without authorization pursuant to § 402 of the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(a) (1988).
283. Section 303 of the Clean Water Act provides a mechanism for
establishing ambient water quality goals. Id. § 1313. The criteria used in
establishing those goals and the effluent limitations necessary to achieve them
include "the effects of pollutants on biological community diversity." Id. §
1314(a1).
284. Section 319(h) of the Clean Water Act authorizes federal grants to
assist states in developing plans for management of nonpoint source water
pollution. Id. § 1329(h).
285. POLLUTION CONTROL AUTHORITIES, supra note 277, at 131-32.
286. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, TOWARD A PLACEDRIVEN APPROACH: THE EDGEWATER CONSENSUS ON AN EPA STRATEGY FOR
ECOSYSTEM PROTECTION (Draft 1994) [hereinafter EDGEWATER CONSENSUS]. The
conference was held in Edgewater, Maryland, thus the name of the document.
287. Id. at 1.
288. Id. at app. A.
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management.2 8 9 In short, the EPA adopted ELI's recommendations and began to implement them.
ELI's proposal, if as comprehensively implemented as EPA
appears to be headed, would fall none short of elevating EPA to
the position of biodiversity czar among federal agencies and
converting its various pollution control programs into
biodiversity conservation programs. The fallacies of that
approach are numerous. First, although some of the pollution
control statutes, particularly the CWA, contain a significant
element of habitat protection as a goal, none is principally
directed at that purpose. Squeezing the round peg of biodiversity conservation into the square hole of pollution control
programs both dilutes the basic regulatory purpose of the
statutes and creates a tenuous biodiversity conservation
authority. The central basis for pollution control authorities as
legislative enactments of common law nuisance concepts does
not support the addition of biodiversity conservation, which has
no tenable basis in common law nuisance, as a major program
component. 2" The basic resolution of the regulated communi-

289. Id. at app. C. The Workgroup's recommendations have already begun
to take hold at the program level within EPA. In late 1994 the Administrator of
EPA's Office of Water distributed an office-wide memorandum spelling out the
agency's water agenda and placing ecosystem management in a prominent
position. See Memorandum from Robert Perciasepe, Acting Administrator, EPA
Office of Water, to Employees of the National Water Program (Dec. 30, 1994) (on
file with author). Under the heading "Organize, Work and Communicate to
Protect 'Places'," the memorandum notes that "EPA is developing a multi-media
program to further institutionalize and improve ecosystem management" and
integrates virtually all of the Workgroup's recommendations for how to do so. Id.
at 4; see also 1995 EPA Water Program Will Increase Focuson ExistingInitiatives,
Staff Told in Memo [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1681 (Jan. 6, 1995).
More broadly, in early 1995 EPA's Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation
proposed a reorganization which would establish a new Ecosystems and
Communities Office to act as an "advocate for ecological consideration" throughout
all of EPA's pollution control programs. Telephone Interview with Andy Spillman,
Special Assistant to Director, Ecosystems and Community Office of OPPE (Mar.
20, 1995).
290. Pollution control statutes duplicate what otherwise could be accomplished under common law nuisance, and therefore do not impair the bundle of
rights associated with property ownership any more so than do the common law
restrictions inherent in title to property in all cases. By contrast, NEPA and
programs for the protection of endangered species, coastal zones, and wetlands
resources find no direct corollary in the common law of nuisance, and thus are
exposed to potential challenge under private property takings law. See Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Indeed, as Professor
Joseph Sax observes, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence in the property takings
arena seems intended to provide an anticipatory repudiation of any notions that
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ty to pollution control regulations, forged largely on their
common law nuisance origins, may dissolve if a strong biodiversity protection element is injected.291' Even putting those
considerations aside, however, it is difficult to imagine an
effective biodiversity conservation program emerging from

policies scattered under yet additional statutory programs.
Notwithstanding the EPA's umbrella authority over the statutes
covered in the ELI report, the ELI proposal and the EPAs

Edgewater Consensus implementation plan may do more to
balkanize biodiversity policy further than is experienced under
the existing regulatory web.
2. A Federal Ecosystems Protection Act
Based on her conclusion that the ESA provides too narrow
a focus for effective biodiversity conservation, Professor Julie
Bloch suggests that an "Ecosystems Protection Act" modeled on
the ESA, but with an expanded focus, would dramatically
improve biodiversity protection.292 Bloch proposes that the
legislation authorize a comprehensive inventory of all ecosystems in the United States and that, "[o]nce a comprehensive
national inventory has been completed, ecosystems can be
categorized according to their need for protection."293 In
essence, this ecosystem designation process is a parallel to the
ESA species listing process. Then, although the details of her

biodiversity and other "sensitive lands" theories are on equal footing with nuisance
law under the property takings calculus. See generally Sax, supra note 240, at
1441. At the same time, however, it is the Supreme Court's narrow factual
application of private property takings law that prevents any meaningful
restriction on the application of coercive biodiversity regulation. See generally
Sugameli, supra note 240, at 491-93.
291. For this reason, as Professor Tarlock has put it, "the politics of
biodiversity protection are infinitely more complex than the politics of pollution."
Tarlock, supra note 3, at 557. The focus of biodiversity policy is on the raw
development of the land, not on the consequences of the development's end uses.
In the eyes of landowners, therefore, "the potential interference with private
property is greater for programs that focus on individual landowners than for
programs designed to curb air and water pollution." Id. at 558. Hence, unlike the
pollution programs, which can rely on the Coercion model with impunity, for
biodiversity protection "the realities of federal, state, and local politics create a
need for mutual cooperation among all three levels of government." Id. at 574.
292. Julie B. Bloch, PreservingBiologicalDiversity in the United States: The
Case for Moving to an Ecosystems Approach to Protect the Nation's Biological
Wealth, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 175 (1992).
293. Id. at 218.
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proposal are fuzzy, Bloch suggests that a regulatory regime
should apply to listed ecosystems much like the ESA:
The next important step in the process would occur when
a federal, state, or individual actor wished to develop an
ecosystem designated for protection under the Act. The Act
would contain an exemption procedure similar to the procedure provided for in section 7 of the ESA. Areas listed as "hot
spots" would require a high burden of proof before development would be permitted. Areas listed as "warm spots" would
require a lesser burden. ... The criteria for granting an
exemption under the ESA could be a starting point for this
new legislation." 4
of
Bloch proposes, moreover, that the ESA and the full panoply 295
other existing biodiversity statutes would continue to apply.
Bloch suggests that the proposed new regulatory program
presents not only biological advantages over the ESA, but
"political advantages as well."2 9 She postulates that the new
law would "allow environmentalists and scientists to circumvent
the very difficult process of obtaining public support for
preserving individual species "297 and "would give greater
legitimacy to the preservationist cause," advocates of which
"seem to be trying to impose their values on the rest of society."29 Indeed, preservationists often are trying to impose
their values on the rest of society, which is precisely why the
proposed Ecosystem Protection Act does not have a chance of
succeeding. Perhaps because the backlash against programs
like the ESA and CWA section 404 had not reached its crescendo at the time she published her proposal, Bloch's political
musings are far off the mark. Given the recent experience of
the ESA in "hot spots" like central Texas, for Congress to
attempt to enact anything like the program Bloch proposes
would invite a full scale political rumble, because her proposal
amplifies rather than suppresses the fundamental shortcomings
of the Coercion model. The Ecosystem Protection Act would
depend on federal designation of ecosystems, federal permitting
of ecosystem development, and federal determination of
mitigation, and, to boot, would not supplant or replace the
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

219.
222.
220.
221.
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existing web of federal regulations that already have become
the focal point of the nonfederal regulated community's scourge.
It is hardly likely that the regulated community's strong
sentiments would be reversed by adding a new, omnipotent
regulatory regime to the picture. In short, although the
proposed Ecosystem Protection Act would, if successfully forced
upon nonfederal landowners, result in more biodiversity
conservation, the requirement that it be forced upon the
regulated community ultimately breeds its own failure.
3. A Federal Land Use Act
The boldest Coercion model biodiversity conservation
proposal to surface to date is premised on the goal that
"duplicative layers of state and federal regulation, which hinder
rational, long-term land use planning, be eliminated or
consolidated."2 99 In other words, this proposal would completely displace the state and local component of land use
control with a supreme Federal Land Use Act. Although the
proponent of this approach, Christopher A. Cole, portrays the
Federal Land Use Act as "function[ing] very much like NEPA,"30 0 in fact it would not. The shell for the proposed Federal Land Use Act would be NEPA's environmental impact review
procedure, administered by the Department of Interior rather
than CEQ and the EPA; however, from there NEPA and the
Federal Land Use Act would bear little resemblance. The
Federal Land Use Act would, in all measures, exemplify the
Coercion model.
The proposed Federal Land Use Act would create a comprehensive environmental review and permitting program for all
land development projects, not just those within NEPA's scope
of actions federally carried out, funded, or authorized. Unlike
NEPA, the Federal Land Use Act would have a powerful
substantive application to all such projects. As Cole describes
the proposal:
The [Federal Land Use Act ("LUA")] would go one step further
than NEPA by providing DOI, an agency with land use
expertise, with substantive veto power. Thus, DOI could

299. Christopher A. Cole, Species Conservation in the United States: The
Ultimate Failureof the EndangeredSpeciesAct and Other Land Use Laws, 72 B.U.
L. REv. 343, 369 (1992).
300. Id. at 374.
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compare the project's impact with its overall environmental
planning goals.
The LUA also would require private developers, regardless
of the presence of any federal nexus, to apply for development
permits....
... The agency then would be empowered to approve the
application with or without condition, to request supplementation, or to deny it. Facing a permit denial, a frustrated
applicant could bring an agency appeal. Failing at the agency
appeal level, the decision could be appealed to a federal
court.'s l
Cole thus posits the Federal Land Use Act as "nationaliz[ing] impact assessment criteria while eliminating duplicative
permit requirements." 2 The new law thus would have the
virtue, not shared by the proposed Ecosystem Protection Act, of
supplanting all other state and federal land use regulation
statutes and providing a uniform federal program in their place.
However, the proposal also would supplant all state and local
autonomy and the flexibility to adapt the regulatory program to
localized and specialized biodiversity issues. °3
To an extent, moreover, the patchwork qualities of the
existing network of environmental laws is not entirely irrational
or inefficient. There is an advantage to charging statutes and
agencies with a narrowly focused mission in order to maximize
the program's effectiveness and the agency's expertise. It is
questionable whether the DOI, despite its experience under the
ESA and other land use statutes, could establish authoritative
expertise in all aspects of land use planning or could fashion a
land use review procedure for the entire nation that effectively
accommodates all the variations and nuances experienced in
different locations and different ecosystem types. That is why
NEPA is nonsubstantive in effect and is implemented by the
various federal agencies on a program-by-program basis rather

301. Id. at 375-76 (footnotes omitted).
302. Id. at 377.
303. Although the proposal contemplates delegation of permitting authority
to the states, id. at 375-76, the history of such delegated authorities under the
existing pollution control statutes is that they remain largely subject to federal
dictate through the requirement that the state program remain at least as
stringent as and otherwise consistent with the federal standards. See Jim Haley,
EPA at Twenty: The View from the States, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer
1990, at 14. In other words, delegation to the states does not eliminate the
coercive fabric of the regulatory scheme.
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than by a single ombudsman review agency. That is also why
the substantive Coercive model statutes, such as the ESA and
CWA section 404, adopt a narrow regulatory subject focus.
In short, the regulated community is likely to perceive any
single federal agency attempting to implement the proposed
Federal Land Use Act in all its manifestations as monolithic
and immensely coercive. The proposal mistakenly blends the
broad focus of NEPA with the substantive power of the ESA,
creating an unwieldy giant of regulatory clout. The proposal
would have been closer to the mark had it borrowed the
ecosystem, listing concept of the proposed Ecosystem Protection
Act as a way of narrowing the subject matter and regulatory
focus. Then, the virtue of supplanting other permitting statutes
would have set the stage for the only other missing necessary
ingredient-state and local autonomy. Instead, given its
overbroad focus, 'immensely coercive approach, and paltry
accommodation of state and local autonomy, the proposed
Federal Land Use Act suffers irreparably from the deficiencies
of the Coercive model.
B. Economic Incentives Proposals
The response of many environmental groups to the emergence of the wise use movement has been to lash out in
counterattack. Defenders of Wildlife, however, has recognized
that the impetus for the wise use movement and the reason for
its sustaining political force was a genuine concern in the
landowning community that federal regulations had largely
divested landowners of involvement in land use decisionmaking. Thus, says the group in a recent report, although
Defenders of Wildlife "has long been a strong supporter of a
regulatory approach, . . . we have become more aware of the
limitations of a regulatory approach, particularly when dealing
with private landowners." °4 Based on their research with
economists and endangered species experts, Defenders of
Wildlife became "convinced ... that the idea of building
economic incentives into the Endangered Species Act merits
more discussion." 30 5

By "economic incentives," however, Defenders of Wildlife
means incentives designed to induce private behavior which is
304. BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES, supra note 12, at v.
305. Id.
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consistent with the goals and prescriptions of the existing
coercive regulatory structure. For example, among the proposals made in the papers are federal tax credits for habitat
improvement and ESA compliance measures and federal tax
penalties for habitat conversion,"'6 a system of tradable
development credits awarded to landowners who preserve
habitat,30 7 and a system of tiered development impact fees
designed to promote development in less environmentally
sensitive areas.30 8 All of the proposals either rely on the
existing Coercive model regulatory structure within which to
build the incentives, or replace the regulatory structure with a
financial program that duplicates the coercive effect of the
regulatory scheme.
It is not clear that the nonfederal regulated community
would perceive such incentive systems as a substantial improvement over the existing structure. Nor is it clear that society
could afford to make them think of such programs as so. To the
extent incentives lighten the financial burden of regulation,
they will induce more compliance behavior only at the margin
where noncompliance and compliance formerly were economically close in consequence. The fact will remain, however, that the
behavior of complying remains essentially nonvoluntary in that
context. Moreover, to the extent purported "incentives" in fact
are designed to increase the sting of noncompliance, such as
through tax penalties or higher impact fees for development in
habitat, they are fundamentally coercive and will only exacerbate resentment of the regulatory scheme. To work truly as
incentives promoting positive behavior, the mechanisms must
be designed to reward behavior taken in excess of that required
by law.
For an incentives program meaningfully to reverse the
deficiencies of the Coercive model, therefore, it must induce
compliance through positive economic rewards that make
biodiversity conservation more valuable to landowners than
development, without the leverage of coercive regulatory

306. See McKinney, supra note 12.
307. See Todd G. Olson et al., The HabitatTransactionMethod:A Proposal
for Creating Tradable Credits In Endangered Species Habitat, in BUILDING
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES, supra note 12, at 27.

308. See Walter Reid, Creating Incentives for Conserving Biodiversity, in
BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES, supra note 12, at 43.
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consequences. As one of the papers in the Defenders of Wildlife

publication observes:
The problem is compounded further by the way land is
evaluated in the United States. Neoclassical economics texts
continue to teach that the value of land is nothing more than
the revenue potential of its production capacity. The benchmark for land tax assessments is the "highest and best use"
to which land can be put, which means determining the
maximum likely revenue potential for each parcel of earth.
The presence of endangered species habitat on private land is
a liability that is scored in the debit column. Our task is to
convert the tremendous value our society holds for endangered
species and biodiversity into positive financial terms, so that
these valuable resources will begin to be scored in the asset
column. 0 9
One must question whether society genuinely is willing to pay

private landowners for what society values about their land to
that degree. Although there is an impressive history of public
willingness to acquire private land for public use in large blocs
devoted, in some cases, to habitat conservation,3 10 the scale of

land preservation and conservation required to accomplish a
meaningful biodiversity policy for nonfederal lands may be
orders of magnitude larger than what has ever been contem-

plated in the past.31

The steadily growing reliance by society

309. See McKinney, supra note 12, at 2.
310. For example, Congress enacted the Land and Water Conservation Fund
in 1965 to collect funds from such sources as surplus land sales and recreational
user fees and appropriate them under other applicable authorities to support
federal acquisition of authorized national park, conservation, and recreation areas
and to make recreation area acquisition grants to states and local governments.
Pub. L. No. 88-578, 78 Stat. 897 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 4601-4 to -11
(1988)). Purchase of lands for endangered species habitat, national wildlife
refuges, and wetlands preservation, as authorized in other specifically referenced
statutes, is among the allowable funding purposes provided in the Land and Water
Conservation Fund, id. § 4601-9(1), and is specifically authorized in section 5 of the
ESA. 16 U.S.C. § 1534(b) (1988).
311. For example, the ESA regional plan proposed in Austin as a measure
to place into preserve status 30,000 acres of privately owned, undeveloped urbanarea lands on which several endangered species depend is estimated to cost
upwards of $220 million to implement. See supra text accompanying note 252.
Since 1967, only about $238 million has been spent under the Land and Water
Conservation Fund for purposes of endangered species habitat preservation
pursuant to § 5(a) of the ESA. See supra note 77. In other words, funding
Austin's biodiversity initiative alone would almost match all the federal government's historical endangered species habitat preservation outlays for all species,
and even then full funding of the Austin proposal would not satisfy all the habitat
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on the Coercion model regulatory system to impose land
development restrictions, and the anathema of government to
inverse condemnation claims, suggest that it will be a long time
before society would be willing to fund an incentives system
which, working alone, will ever bring about widespread
biodiversity conservation behavior on nonfederal land.
The concept of economic incentives, however, should not be
abandoned. Indeed, there is strong evidence from a recent
report by the Northern Forest Lands Council that our present
estate and transfer tax structure is perversely inconsistent with
biodiversity conservation and that, at the very least, reform is
necessary in that and other financially related respects to weed
out those counterproductive elements.3 12 The broader question is whether economic incentives can be blended with a
regulatory approach that results in enhanced compliance
without enhanced resentment. The Coercion model is not an
appropriate candidate for that task, and economic incentives
cannot smooth over the deficiencies of the Coercion model.
Proposals to the contrary generally emanate from single-sided
interests groups who have wedded themselves irreversibly to
the Coercion model approach and portray economic incentives
as a tremendous concession to the regulated community.
Economic incentives should draw their power from the inherent
features of the market and economic responses to market forces,
not from the threat of regulatory punishment.
On the other hand, focusing the role of economic incentives
on market forces, and using such incentives as one tool within
the context of a noncoercive regulatory structure, is not to be
confused with the Cato Institute's notion of using exclusively
"noncoercive market processes" to dictate biodiversity re-

preservation goals of the various Austin area endangered species' recovery plans.
See, e.g., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Golden-Cheeked Warbler Recovery Plan 35-37
(1992) (recovery of the species from endangered and threatened status may be
attained only when viable independent populations exist in eight different
subregions of the species' range, only one of which includes the area proposed as
the Austin regional plan preserve).
312. NORTHERN FOREST LANDS COUNCIL, SUMMARY OF PUBLIC COMMENT ON
FINDING COMMON GROUND 25-29 (1994) [hereinafter COMMON GROUND]. The
Northern Forest Lands Council was conceived in 1990 as a forum for recommending management options for the 26-million acre wooded area extending across
Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York. The council's panel included
representatives from the United States Forest Service, state government,
landowners, industry, and environmental groups. Id. at 23.
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suits.3 13 A complete abdication of federal regulation to the so-

called free market would remove biodiversity goals as a direct
economic incentive or disincentive for any nonfederal landowner
in making land use decisions. Biodiversity might benefit or
perish indirectly as the consequence of decisions made to
maximize, for example, market value, resource use value, and

development potential of land, but such "noncoercive market
processes" do not lead to any particular biodiversity outcome.
For example, the owner of a forest might manage it from the
perspective of sustainable income in ways which, as an indirect

consequence of that approach, benefit the sustained existence
of certain species in the forest ecosystem. As demonstrated by
the Tragedy of the Commons paradigm, 14 however, we cannot

expect the unfettered operation of human economic incentives
always to result in biodiversity results, or even economic
results, which we desire as a society. Both the Coercion model,
in its response to the perceived ravages of the marketplace, and
the "noncoercive market processes" model, in its response to the
perceived ravages of government command and control styles of
regulation, "underestimate the prospects of cooperation getting
started in human endeavors" 15 and thus serving as the
framework both for regulatory responses and for economic
incentives.
When a broader vision is used, therefore, the Cooperation

model rises to the top of the list as a mechanism for enhancing
the effect of economic incentives in a noncoercive setting. For

example, conspicuously absent from the Northern Forest Lands

313. See Fitzsimmons, supra note 15, at 23.
314. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
Hardin demonstrated how, in the absence of concerted cooperation and management, individual users sharing a common resource, such as a grazing land or
fishing area, are likely to deplete the common resource to their mutual disadvantage simply by each individually attempting to maximize personal gain from the
resource.
315. RODGERS, supra note 163, at 41. Professor Rodgers observes that there
are "countless examples of successful strategies of communities that have escaped
from the trap of the tragedy of the commons-lobster fishing in Maine, cattle
grazing in the Alps, rice cultivation in Bali . .. and many others .... The two
solutions urged in the simple models-complete government control and
untrammeled privatization-are prominent only in the minds of analysts." Id. at
41-42. My thesis is simply that, given the innate propensity of humans to
cooperate in the face of such resource depletion questions, our regulatory structure
should do as much as possible to take advantage of that propensity rather than
dictate the outcome through coercive regulation.
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Council report, which unquestionably is the most comprehensive study to date of the role of economic factors in biodiversity
conservation, is any sweeping proposal for more regulation and
more coercion of private land uses. Instead, the report is
teeming with calls for more cooperative structures to allow land

use decisions to be made through mechanisms relying on state
and local autonomy and cooperation with private landowners.116 It is through such a Cooperative model structure that
the report advocates economic incentives, particularly relief
from counterproductive income and inheritance taxes, as
playing an important positive role. 17 Hence, the federal
biodiversity conservation program should eschew economic
incentives as a means of ameliorating the Coercion model's
pernicious effects, but should consider relying on economic
incentives as one tool for promoting compliance behavior
through a Cooperative model approach.

316. Of the 33 specific recommendations made in Common Ground, not one
calls for increased scope or intensity of coercive regulation. One recommendation
advises that 'Is]tate agencies should periodically review the effectiveness of
administrative rules regarding business, land use and the environment, using a
process that involves all interested parties." COMMON GROUND, supra note 312,
at 66. Another recommendation is that "[s]tate agencies should develop and
implement innovative approaches to simplify and stabilize the regulatory process."
Id. at 67. The report also called for states to "conduct objective assessments of
existing ... regulations, to evaluate their adequacy in protecting wood supply,
water quality, aesthetics, recreational opportunities, forest health, and biological
resources." Id. at 44. With respect to biodiversity conservation generally, the
report recommended merely that "[sItates should develop a process to conserve and
enhance biodiversity across the landscape." Id. at 31. All other recommendations
dealt with economic and tax incentives, public funding strategies, information
gathering and exchange, and educational programs. For a thorough examination
of the Northern Forest Lands Council's recommendations in the context of
ecosystem management policy on private lands, particularly in their rejection of
coeicion model approaches, see Lee Breckenridge, Reweaving the Landscape: The
Institutional Challenges of Ecosystem Management for Lands in Private
Ownership, 19 VT. L. REV. 363 (1995).
317. Seven of the report's 33 recommendations deal with improvements to
tax policies. Id. at 9-13, 25-30, 39-41. The GAO has identified as one of the major
'economic obstacles to biodiversity conservation those "[flederal and state income
and inheritance taxes [which] generally do not distinguish between landowners
who undertake costly actions supporting desired ecological goals and those who do
not." ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT, supra note 10, at 59. For a complete evaluation
of the tax policy recommendations, see Janet E. Milne, Timber Taxes: A Critique
of the Northern ForestLands Council's Tax Recommendations, 19 VT. L. REV. 423
(1995).
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C. Information and PlanningProposals
The only proposal for a unified federal biodiversity conservation program for nonfederal lands that has seen the light of day
in Congress relies on an expansion of NEPA procedures to
embrace biodiversity goals. The proposed National Biological
Diversity, Conservation, and Environmental Research Act,
introduced in the 103d and previous Congresses, is intended to
establish a national policy for biodiversity conservation through
support of environmental research and by establishing coordination mechanisms. Like NEPA, the bill is predicated on broad
findings and goals. The bill correctly recognizes that "existing
laws and programs relevant to the loss of biological diversity in
the United States are largely uncoordinated and inadequate,
and sometimes result in duplication of efforts, conflicts in goals,
and gaps in geographic and taxonomic coverage."" i ' Despite
its call for a "comprehensive and coordinated Federal strategy"3 19 to address those defects, however, the bill would do very
little that is not already being done by one agency or another
under one of the existing biodiversity regulation statutes. For
example, the bill would establish a National Center for
Biological Diversity and Conservation Research to compile
information on biodiversity, 20 something the National Biological Survey already is accomplishing.321 The bill would amend
NEPA to require CEQ's rules to mandate consideration in EISs
of the effect the federal action would have on biodiversity
values,"2 something CEQ has already begun through its
NEPA initiatives." s Hence, as one commentator has observed, "[1]ike NEPA itself, the bill is more symbolic than
substantive. It would create a large, and probably unnecessary,
federal bureaucracy."3 24 Although the measures outlined in
the bill are a necessary component of a federal biodiversity

318. H.R. 305, 103d Cong., lt Sess. § 2(9) (1993). The legislative initiative
largely would have implemented recommendations the Office of Technology and
Assessment had made years earlier. See TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 4, at 11-22.
319. H.R. 305, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(10).
320. Id. § 9.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
322. H.R. 305, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(b)-(f).
323. See supra text accompanying notes 184-88.
324. Doremus, supra note 2, at 327. For other commentary on the proposed
legislation, see Carlson, supra note 178, at 23-26.
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conservation program, they would fall far short of all that is
necessary.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR BIODIVERSITY'S FUTURE-USING THE
FEDERAL COOPERATION MODEL AS A NEW BEGINNING

And now for something completely different."
The assessment of the three regulatory models demonstrates
that the Cooperation model poses the greatest promise of
achieving the goals of a unified federal biodiversity conservation
program for nonfederal lands. Unfortunately, meaningful
biodiversity program proposals to date generally have not
adopted the Cooperation model; rather, Congress had timidly
relied on the Coordination model, proposing weak information
gathering and procedural review measures, whereas environmental advocates, particularly in legal literature, have exhibited strong devotion to the Coercion model.
Only one other commentator, Holly Doremus, has suggested
the virtues the Cooperative model would offer to a federal
biodiversity conservation program. 26 She advocates adoption
of a "Representative Ecosystems Act" sharing most of the
Coercion model qualities of Bloch's proposed "Ecosystem
Protection Act." 2 ' In classic understatement, however, she
acknowledges that the coercive elements of such proposals are
"likely to arouse organized political opposition,"" and thus
she suggests that:
Perhaps the best model for the [Representative Ecosystems
Act] would be one of federal-state cooperation. The federal
government should develop an overview of ecosystems, and

designate those most in need of protection. States should
retain a local management role, provided they meet federal

standards.

States could be afforded some flexibility with

regard to what portions of ecosystems to protect and what

activities to allow in protected areas, within federal specifications.3

325. Segue line used often in the BBC television series Monty Python's
Flying Circus.
326. Doremus, supra note 2.
327. Id. at 323-26.
328. Id. at 326.
329. Id. at 323.
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That is the extent of Doremus's exploration of the Cooperative
model, however, and even in that sparse detail the proposal is
too stingy in the degree of autonomy it accords to state and
local governments. Although Doremus should be credited as
being almost alone among commentators thus far in allowing
for the possibility of some departure from the Coercion model,
there has yet to be a proposal for a federal biodiversity conservation program for nonfederal lands based principally and
enthusiastically on the Cooperation model.
The point of the Cooperation model proposal made in this
article, therefore, is to offer an alternative to the existing
regulatory web which has a meaningful chance of being
biologically and politically effective. The proposal depends on
a blend of federal objectives, state and local autonomy, and
regulatory flexibility to achieve those dual purposes. The
proposal recognizes, however, that it is unlikely that biodiversity conservation on nonfederal lands will ever be delivered in
significant measure through completely voluntary behavior by
the regulated community.' Hence, the proposal uses the existing
regulatory structure as leverage to promote state and local
governments and the private sector to explore consensus-based
alternatives with real biological results. Where the regulated
community takes advantage of the measures outlined in this
proposal, thus opting out of the existing regulatory structure, it
will be in a position to deliver more biodiversity conservation
value to society for less regulatory headache to itself, and for no
more cost.
The proposal calls for a unified federal biodiversity conservation statute, the Biological Resources Zone Management Act
("BRZMA"), centered around three stages of biodiversity
conservation management: (1) state identification, inventory,
and nomination of biological 'resource zones; (2) local and
private development, and federal approval, of biological resource
zone management plans; and (3) implementation of the
management plan in lieu of the existing federal regulatory
structure. The first stage allows states to identify areas of
biological resources which are in need of protection and which
may present controversial issues if those protective measures
are carried out through the existing coercive federal regula-
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tions 3" The second stage allows the local and private entities potentially most at risk of bearing the brunt of federal
regulation to develop a comprehensive management plan for the
biological resources zone, knowing that it must not only meet
their needs, but also the federal objectives of biodiversity
conservation.33 ' The third stage provides the reward to the
state, local, and private interests for their expenditure of time
and effort and their commitment to the plan-complete relief
from all the headaches of the existing federal structure,
including the multiple permitting requirements, inflexible and
overlapping regulatory standards, different agencies and
policies, and never-ending litigation. The first two elements,
which draw from such existing programs as the CZMA and the
CWA National Estuary Program, are what set the proposal
apart from other biodiversity conservation legislation proposals
made thus far; the third element, which has no corollary in the
existing federal structure, sets the proposal apart from anything
ever ventured in federal environmental law, but which is
needed if the federal government expects its "partners" to feel
and act like partners.
A. BiologicalResource Zones
The BRZMA procedure for identifying biological resource
zones ("BRZ"s) would codify the efforts of the National Biological Service and similar state institutions to develop a standard
ecosystem inventory and evaluation system. The research from
those efforts would amass a baseline of information regarding
the locations and conditions of biological resources comprising
the principal biodiversity components. A specific purpose of the
research would be to describe BRZs within each state corresponding to local and regional ecosystems requiring the greatest
levels of protection because they are unique, sensitive, or
threatened.

330. The GAO identifies ecosystem delineation as a problematic process, but
also as a prerequisite to effective biological conservation management. See
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT, supra note 10, at 42-48.
331. According to the GAO, development of a management plan involves
examining "(1) the desired future ecological conditions, (2) the types, levels, and
mixes of activities that can be sustained while still achieving these conditions, and
(3) the distribution of these activities over time among the various land units
within the ecosystem." Id at 49.
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Some BRZs may require or justify no further protection.
For those, the existing web of federal regulation would remain
in place to check any serious decline and alert the state in the
future to the need to take the BRZMA process to the next step
of nomination. Other BRZs, of course, would emerge from the
identification stage as immediate candidates for nomination.
The nomination process would resemble the National Estuary
Plan process, under which a state may request that the EPA
convene an estuary management conference. The BRZ nomination process would require a state to demonstrate three
conditions to the Secretary of the Interior: (1) the BRZ is
comprised principally of nonfederal lands and is geographically
well defined for purposes of evaluating its biological resources
and ecological boundaries; (2) the BRZ is either unique,
unusually sensitive to natural or human disturbances, or
currently subject to substantial threat of decline;332 and (3) a
majority of the local jurisdictions within the BRZ boundaries
have confirmed a preference for the BRZMA process and will
contribute, along with the state, up to half of the funding
necessary for development of a biological resources zone
management plan. These three conditions will ensure that the
BRZ is a definable entity which will benefit from focused
management efforts, and that the impetus for such efforts
comes from local interests. If either of those elements is
missing, there is either no use or no need for the BRZMA
process.
When a BRZ falls within more than one state, the nomination process would allow one state to request that the Secretary
of the Interior convene a conference of the affected states to
determine which states wish to participate in the BRZMA
process. No state should be forced into the process, however,
and thus in the event any state opts not to participate the
remaining states would be required to design and defend the
nomination for the BRZ area within their jurisdictions.

332. Although evidence that an ecosystem is threatened by anthropogenic
forces clearly would be relevant to the nomination process, the determination of
ecosystem eligibility could be based on a finding of vulnerability resulting
exclusively from natural phenomena, such as the impermanence of midsuccessional forests, the oligotrophic conditions of many freshwater systems, the
undersaturated populations found in desert springs and glacial lakes, and the
isolation of island and mountaintop populations. See THREATS TO BIODIVERSITY,
supra note 27, at 21-23.
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The Secretary would evaluate the BRZ nomination based on
the three principal criteria only according to the best available
scientific information regarding the biological need for and
benefits of the BRZMA process relative to biological resources
in the defined area. In other words, other than the ministerial
act of confirming the commitment of local jurisdictions to
participate, the Secretary would have no discretion to reject a
nomination on political or policy grounds. In the event the
Secretary rejects the nomination, that decision would be
appealable to the members of the Endangered Species Committee provided for in the ESA," who would comprise the
BRZMA Committee. Acceptance of the nomination would
commit the federal government to finance at least one-half of
the cost of developing the BRZ management plan.
B. Biological Resource Zone Management Plans
Once a BRZ nomination is approved, the governor of each
state within which the BRZ is located would appoint a lead
state agency to administer the management plan development
and a committee of local officials comprised of one representative from each local political subdivision within which the BRZ
is located. In the case of a multi-state BRZ, the designated
state agencies would serve as planning liaisons.
Working closely with private interests, the BRZ management plan process would initiate an in-depth inventory of
geographic, biological, and socioeconomic factors relevant to
planning land and resource uses within the BRZ, including the
location of biological resources, land uses, growth trends,
resource development trends, existing preserve areas, and
future preserve opportunities. This "map" would be used to
identify areas of particular concern in terms of biological
sensitivity, land use trends, and threat to resources, similar to
the CZMA process for identifying special management areas.
The next planning step would involve an evaluation of how
the present legal framework would apply to the conditions
disclosed in the resource and land use assessment. The point
333. The Endangered Species Committee is authorized to grant exemptions
to the prohibition federal agencies face against jeopardizing the continued
existence of a species listed under the ESA. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(p) (1988). The
Committee consists of the Secretaries of Agriculture, the Army, and the Interior,
the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, the EPA Administrator, the
NOAA Administrator, and one individual from each affected state. Id. §1536(eX3).
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of such an evaluation would be to determine where existing
regulations may be inadequate to achieve necessary levels of
protection and where they may be too extreme. Also, the
process of applying the existing regulations demonstrates to the
planning entities and private interests the likely effects on local
economic and growth factors of not participating in the BRZMA
process. It may turn out that the existing regulatory structure
is meeting biodiversity conservation goals adequately without
generating local and private controversy, in which case the full
BRZMA process may be unnecessary or premature. At least in
those cases the biological resources will have benefited from the
increased level of information available for future assessments,
and the local and private sectors will have benefited from the
increased awareness of the operation of the existing federal
laws.
In the event the legal evaluation points to the need for
further BRZMA procedures, the next step would involve a
comprehensive land planning process designating the types of
land use controls, from none to preservation, applicable
throughout the BRZ. Controls applicable in any particular
area, and in the BRZ generally, could not significantly depart
from the existing regulatory consequences, either more or less
stringently, without adequate biological or economic justification. Implicit in this process is the possibility that lands
previously unregulated, such as uplands adjacent to wetlands,
could be subject to new land use controls. Also implicit,
however, is the possibility that lands subject to existing
regulation under the ESA, section 404, the CZMA, and similar
laws, but which offer little biodiversity value in comparison to
their socioeconomic development value, might no longer be
subject to such regulation. Thus, a small stand of trees offering
potential habitat to an endangered bird may not be protected if
it lies in the path of development and other more productive
habitat areas are available for preservation within the BRZ.
The BRZ management plan would designate a state-level
authority for administering the land use controls through a
permitting review procedure.
The last planning step would involve developing a financing
system for preserve acquisition and for compensating landowners for any increased regulatory burdens. Because the entire
economy within the BRZ is likely to benefit from the long-term
certainty and reduced regulatory strings offered by the BRZMA
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process,3 3 4 it is appropriate to require that state and local

public financing constitute a substantial share, at least half.
Also, because a successful BRZ management plan will relieve
the federal government of many regulatory burdens, federal
funding should also constitute a significant portion. Privatesector financing through development fees, recreational user
fees, and similar mechanisms could generate additional
funds."3 5 Incentives to private landowners, such as transferable development rights and land swaps, could also induce
compliance at affordable levels and provide appropriate

334. For example, in connection with its consideration of participating in the
regional habitat conservation planning effort underway in Austin, Texas pursuant
to § 10(a) of the ESA, see supra notes 243-62 and accompanying text, Travis
County, Texas commissioned a study comparing the economic impact of the
regional approach to the economic impact over the 20-year life of the regional plan
of continuing ESA permitting on a piecemeal, individual project-by-project basis.
Gau & Jarrett, supra note 71, at 1-2. The report concluded that the regional
approach could result in up to 39,000 more jobs, up to $439 million in property tax
revenue, and $300 million less in compliance costs, for a possible net benefit of
over $700 million. Id. at 1-10 to 1-12. Not only were those economic advantages
potentially to be reaped, but FWS's whole objective in promoting the plan was
based on the extensive evidence that it would also prove superior for the
endangered species in question, notwithstanding that the regional plan would
facilitate development. Id. at 1-12. Hence, there is every reason to expect that the
potential for win-win outcomes that could be experienced under ESA-style regional
planning would be duplicated under the BRZMA approach, only without the
contentious, adversarial element that has burdened the ESA regional planning
effort as a result of its essentially coerced origins. Indeed, notwithstanding the
tremendous expected economic and biological benefits of the Austin regional plan,
it remains, over 2500 days after the planning effort began, still no more than a
plan faced with intense opposition by some state, local, and private figures who
perceive it as fundamentally coercive in nature, a perception that is difficult to
dispute. See supra text accompanying notes 260-62.
335. For example, though the effort failed as a result of legislative calendar
deadlines, a bill proposed in the Texas legislature would have generated sufficient
funding for the Austin regional plan through the imposition of modest development fees added to the local platting and permitting process for all new development in the planning area. See Tex. S.B. 880, 73rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (1993). The
initiative recognized that the regional plan would have facilitated economic
activity generally throughout the planning area, see supra note 334, and thus it
was equitable to impose fees throughout the planning area. S.B. 880. By
spreading the economic burden as broadly as the economic benefit, no individual
project faced onerous fees, and the total amount of funding needed to acquire the
habitat preserves which were the basis of the regional ESA permit would have
been generated swiftly. Unfortunately, after that bill failed to reach a vote within
the legislative deadline, the fragile consensus which had formed dissolved, and
later funding proposals have focused the brunt of private sector funding on a more
limited universe of development projects. See supra text accompanying notes 248
and 260.
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compensation to private entities for accepting any increased
regulatory burdens. The goal of the financing system would be
to finance fair market value acquisition of all land areas needed
to satisfy the BRZMA plan approval criteria discussed below,
and to put no private entity in any worse position than had the
existing regulatory structure been applied, taking into account,
of course, that the costs of complying with the existing system
will no longer apply.
Once the BRZ management plan is developed and approved
at the state level, the state (or states) would submit the plan to
the BRZMA Committee."'6 The BRZMA Committee shall
operate and vote according to the ESA procedures for the
Endangered Species Committee. Approval of a BRZ management plan would be required if the BRZMA Committee finds
that: (1) the BRZ nomination continues to satisfy the BRZ
nomination criteria; (2) the BRZ management plan promotes
biodiversity conservation on the whole within the BRZ boundaries at least as adequately as would be the case under existing
federal laws; (3) private property and other economic interests
on the whole within the BRZ boundaries bear no significantly
greater regulatory or financial burdens under the BRZ management plan than they would under existing regulations; and (4)
financing for the implementation of the BRZ management plan
is adequate and reasonably assured for the foreseeable future.
These approval criteria import the biological protection
elements of the existing regulatory structure, but allow them to
be distributed within the "bubble" of the BRZMA management
plan area in the way that makes the most sense for the
area. 3 7 The BRZMA Committee's decision would be subject

336. Because the delineation of a BRZ is principally a biological and
information planning question within the expertise of the Department of the
Interior, the BRZ nomination approval decision is delegated to the Secretary of the
Interior alone. By contrast, the BRZ management plan approval process includes
a broader array of criteria, including economic impacts, and thus is appropriate
for consideration by the full BRZMA Committee.
337. Precedent for such an approach is found in the Clean Air Act "bubble
policy," which allows a facility to have its air pollutant emissions measured as if
an imaginary single-vented bubble covers the facility, rather than measuring
emissions at each real vent or emission point. That policy has been supported as
a successful example of "seek[ing] to accommodate progress in reducing air
pollution with economic growth." Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under the bubble policy, if two pieces of machinery emit
similar pollutant loads and would be subject to similar emission limits if
independently regulated, the facility operator may weight its devotion of pollution
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to the same judicial review provisions that apply to decisions of

the Endangered Species Committee.
C. In with the New, Out with the Old
According to the GAO study, one of the major impediments
to implementing federal biodiversity conservation policy on
nonfederal lands has been the "spotty ... often contradictory,

laws and regulations," which result in private landowners
having to "comply with the rules of multiple governments,
multiple agencies, and multiple purposes-different authorities
with competing and often conflicting directives on protecting

water quality, wildlife habitat, [and] fish habitat."338 GAO
suggests that this condition "poses tremendous institutional
challenges to coordinated landscape-level management" and
requires that we "examine how and where laws interact and
conflict, who is affected, and possible ways of reconciling

priorities."339 Although GAO should be credited with recognizing this phenomenon, the better approach is not to find ways
of managing and reconciling the statutory chaos, but rather to

find ways of eliminating it altogether in the first instance.
Upon approval of a BRZ management plan, therefore, no
provisions of the ESA, CWA section 404, the CZMA, or NEPA
would apply within the BRZ except insofar as the BRZMA
management plan specifically incorporates them. Moreover,

although other environmental laws, such as the pollution
control statutes discussed in the EPA's Edgewater Consensus,
control technology to the piece of machinery which will respond more efficiently,
so long as the combined emissions achieved through that method are less than or
equal to what the independently mandated limits would have been when
combined. The effect of such a policy is to allow the facility to make the most
economically efficient production and pollution control choices for the facility as
a whole, while still achieving the same total pollutant emission levels emitted from
the "bubble" as would be experienced under a point-by-point disaggregated
measuring system. See generally Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart,
Reforming EnvironmentalLaw, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985); Robert W. Hahn &
Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based EnvironmentalRegulation: A New Era from
an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991). Similarly, if the BRZMA management
plan can provide the same or a greater level of protection for resources overall
within the "bubble" defined by the BRZ as would be experienced under the
scenario of individualized projects seeking a variety of permits and authorizations
under the existing web of regulatory programs, it makes sense to allow the state
and local jurisdictions to distribute the regulatory impacts within the "bubble" in
the manner most efficient for maximizing the local economic and planning goals.
338. ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT, supra note 10, at 57.
339. Id. at 58.
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would continue to apply within the BRZ, biological resource
considerations would no longer be relevant decision-making
factors for actions carried out, funded, or approved under such
laws. The very point of the BRZ management plan is to meld
all the biodiversity conservation goals and protections of all
existing federal statutes into one plan and allow that plan to
take over as the exclusive biodiversity conservation regulatory
mechanism for the BRZ area. The BRZ management plan
would also, therefore, preempt state and local laws from adding
any biodiversity conservation requirements through other
regulatory mechanisms.
These features are simply the
necessary corollaries to the use of a "bubble" approach to how
regulatory impacts are distributed within the BRZ. 34 They
undoubtedly would be the most controversial among proponents
of stronger regulatory responses; however, they are the kind of
measures that will be necessary in order to break out of the
Coercion model mold.
Permitting of nonfederal actions under a BRZ management
plan thus would be as simple as demonstrating compliance with
the plan requirements. Projects would have to deal with only
one permitting entity, and would know well in advance of
project development what regulatory standards and financial
341
burdens would apply. Permitting of direct federal actions
under the plan would require a consistency review finding
similar to the CZMA process.
Because of the possibility that factors taking place outside
the BRZ could affect resources or land use decisions within the
BRZ, a BRZ management plan would be subject to ten-year
reviews in which the state or any other member of the BRZMA
Committee could request reopening of the BRZ management
plan for amendment. An amendment to a plan could be based

340. In other words, this approach is analogous to the Clean Air Act bubble
policy approach of not applying otherwise applicable emission limits to individual
emission points within a facility operating under the bubble. It would defeat the
purposes of the bubble policy to continue to apply individualized point source
emission limits within the facility bubble. Similarly, it would defeat the purpose
of the BRZMA management plan to continue to apply the ESA, § 404, NEPA, the
CZMA, and the biological impact review components of other environmental laws
unabated within the BRZ bubble.
341. The category of direct federal actions subject to the consistency review
would be limited to actions carried out by federal agencies. Nonfederal projects
authorized or funded by federal agencies would be treated as would any other
nonfederal action.
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only on a finding that the plan no longer satisfies the BRZMA
management plan approval criteria, and could result in no
additional uncompensated regulatory burdens on private
landowners. Of course, an amendment could not diminish the
biological protections intended to be afforded by the BRZMA
management plan.
Finally, enforcement of a BRZ management plan with
respect to nonfederal entities would take place exclusively
through the plan's state administrative entity using whatever
measures the state provides in the plan. No federal citizen suit
action would be available against alleged nonfederal violators,
but would be available against federal actors alleged to have
violated the plan. Only in the event that the BRZMA Committee finds that the state administrative entity is not adequately
enforcing the plan could the federal government take action to
enforce the plan, including instituting proceedings to rescind
plan approval.
CONCLUSION

I need a pizza break.3"
Many details of the proposed Biological Resources Zone
Management Act would need to be developed further before it
could be seriously proposed as a legislative measure for
managing biodiversity conservation on nonfederal lands. The
point of this article principally is to demonstrate the need to
wean ourselves off of the Coercion model, not to write the
regulations that would implement the BRZMA. At that broader
level, this article has shown that, even in the short lifespan of
federal biodiversity policy, the inherent limitations of the Coercion model have already begun to manifest themselves in failed
efforts such as that experienced in Austin, Texas, and that we
must make room for a paradigm-shifting initiative such as the
BRZMA in order to displace the present coercive, confused
structure of federal biodiversity conservation law with a unified
statute relying on the Cooperation model for its energy and
effectiveness.

342. Favorite line of the character Michaelangelo from the television cartoon
series Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles, uttered when he is fed up with whatever
predicament he and his fellow turtles are facing.

672

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

A strong federal presence in shaping our national response
to biodiversity conservation clearly is needed. The present
federal system for defining that policy, however, is in danger of
disintegrating as a result of uncoordinated regulatory efforts
and overzealous application of unbridled regulatory powers.
Areas such as Austin offer prime examples of the need for a
focused federal plan that does not rely on focused federal power.
Austin is an area as rich in biological diversity as any, but
which poses all the complications of regulating in the realm of
nonfederal interests. The approach the federal government has
taken thus far in Austin has been largely coercive and has
backfired as a result. One would be hard-pressed to find
anyone involved in the Austin regional habitat planning
experience who would not take the opportunity to turn back the
clock and start over with a fresh approach.
We don't need more Austins. We need a break from strongarm federal regulations. We need a solution that does not rely
on yet more and strengthened Coercive model regulation. But
we also need federal policy to guide the process. The fresh
approach proposed in this article for doing so relies more on the
Cooperative model of regulation than any other biodiversity
conservation proposal offered to date.
The Cooperative model, as embodied in the proposed
BRZMA, offers as much if not more biological resource protection than does the fractured Coercive model approach, and does
so in a flexible manner posing no added regulatory or financial
burden to the nonfederal sector on the whole. To be sure,
developing a management plan as outlined under the BRZMA
would be time consuming, controversial, and expensive in its
own right, but the product would be a long-term structure
offering benefits to the biological and regulated communities.
We cannot afford, in terms of money, environmental health,
and political stability, to allow federal biodiversity conservation
policy for nonfederal lands to be carried out any longer by the
present structure. Its myopic emphasis on regulation through
coercive mechanisms will not produce meaningful biodiversity
conservation without an unacceptable human-factor cost. We
have discovered, painfully, that humanity is a "context for the
global ecology,"3"s and thus everything we do affects the global
system's biodiversity. By the same token, the global ecology is
343.

COHEN & STEWART, supra note 17, at 389.
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a context for humanity, and thus everything relating to the
global ecology affects humanity. An effective biodiversity policy
must stay aware of both contexts if it is to succeed in both.

